Introduction
On 4 November 2024, federal agents arrested 24-year-old white supremacist Skyler Philippi for plotting to destroy an electric power station in Nashville, Tennessee. Philippi allegedly first learned of vulnerabilities to the United States’ critical infrastructure through Terrorgram, a network of extremist channels on Telegram promoting militant accelerationist neo-Nazi propaganda and the use of mass violence to cause societal collapse. The resurgence of accelerationist movements in recent years coincides with a marked increase in domestic plots targeting critical infrastructure, with prominent disruptions of several neo-Nazi cells planning coordinated attacks on power substations. However, what separates Philippi from his fellow domestic extremists is not his ideology or motives but his choice of tactics. According to the criminal complaint, he planned to destroy the electric substation with a homemade drone strapped with explosives, making Philippi’s one of the first known violent extremist plots to target domestic critical infrastructure using drones.
Concerningly, Philippi’s alleged drone plot fits squarely within broader trends in non-state actor use of emerging technologies like drones to potentially target critical infrastructure. A joint security bulletin released by DHS, the FBI, and the National Counterterrorism Center identified a July 2020 incident involving a DJI Mavic 2 drone at a Pennsylvania power substation, revealing the first known instance of a modified, uncrewed aircraft system being used to “specifically target” US energy infrastructure. While the full scope of such incidents are not publicly known, documents obtained by Forbes under the Freedom of Information Act revealed 57 drone incursions at 24 separate nuclear sites in the US between 2015 and 2019.
Given the rapid growth in personal drone usage in recent years, the widespread commercial availability of “off-the-shelf” models and their resulting decreased barriers to market entry have made them a cheap and effective method of irregular warfare for large militaries and non-state actors alike. This Insight will analyse the recent uptick in concerns over drones and serious issues they raise about the US government’s current strategy to defend against such threats and a potential shift in the violent extremist landscape.
Previous Trends
Prior to the adoption of commercially available drones, violent extremists heavily relied on rudimentary methods for carrying out their attacks, such as firearms and homemade explosives. For instance, in April 1995, Timothy McVeigh detonated a 7,000 lb. truck bomb at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, killing 168–including 19 children. The ensuing investigation revealed that McVeigh and his co-conspirator, Terry Nichols, constructed the bomb for approximately $5,000 by closely mimicking the attack on FBI headquarters as described in his favourite novel, The Turner Diaries–a racist dystopian novel penned by neo-Nazi William Luther Pierce that has served as a source of inspiration for domestic terrorists since its publication in 1978.
In 1994, then-President Bill Clinton signed the Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, popularly known as the Assault Weapons Ban. This federal law, a subtitle of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, prohibited the manufacture and civilian use of certain semi-automatic firearms and accessories, such as high-capacity magazines. After its expiration in 2004, violent extremists turned to popular models such as the AR-15 as their weapon of choice to carry out their attacks.
Armed with a Colt AR-15, Robert Bowers attacked the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in October 2018, killing 11 worshippers in the deadliest attack on the Jewish community in American History. Six months later, in April 2019, John T. Earnest used a Smith & Wesson M&P 15 rifle to kill one and injure three others at a synagogue in Poway, California. Unfortunately, the American carnage did not end there. In the following years, copycat attackers in El Paso, Texas, and Buffalo, New York, followed suit.
While this crop of extremists primarily targeted minority communities directly, recent developments in the accelerationist milieu over the last decade indicate a parallel targeting strategy focusing on critical infrastructure–one that utilises traditional tactics such as firearms and explosives for sabotage while leveraging technological advancements in commercially available drones that have not received adequate attention from law enforcement, intelligence services, and policymakers.
Current Trends in Critical Infrastructure Targeting
As research by the Program on Extremism highlights, the growth of accelerationist movements like Terrorgram has placed critical infrastructure squarely in the crosshairs of domestic terrorists. Indeed, Terrorgram’s 2022 publication of the digital magazine Hard Reset exemplifies the ongoing accelerationist fixation with critical infrastructure, devoting nearly 50 pages to promoting such attacks and providing the reader with detailed instructional material. The allegations within Philippi’s criminal complaint highlight the prominent role that Terrorgram and broader accelerationist messaging played in developing his plot.
