Since 2021, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has reformed its organisational structure every year – imitating the Taliban’s insurgency model – to recruit, radicalise, and incite violence. TTP has paid particular close attention to managing its information warfare. The terror group meticulously disseminates ideological narratives to defend its militant campaign in Pakistan and rebut the Pakistani state’s efforts to undermine its legitimacy by labelling it as Fitna Al-Khawarij (the menace of Islamist seceders).
At the same time, by carefully infusing jihadist rhetoric with Pashtun nationalism, TTP seeks to position itself as the self-appointed defender of tribal rights along the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderland. This attempt to appropriate ethnic identity for militant legitimacy, however, is widely rejected by most Pashtuns.
To sustain its narrative in the face of such rejection, TTP relies heavily on its propaganda arm, Umar Media. It plays a strategic role in influencing public opinion on politically charged issues such as Pakistan’s Afghan policy, the treatment of Afghan refugees, and US-Pakistan relations. By presenting itself as a political and ideological voice for disaffected communities, TTP seeks to obscure its violent tactics behind a façade of resistance and representation.
Against this backdrop, this Insight will discuss Umar Media’s evolution, content, and expansion. It will then examine the latest propaganda campaigns the group has conducted on social media and encrypted messaging platforms. The last section will discuss the implications of TTP’s propaganda warfare and outline some policy measures to counter it.
Evolution and Main Contents of Umar Media
In 2006, Umar Studio, named after the Taliban’s founder, Mullah Muhammad Umar, began as a patchwork of propaganda channels recording and publishing videos of TTP’s militant campaigns. Until 2010, Umar Media’s propaganda material was distributed through CDs, DVDs and pamphlets.
The rise of the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) in 2015, challenging the Taliban’s ideological legitimacy, was a turning point for Umar Media. TTP responded with a 66-page Urdu rebuttal contesting ISKP’s claim to a global Sunni Caliphate (see Figure 1) and launched an Urdu-language magazine in 2016, publishing eight issues through 2020.
Figure 1: Title page of TTP’s ideological rebuttal of Islamic State’s claim to a self-styled Sunni Caliphate.
Umar Media’s latest reincarnation came in 2021 following the Afghan Taliban’s re-takeover. Since then, it has regularly published its monthly magazine with notable improvements in design and content. Two additional magazines in Pashto and Urdu, including one focusing on women, have also been introduced. The women’s periodical features interviews with commanders’ wives to attract female sympathisers.
Figure 2: The title pages of TTP’s Pashto and Urdu language monthly magazines of May 2024 and January 2025 issues, respectively.
Furthermore, TTP currently broadcasts video shows in Urdu, which are posted on Telegram and other social media channels. It also publishes a daily newsletter that features articles and reports on the group’s operational activities.
Figure 3: A collage of TTP’s two video series.
Recent Propaganda Expansion and Diversification
Umar Media has expanded its operations in multiple languages to increase its ideological appeal among diverse ethnic groups in Pakistan. Additionally, it has improved the production quality of its audio-visual content and published materials. Under TTP’s revamped organisational structure in January, five dedicated sections for audio, video, magazines, FM radio, and social media were announced, overseen by a nine-member commission. In 2023, former al-Qaeda propagandist Chaudhry Muneebur Rehman Jutt, who previously ran As-Sahab’s media operations, transformed Umar Media by joining TTP as a media advisor. Presently, Jutt is Umar Media’s director and TTP’s so-called Information Minister, while Naveed-ul-Hassan Yousafzai is his deputy.
Besides improved propaganda, Umar Media is now frequently publishing AI-generated news bulletins, comprising translations and voice-overs in Sindhi, Punjabi, and Balochi languages, in addition to Urdu, Pashto, and English. In April, the TTP restructured its social media division by adding a new department and more personnel.
Propaganda Themes
TTP exploits emotionally charged world issues, like atrocities in Gaza, and alleged human rights abuses by the Pakistani military in the ex-Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), such as civilian deaths in counterterrorism drone strikes, to gain public sympathy.
A key theme in TTP’s propaganda is Pashtun nationalism, aimed at winning support from Pashtun tribes in the ex-FATA region. Under the incumbent chief Mufti Nur Wali Mehsud, TTP shifted from indiscriminate attacks to targeting only security forces, as an attempt to win locals’ support. Umar Media opposes the fencing of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border for dividing Pashtun families, condemns it as a colonial imposition, highlights Afghan refugees’ forced repatriation, and emphasises Pashtun victimhood and tribal honour, blending radical Islamism with Pashtun nationalism. This reiterates TTP’s claim as representing both jihadism’s vanguard in Pakistan and the defender of Pashtuns.
Following the Pakistani state’s decision to brand the TTP as Fitna Al-Khawarij, TTP’s monthly Urdu magazine launched a regular column series in April, criticising the Pakistan Army. So far, three articles have been published under this theme. The use of the term Fitna al-Khawarij stigmatises TTP and undermines its ideological legitimacy.
Critically, in a major discursive shift, TTP’s anti-military messaging has abandoned the ex-communication term Murtad Fauj (apostate army) and instead adopted anti-colonial labelling, such as Dushman, Ghasib and Ghulam Fauj (enemy, occupier and slave army). TTP’s shift from Takfiri discourse – accusing opponents of apostasy – to anti-colonial framing is well calibrated. On the one hand, such framing of the Pakistani military allows TTP to position itself as defender of Pashtuns’ rights whose lands (the ex-FATA region) are portrayed as under “occupation.” On the other hand, it is aimed at avoiding ideological confrontation with co-sectarian mainstream Pakistani Deobandi religious scholars like Mufti Taqi Usmani, who are supportive of the Pakistani state’s counternarrative campaign against TTP.
