Introduction
Following the announcement on 15 January that TikTok would be banned in the United States on 19 January 2025, hundreds of thousands of TikTok users migrated, and continue to migrate, to XiaoHongShu (‘Little Red Book’, or ‘RedNote’). XiaoHongShu is a Chinese app with a format similar to TikTok, which became the #1 most downloaded app [1] on the Appstore, with 700,000 Western users joining in just two days. On 24 January, 4 days after President Trump repealed the short-lived ban, XiaoHongShu remained at #8 on the Appstore, evidencing its enduring popularity even with the return of TikTok.
This Insight investigates how Western extremists, including neo-Nazis, white supremacists and participants in Saints Culture, capitalised on the migration to XiaoHongShu. They rapidly started sharing extremist content, and even using Chinese language text to pose as Chinese netizens or be understood by a Chinese audience. Chinese netizens’ responses were largely negative, including some grassroots activist reporting of offensive content. Additionally, many monitored far-right extremist accounts and posts were removed within the first week of the migration, indicating that Chinese moderators were aware of and restricting the extremist activity, despite the unprecedented surge in English-language users.
Background
The migration of so-called ‘TikTok Refugees’ resulted in a mass cultural exchange moment. Western users of the app expressed appreciation for XiaoHongShu and its Chinese population, as well as disapproval of perceived American censorship and anti-China rhetoric. The Chinese government’s official response was broadly positive, in line with its warmer rhetoric on US-China friendship ahead of Donald Trump’s inauguration on 20 January. Furthermore, the migration was seen to constitute a public relations win for China and an embarrassment for the United States.
On the other hand, Western social media platforms, including X, Meta platforms, and Whatsapp, are banned in China, which has long maintained a so-called ‘Great Firewall of China’ to restrict undesired outside influences on its netizens. Furthermore, China’s Cyberspace Administration told XiaoHongShu that it should prevent Chinese users from viewing Western content. Although this did not happen, as demonstrated by Chinese users’ continuing interactions with Western content on XiaoHongShu, it can be deduced that Trump’s reversal of the TikTok ban stemmed the number of permanent migrants and the potential of a more extensive merging of US and Chinese online space. Nonetheless, as of March 2025, some ten weeks after the migration, Western TikTok migrants – including extremist accounts – were still active on XiaoHongShu.
While most interactions between Western and Chinese netizens were positive, Western extremists also participated in the migration. Neo-Nazi and white supremacist accounts sought to establish themselves on the app and proliferate extremist content. They have posted content which glorifies terrorists alongside conceivably non-ideological glorification of mass shooters, known as ‘True Crime Community’ (TCC) content. A much smaller number of jihadist accounts have been identified as well.
Neo-Nazi and White Supremacist Accounts on XiaoHongShu
TikTok has a well-documented and enduring problem with far-right extremists exploiting the platform to spread hateful and violent content. It is unsurprising that those users should capitalise on the opportunity to propagate themselves on a platform with little experience in regulating Western far-right extremist content, and where Western ‘migrants’ and a new audience of Chinese users could be exposed to their content.
Figure 1. Neo-Nazi posts on XiaoHongShu. Right: clip from the Christchurch massacre livestream. Chinese comment from a user with the name of a mass shooter reads: “This is already a Qing Dynasty video.”
Some neo-Nazi accounts were registered to IP addresses in China, had Chinese-language usernames, and communicated with each other in Chinese. However, most of their captions and interactions were in fluent English, and the accounts’ first posts appeared within the initial few days of the TikTok-XiaoHongShu migration. These features suggest that they were likely Western far-right extremists using Chinese IP’s and language to pose as Chinese netizens.
In one now-deleted post, a Soviet meme is reproduced to portray Western-Chinese far-right solidarity. The white/Western man says “TMD, Mr Lee?” to his counterpart, while captions include neo-Nazi references [2]. TMD is code for ‘Total Muslim Death’. The post is notable for its mixing of Chinese language text with far-right extremist lingo such as “vril” and “TJD”
Figure 2. Saints Culture (left) and neo-Nazi (right) posts.