After initially discussing his desire to commit a mass shooting at a YMCA facility, Philippi asked a confidential human source to steal a train derailer–another prominent attack method promoted by Hard Reset–before allegedly settling on a plot to attack multiple power grids to assist in “accelerating the collapse of the US power grid, which he learned about in part from Terrorgram.” Critically, Philippi’s choice to target the power grid reflects the accelerationist movement’s broader strategy, making him just one example in a sea of extremists following a similar tactical decision-making process.
In May 2017, Atomwaffen Division founder Brandon Russell was arrested for possessing unregistered destructive devices for use in attacking critical infrastructure such as “power lines [and] nuclear reactors.” After serving three years of a five-year prison sentence, Russell was arrested again in February 2023 alongside his girlfriend Sarah Clendaniel for planning to attack multiple electrical substations in Baltimore, Maryland.
In November 2020, federal authorities arrested five additional members of Atomwaffen Division for planning to destroy energy facilities. Initially, the cell members planned to use their illegally manufactured fully automatic firearms in the attack, but prosecutors announced additional charges for plotting to use thermite–a mixture of aluminum powder and iron that can reach temperatures hot enough to burn through electrical grid components such as transformers. The five men of the Camp Lejeune cell researched previous power grid attacks, such as the 2013 Metcalf sniper attack in Coyote, California, where multiple unidentified gunmen opened fire on a Pacific Gas & Electric power station, causing approximately $15 million in damage.
Conversely, Philippi chose to use a homemade drone that, according to prosecutors, cost “about $150” and could be assembled using a 3D printer. Moreover, Philippi’s decision to leverage the use of a drone to carry out his attack signals a shift in tactics that reflect those used by non-state actors and national militaries. In the Middle East, the use of drones by ISIS first appeared in 2013, though solely for ISR capabilities. However, by 2017, the jihadist group’s drone operations turned lethal when it deployed an aerial munition over an Iraqi military base. Similarly, drone warfare in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War has revolutionised modern interstate conflict, where their use in reconnaissance, artillery spotting, and small-scale attacks is nearly ubiquitous.
The proliferation of drones from the battlefield to the backyard and their adoption by extremists is just one example of how they present a growing challenge to countering their use for nefarious purposes. Since the FAA issued its first set of guidelines for the domestic use of drones in 2005, the technology’s market size and demand have grown significantly, with some estimates placing the US’ market share at more than $54 billion. Moreover, models vary greatly in price and capabilities, significantly lowering the barrier to entry for would-be terrorists.
Challenges and Solutions
Despite the recent drone panic in New Jersey, which spurred numerous conspiracies and the spread of rampant disinformation, an October 2024 report by the Wall Street Journal underscores how inadequate the current US government strategy is in proactively responding to the threat of coordinated drone usage against critical infrastructure. For 17 days in December 2023, a fleet of drones regularly breached restricted airspace over Langley Air Force Base, on a stretch of land on Virginia’s shoreline that has “one of the largest concentrations of national-security facilities in the U.S.” with no meaningful response by government authorities. Numerous interventions, from electronic signal jamming to directed energy weapons, were deemed too risky to local 911 emergency systems and commercial aircraft; questions of legal authority and effectiveness stymied efforts by the US Coast Guard to launch nets into the air to capture the drones, and even efforts to simply monitor the drones was largely ineffective.
In light of these challenges, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin signed a classified strategy for countering drones in December 2024, which, according to the DoD, “pose the most significant threat at this time and increasingly in the US homeland.” The unclassified fact sheet summarizing the DoD’s strategy presents five ways the Department will implement it. The most important of these strategic ways is identifying threats and trends and disrupting threat networks. Both pillars emphasise the need to correctly characterise threats and implement policies and procedures that streamline cross-agency and department coordination.