Figure 4: A collage of TTP’s three article series from the Urdu-language magazine’s April, May and July issues, respectively.
Social Media Campaigns
In June, TTP launched two distinct social media campaigns. The first, on 9 June, expressed solidarity with Palestinians and criticised global silence about the war. Hashtags in English and Arabic were used to portray ideological affinity with Gaza’s resistance. This came shortly after the Afghan Taliban’s statement in support of Palestine.
The second campaign, launched on 21 June, sought to defend the group’s operations in Pakistan as the so-called “defensive jihad.” TTP insisted its struggle was not for personal gains but to implement Sharia, akin to the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate.
Propaganda Tools and Strategies
Over the last year, TTP has increasingly leveraged AI-generated English and Urdu news bulletins to expand its linguistic and digital footprint, especially in Punjab and Sindh’s urban areas. AI has also been employed to translate propaganda into regional languages like Barhui, Sindhi and Punjabi in addition to Urdu, English and Pashto.
For TTP, Telegram has become a platform of choice to freely operate and communicate due to its encryption features and lax content moderation and regulation policies. Several TTP Urdu and Pashto supporter groups with hundreds of subscribers are also present on Telegram and WhatsApp. Individual accounts sharing TTP’s content and promoting its ideological narrative are also present on open social media platforms like X, Facebook (see figure 5) and YouTube.
Figure 5: A collage of screenshots of TTP’s activities in Chitral and Kurram districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa uploaded by pro-TTP accounts on Facebook.
TTP employs both top-down and bottom-up circulation strategies to amplify its visibility and reach. Through its official channels on Telegram and WhatsApp, TTP disseminates professionally produced and tightly controlled propaganda, while supporter channels recirculate this content across multiple platforms, such as X, Facebook, and YouTube, further expanding its reach. TTP’s sustained presence on encrypted and open social media platforms underscores its resilience to adapt to evolving content moderation efforts and the ability to exploit moderation gaps by carefully mixing its ideological messaging with socio-political commentary.
Figure 6: An infographic shared on X by a pro-TTP account detailing the breakdown of the terror group’s attacks in Pakistan in August.
Implications
Concerningly, a simple keyword search on X, Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp and Telegram can lead to TTP channels, accounts, and pages, as illustrated in this Insight. Unfortunately, reductions in human content moderator teams who understand the political and linguistic nuances and regional contexts, along with incorporating some AI-powered automated moderation tools on Facebook and X, have left several gaps for groups like TTP to exploit. More efforts are required in this direction to keep these platforms secure, especially for young users, understanding that these groups are especially targeting teenagers for recruitment and radicalisation. Flagging and removing the search functionality of terms that can potentially lead to radical materials from the keyword search function could help block vulnerable youth from engaging with violent extremist groups on the aforementioned platforms.
TTP’s success in employing AI tools to produce propaganda will attract educated youth from the urban middle class, especially those with backgrounds in information technology, computer science, and software engineering. AI’s use coupled with the presence of TTP sympathisers on Facebook, X, as well as Telegram and WhatsApp, would lower entry barriers for their participation in militancy as keyboard warriors. There have been past cases wherein vulnerable Pakistani youth who lack a sense of belonging have ended up working with violent extremist groups as freelancers. Their participation not only improves extremist groups’ ability to harness emerging technologies for lethal purposes, but also enhances their social prestige as educated youth bring “strategic thinking and technological sophistication.”
In addition to lowering entry barriers for educated youth to become TTP’s keyboard warriors, the use of AI and quadcopters for attacks will make Pakistan’s multi-actor threat landscape more competitive, adding to terrorist groups’ lethality and longevity.
Conclusion and Recommendations
TTP’s ability to retain its ideological legitimacy through media-savvy propaganda and expand its digital footprint while navigating a complex and competitive threat landscape underscores its resilience and adaptability to operate in a fluid environment. It is evolving its tactics from traditional guerrilla warfare to urban terrorism using Umar Media as a force multiplier. It is trying to mainstream its ideological discourse by consistently commenting on Pakistan’s socio-political issues, dishing out women-centric propaganda to win their sympathies, showing solidarity and support for Pashtun and Baloch groups, as well as squeezing the mainstream far-right space from the country’s religious-political parties. Without blocking TTP’s encroachment into Pakistan’s mainstream discourse, the country’s fight at the operational front will remain partially effective.
In this regard, a working relationship between social media companies and the Pakistani government, allowing the exchange of information concerning the presence of terrorist groups on encrypted and open platforms, will enhance the efforts to remove their presence and make their use secure. In July, Pakistan’s State Minister for Interior claimed that around 481 accounts belonging to various terrorist organisations on WhatsApp, Facebook, and X were reported for violative content. He lamented that some accounts were removed while others remained on the platforms. At the same time, he also sought assistance from tech companies to enhance the Pakistani government’s capacity to spot such groups in digital spaces. The Pakistani government will have to designate accounts flagged for extremist content on its terrorist watchlist under a well-defined and robust set of criteria proving their links to extremist groups. Concurrently, it will have to establish that such accounts were violating community standards of various social media platforms where they are located to ensure their removal.
At the same time, social media companies can leverage the willingness of regional governments, like those in Pakistan, to forge partnerships that help address their blind spots, scrutinise flagged radical content, and decide on its removal or retention in line with their policies. Language-specific moderation can also enhance social media companies’ ability in detecting, disrupting and removing extremist ideologies and hate materials from their platforms, especially in regional contexts marked by ethnic and linguistic diversity.
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Abdul Basit is a Senior Associate Fellow at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, a specialist unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
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