Far-right accounts racked up dozens and sometimes over 100 followers in the first week of the TikTok migration, rapidly sharing extremist content that garnered tens and even hundreds of likes within days.
Some content, as shown in Figure 2 (right), used Chinese in an apparent attempt to communicate to Chinese netizens. Such posts largely did not receive positive engagement from bonafide Chinese accounts. It is possible that the use of Chinese was performative rather than a strategic agenda to appeal to Chinese audiences or that the extremists lost interest in the face of negative and confused feedback.
Jihadists and pro-Kremlin Accounts
Islamic State supporter accounts identified had much fewer followers, less content and smaller networks than their neo-Nazi/white supremacist counterparts. There was also relatively little violent content, although some Saints Culture accounts incorporated the symbols of Islamic State in appreciation of their use of violence.
Figure 3. Islamic State posts and supporter accounts on XiaoHongShu.
The author also identified some accounts which posted content in line with pro-Kremlin narratives, but from Chinese IP addresses, as well as one Wagner Group account. However, these accounts were present on XiaoHongShu before the TikTok migration beginning on 15 January 2025. Unlike some Western countries, China does not officially sanction Wagner Group. It should be noted that such content is also available on TikTok, despite the fact that TikTok is subject to the law of countries which do sanction Wagner Group, some of which have proscribed them as a designated terror group.
Figure 4. Left: pro-Kremlin narrative post. Middle: pro-Wagner Group/recruitment post. Right: Wagner Group logo used at the end of a Saints Culture clip of the Christchurch shooting, probably in reverence for the group’s reputation for violence.
Chinese Netizen Engagement: Confusion, Support, and Resistance
Extremist posts appeared to have limited engagement from Chinese netizens. Comments included confusion, for example, over the Nazi swastika (“What is that thing in the sky?”) or the glorification of mass shooters. One post celebrating mass shooter Randy Stair had two comments appreciating the perpetrator’s good looks from Chinese netizens who otherwise showed no indication of far-right ideological affinity; another glorifying Brenton Tarrant received a Chinese comment objecting to the glorification of guns, seemingly unaware of the ideological subtext. One Chinese language post with a Japanese IP address asked for clarification on Western far-right extremist terms it had seen (“Vril” and “Groypers”); comments from other Chinese netizens explained the white supremacist context.
Figure 5. Right: XiaoHongShu users confused by Western far-right extremist terms. Left: Chinese netizens leave positive comments on a mass shooter glorification post, apparently unaware of the connotations.
However, some accounts more actively criticised the extremist content. On one antisemitic neo-Nazi post, a Chinese user wrote, “They didn’t expect China doesn’t welcome racists. We all think they’re like rats in the gutter.”
Figure 6. Chinese netizens respond negatively to neo-Nazi posts and comments on XiaoHongShu.
In a post by the same user [3], which said “Fascists are not welcome here” in both English and Chinese, comments debated over the best way to manage the issue of Western far-right extremist users on XiaoHongShu. One Chinese user questioned the purpose of debating racists, and the original poster concurred: “It’s fine, we’ve reported them a lot and also contacted the authorities. I think only when the authorities step in to control can such issues be resolved” [4]. Another comment said: “Our fellow citizens should not join in racist arguments and give them traffic. Report them directly.” Two Western commenters expressed “comfort” at seeing the Chinese post.
Figure 7. Chinese users respond to far-right presence on XiaoHongShu. Left post: “Recently discovered that many white supremacists and far-right individuals from abroad have mixed into Chinese online spaces. Please look out for profile pictures with symbols like VRIL, Groyper, or similar fonts, and report them immediately!”
However, some Chinese users were more sympathetic to certain subjects. One commented: “Respect *salute emoji*” on a neo-Nazi account’s post, which portrayed a single Nazi arm-banded figure in a crowd of pride-flag-coloured figures captioned “Think Different”. It is unclear whether the commenter understood the Nazi aspect or was only supportive of the anti-LGBTQ+ sentiment.