It is important to note that while Philippi’s alleged drone plot was disrupted due to the proactive efforts of domestic law enforcement, the continued reliance on well-placed confidential human sources and loose-lipped domestic terrorists is a precarious gamble. The accelerationist fixation with attacks on the power grid shows no sign of abating, and these highly motivated domestic actors will continue to seek out innovative tactics and emerging technologies to achieve their goals and avoid law enforcement disruption.
While the FAA prohibits drones from flying over designated national security-sensitive facilities, including critical infrastructure, the government relies on users’ adherence to these regulations and factory-installed geofencing software with some models. However, users can easily bypass these restrictions if they are savvy enough or if the drone requires GPS or internet connectivity to enforce restrictions. In light of these workarounds, practical solutions are necessary.
First, policymakers must seek regulatory frameworks that implement uniform restrictions on all domestic and foreign drone manufacturers selling their products in the US. Currently, not all drones sold in the US come with standard geofencing software, nor does US law require it. By mandating geofencing software, the US government can take an easy first step in safeguarding critical infrastructure.
Second, tech companies in the US defence industry should pursue greater private-public cooperation to implement counter-drone measures at critical infrastructure sites. Furthermore, equipping and training local and federal law enforcement with counter-drone technologies will enable them to better respond to emerging threats.
Finally, the “custom” or “DIY” segment of the drone market represents an emerging sector. Like firearms, determined malicious actors can custom assemble drones to their specifications by ordering components from various manufacturers with little or no regulatory oversight or modifying existing platforms. Just as a violent extremist could convert the trigger on a firearm to fully automatic or 3-D print the required parts to do so, the same approach can be applied to drones by neglecting to install geofencing software or modifying the airframe for increased payloads.
Conclusion
At present, the alleged drone plot in Nashville represents an aberration within critical infrastructure targeting data. Many plots against critical infrastructure still, and will undoubtedly continue to, rely on traditional methods of attack, such as firearms and homemade explosives. The appeal of low-tech tactics, especially by lone actors, has remained consistent despite shifts in government counterterrorism efforts and other preventative measures. However, the introduction of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), or drones, represents a shift in domestic extremist strategy and an underappreciated attack vector that the US government has been slow to counter. Like their international compatriots, domestic extremists have begun looking at drones in earnest for several reasons, least among them the vast asymmetry between state and non-state actor capabilities, their relatively low cost and widespread availability, and continuing advances in technology allowing for their autonomous programming, which effectively removes the human element traditionally required for kinetic action.
Coupled with an emerging trend of critical infrastructure targeting by domestic extremists, the recent drone panic makes this delayed government response apparent, and without a counter-drone policy framework that addresses the gaps in no-fly zone enforcement, accelerationists find themselves ahead of the curve when it comes to government-led countermeasures. If the US is to counter the potential drone threat at home and abroad, it first needs to look at the evolution of terrorist tactics across time and accurately identify trends in the domestic extremist space.
Luke Baumgartner is a Research Fellow at the Program on Extremism at George Washington University, whose research interests include domestic violent extremism, white supremacist movements, and the role of military veterans in political violence. Luke received his Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from Southern Illinois University Carbondale. Upon graduation, Luke received his commission into the United States Army, where he served as an active-duty Field Artillery Officer for four years. Following his separation from active duty service in 2021, Luke enrolled in Georgetown University's Security Studies Program, where he received his Master of Arts in Security Studies. His analysis and insights have been featured in media outlets and academic publications, including The Georgetown Security Studies Review, ABC News, CNN, USA Today, Military.com, Lawfare, and Inkstick.
Jon Lewis is a Research Fellow at the Program on Extremism at George Washington University, where he studies domestic terrorism, with a specialization in the evolution of white supremacist and anti-government movements in the United States and federal responses to the threat. His analysis and insights have been featured in numerous media outlets and academic publications, including: The New York Times, The Washington Post, AP, BBC News, CNN, The Guardian, Los Angeles Times, Boston Globe, Rolling Stone, CTC Sentinel and VICE News.