On 25 May, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), through its so-called official media outlet, Al-Azaim Media Foundation, released a 36-minute-long propaganda video in the Pashto language titled “Mastung Incident.” The video portrays acts of brutality and features speeches accompanied by flashy graphics and threatening background audio. It criticises Baloch separatists as secular infidels who, according to ISKP, are more aligned with Western democracy than with the Islamic law of Sharia. In the video, ISKP declared war against Baloch nationalist armed groups and women-led Baloch political rights groups operating in Pakistan’s southeastern province, Balochistan. In this video, ISKP confirmed that 30 of its fighters, among them foreign fighters from across the world, had been killed during a three-day confrontation with Baloch separatist forces at one of its training camps in Balochistan’s Mastung district. The footage alleged that the Baloch fighters had long been aware of ISKP’s presence in Mastung and the adjacent mountainous Bolan region, and they avoided confrontation as per an unannounced non-aggression pact in common territories. That truce, ISKP now claims, is over.
The video threatens Baloch nationalist organisations and civil rights groups, such as the woman-led Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC), threatening civilians to avoid their public gatherings. The group’s rhetoric has escalated, reflecting a broader strategic shift: ISKP is no longer solely targeting the Pakistani state as it considers the country’s democracy un-Islamic and a Western ally, but is now openly waging an ideological, military, and social media campaign against ethnic secular Baloch separatist movements in Pakistan, similar to Syria’s Kurdish movements.
This Insight delves into the propaganda materials, including booklets, videos, pamphlets, social media content, disseminating strategies, and language employed by the ISKP to reach Baloch audiences. It explores what the group’s new wave of warfare signifies and how desperate they are to avenge their fallen comrades in a region where Baloch armed separatists already maintain a significant presence. The Insight examines ISKP’s regionally ignorant propaganda tactics in the digital arena of Baloch society. The piece also discusses why the Baloch have turned against ISKP and the implications this shift could have on Baloch society and its digital landscape, especially as ISKP is being increasingly portrayed as an ally of the Pakistani government in its suppression of Baloch movements in Balochistan.
ISKP’s Propaganda Offence in Balochistan
In its propaganda campaign against Baloch militant civil rights movements outfits, the Islamic State Pakistan Province (ISPP) and ISKP released a 36-minute-long video following a 117-page Urdu document, briefly outlining its intentions to target the BYC and other nationalist parties.
Similarly, through its Nashir media arm, it released a 14-page document in Pashto, a 28-page booklet in Urdu, a 14-page document in Persian, and an audio clip and pamphlet in Brahvi, the second language of Baloch ethnicity.
Figure 1: ISPP pamphlet illustrating Dr Allah Nazar Baloch, a militant leader of the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), and criticising Baloch insurgency as un-Islamic. Source Al Nashir Media
In said video, the group demonstrated reluctance to clarify in which area of the Mastung district Baloch armed separatists were wiping out their camps; this further demonstrates the ISKP’s unfamiliarity with the region. To back its claims, ISKP relies on X posts by a former United States Ambassador for Iraq and Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad.
Figure 2: Screen grab of Al-Azaim Media Foundation portraying Baloch Insurgents in a picture alongside Sheikh Abu Abdul Rehamn’s commentary regarding the declaration of war against Baloch insurgents. Source: Al Azaim Media
In a 12-page Persian booklet, ISKP’s Al-Azaim Media Foundation delineated why Baloch Nationalists are its targets. It lambasted Baloch armed groups for betraying a long-standing non-aggression pact, alleging these groups acted as proxies for the United States of America and the Afghan Taliban. It condemns Baloch nationalism as un-Islamic and warns of retaliation, while urging civilians to distance themselves from separatist movements.
ISKP also condemned the fragmentation of Muslims through ethnic and tribal affiliations; its narrative appears deeply disconnected from the realities on the ground. Its content lacks cultural sensitivity, fails to acknowledge the historical suffering of Baloch communities, and demonstrates a limited understanding of the region’s ethnic and political complexities. Rather than engaging with the root causes of discontent, such as political repression, economic disenfranchisement, and human rights violations, ISKP offers a rigid ideological framework that seeks to erase those grievances under the guise of Islamic unity.
Another indicator of ISKP’s disconnect with local realities is its use of language. In a 117-page-long document, the group repeatedly refers to the Baloch people as “Balochi,” a term widely considered offensive by the community.
Figure 3: ISPP propaganda document referring to Baloch as ‘Balochi’, a term considered to be incorrect. Source: Al Nashir Media
This linguistic error symbolises a broader failure to understand Balochistan’s sociocultural context. ISKP’s social media campaign in Balochistan appears to suffer from a lack of authenticity, local relevance, and linguistic nuance, as it translates its social media content using digital tools into poor translations of the Balochi language.
ISKP’s Social Media Strategy of Dissemination
ISKP’s social media propaganda reflects their lack of local engagement and growing frustration after losing several fighters in the province. ISKP shifted its bases from Afghanistan to Balochistan’s Mastung district and conducted operations throughout the region from the operational camps. These hideouts have now been wiped out from these areas, which are currently considered strongholds of Baloch separatist militant groups, who are now their enemies.