Figure 8. Chinese netizens respond with ambiguous support to neo-Nazi posts. Left: anti-LGBTQ+ post. Right: Comments on a Christchurch shooting clip.
Moderation
Of the 20 neo-Nazi accounts scoped by the author in the first week of the XiaoHongShu migration (15 January – 22 January), seven had been banned by 24 January, indicating an active response by the platform to moderate offensive content. XiaoHongShu’s terms of service explicitly prohibit “promoting terrorism or extremism” and “depicting violence and terror”. In addition to deleted accounts, some offensive posts were also removed. A search for the neo-Nazi term “1488” on January 24 compared to 16 January clearly showed that the platform had removed some offensive posts by Western far-right extremists, and many of the results were anti-fascist.
However, violent extremist content is still easily accessible. For example, a search of a certain mass killer’s name returned at least 11 clips from his livestreamed mass killing attack, 8 of which contained explicit violence [5]. Other content glorifying the killer and his ideology was also present on the platform, as were clips from other attacks.
Figure 9. Screenshots comparing a search on XiaoHongShu for “1488” on 16 January (left) and 24 January (right).
The extremist post with the most interactions, posted as early as 15 January and still active as of writing, was an animation of ‘chudjak’ at the centre of a white circle backgrounded by red (reminiscent of the Nazi flag) which featured far-right extremist phrases such as “TND”, “BILLIONS MUST DIE” and “MILLIONS MUST BREED”. The post had 2615 interactions [6]. While it could be interpreted as mocking far-right extremists, most comments did not interpret it this way. The account mentioned that previous posts had been moderated by XiaoHongShu.
Policy Implications
The migration from TikTok to XiaoHongShu exposed glaring flaws in then-US tech policy, regardless of Chinese moderation and US citizens’ presence on the platform. It showed that outright national bans fall short of addressing key issues; platform users affected by a ban can simply adapt by resorting to other countries’ platforms, and consequently, the government loses an opportunity to moderate extremist content effectively.
The migration episode suggests that outright prohibition is not a panacea. Instead, tech companies and domestic and regional policymakers should engage to collaboratively develop broader tech legislation for issues such as data protection, privacy, and online safety. For China, the entry of Western extremists into a Chinese social media space was, in this case, largely rejected or ignored by Chinese netizens. Nonetheless, they should be conscious of far-right extremist online content from the West, which has already proven itself adaptable and capable of internationalising across national, linguistic and geographic borders. For greater efficiency, Chinese tech platforms concerned with such internationalising phenomena might reach out to existing Western-based organisations to exploit their experience in mitigating such forms of extremist content. In particular, the glorification of mass shooters and extremist figures and symbols, which have the potential to inspire violence and impart extremist ideologies, but which are evidently resilient in evading moderation.
End Notes
- On the United States version of the Apple Appstore, of Top Free Iphone Apps.
- “The way of Agartha” refers to myths of a subterranean civilisation called Agartha, which has at times been incorporated into esoteric neo-Nazism.
- The user also posted a comment which suggested that Western users of XiaoHongShu might be spies seeking to steal Chinese technology or information. The comment is outside the scope of this dispatch, but possibly indicative of a phenomenon that would merit further research.
- The user added: “Sigh, individual efforts are weak and can easily harm the liver”, in recognition of the potential mental health toll and feelings of an uphill struggle faced by counter-extremism actors.
- Of the remaining three clips, one switched to gameplay as the attacker entered the mosque, and the other two only contained the prelude to the shooting.
- 1828 likes, 167 comments, 272 favourites, 180 upvotes and 168 shares.
Guy Fiennes is a Research Associate at ISD specialising in Islamist extremism. He is multilingual and a MENA specialist. His research interests include far-right extremism in Europe, North America and Israel, anti-LGBTQ+ hate, far-left extremism, and Russian disinformation operations.