Following these strategic losses, ISKP turned its propaganda tactics toward the Baloch religious sect, the Zekri community, which is considered to be a sect of Islam. They are mostly based in Kech, Gwadar, and Awaran district of Balochistan and have contributed many fighters to the Baloch insurgency.
Figure 4: ISKP users are suggesting targeting the worship places of Zakri Baloch, describing them as soft targets, as they gather there every Friday. Source: Facebook
Similarly, Islamic State social media users also urged the Baloch community to translate their propaganda into Balochi. Due to the lack of Baloch people in their ranks, they have failed to produce a single piece of propaganda in Balochi, which forced them to employ digital translation tools. However, due to a lack of proficiency in the Balochi language, their propaganda materials turned into a joke in Balochistan and exposed their unfamiliarity with the province.
Figure 5: ISKP member requesting Baloch community to translate their propaganda contents into Balochi as it’s their ‘Islamic duty.’ Source: Facebook
With the confirmation of ISKP fighters killed by Baloch militants, ISKP supporters raced to Facebook, Telegram, and, to some extent, Element in May to broaden their reach to the Baloch community. ISKP announced a social media campaign to garner support from the Baloch community and requested their supporters identify Facebook pages that are linked to the community or have a large number of followers from the province. For this purpose, ISPK supporters shared the URL links of these pages on their profiles and asked their followers to respond to every individual of the Baloch community in their comment sections of the post.
Figure 6: Call of ISKP supporters to respond to the Facebook post of the Baloch community
In addition, the Pakistani chapter of IS, through its official mouthpiece Al Nashir media, also released audio speeches and pamphlets in the Brahavi language. The audio denounced nationalism as it is considered to be un-Islamic, according to the Islamic State’s views.
Figure 7: ISPP audio speech in the Brahavi language, in which it terms the Baloch insurgency as un-Islamic. Source: Nida e Haqq Media of ISPP
Costly Fights for Baloch Nationalists.
Dr. Mahrang Baloch, an imprisoned young doctor and peaceful rights activist, a TIMES Young Leader and a nominee for the Nobel Prize, has become the central target of ISKP’s propaganda and featured in their video footage, booklets, pamphlets, and social media campaigns. ISKP has criticised her work as a woman in a leadership position fighting for the civil rights movement in Balochistan against enforced disappearances. The Islamic State views it as forbidden in Islam for a woman to lead a Muslim society. ISKP has weaponised Dr. Mahrang Baloch’s featured image by blurring her face in the TIMES magazine and portraying her as a symbol of alleged Western influence. The group accuses her of being an agent of the West, promoting democracy and siding with what they term as ‘infidels’, a propaganda tactic that reflects their broader strategy of targeting progressive, secular voices, women’s rights, and civil rights activists within Muslim societies.
Figure 8: Dr Baloch, a prominent human rights activist, was the center stage of Islamic State propaganda
In response to ISKP’s threats online, the BLF leader, Dr Allah Nazar, in a propaganda piece of its group’s monthly magazine, released via their official Telegram channel. The message was subsequently amplified by the group’s digital operatives on Facebook and X, reflecting a narrative control and information warfare within the separatist circle. It responded to the IS and intended to respond to any retaliation by the IS and asked Baloch people to inform their fighters about any presence of IS members in their areas. Baloch insurgents have earlier distanced themselves from any confrontation with IS in the province, and even Baloch insurgents group accuses each other of helping religious extremist groups to establish their camps in Mastung district of Balochistan.
Figure 9: This pamphlet from the BLF magazine includes statements by its leader, Dr. Allah Nazar, in which ISKP is criticized as a proxy of the Pakistani state. Source: BLF propaganda outlet Ashoob Media
Conclusion
This messaging signals a likely escalation in Balochistan’s already complex conflict. As indicated, ISKP threatens to target Baloch sympathisers and nationalist figures, including their leadership. This conflict could annihilate Baloch youth and radicalise them towards militancy as a shelter from ISKP and repressions from the Pakistani authorities in the province. Counter-terrorism agencies and tech companies need to closely monitor the evolving use of digital platforms by ISKP and other terrorist organisations in the region. These groups are no longer limited to using such platforms for propaganda or narrative warfare; they are actively identifying targets through online engagement, as demonstrated in Figure 4.
Moreover, these actors are deliberately manipulating language and terminology, such as using local script or alternative spellings for terms like ‘IS’, to evade algorithmic detection and monitoring. Current tracking systems often miss these linguistic tricks due to a lack of focus on regional language patterns. In such cases, it is important to enhance algorithmic capabilities and expand linguistic techniques to detect and disrupt these digital activities. Lastly, their approach needs to be closely monitored by local authorities, civil rights movements, women activists, both at the government and organisational level, and tech companies need to expand their tracking expertise with a regional approach where extremist actors exist.
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Imtiaz Baloch is a journalist and researcher with a particular interest in political development and security in Pakistan’s Balochistan and Iran’s Sistan-va-Baluchestan provinces. He works as a Researcher at the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad. He tweets at; @ImtiazBaluch
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