Since the Afghan Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has experienced a significant resurgence, transforming both its operational capabilities and its strategic approach. Beyond expanding its militant activities, the group has embraced modern technologies to enhance its battlefield effectiveness and strengthen its propaganda efforts. One of the most notable developments has been the extensive use of drones by the TTP. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) police reportedly foiled 341 drone attacks in the first half of 2026, highlighting the increasing reliance of militants on drones.
This Insight examines how TTP’s growing drone capability is transforming its operational reach and tactics. The Insight argues that TTP’s growing drone capabilities are increasing Pakistan’s counter-terrorism challenges, exposing gaps in response, which is reactive rather than systematic, and in managing the supply of this technology, especially in the borderland regions of Afghanistan-Pakistan.
TTP’s Evolving Operational Capabilities
When TTP was formed in December 2007, it relied primarily on conventional insurgent tactics, including ambushes, suicide bombings, roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and targeted assassinations. Pakistan’s sustained military operations subsequently weakened the group inside Pakistan and pushed its leadership and fighters across the borders into Afghanistan, where they could regroup and preserve their operational capabilities.
Since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, the TTP has benefited from a more “permissive environment” across the border. It has rebuilt networks in Pakistan’s tribal districts while maintaining leadership, training and logistical infrastructure in Afghanistan. Its growing access to modern weapons left behind following the withdrawal of the US and NATO forces from Afghanistan has further enhanced its operational capacity. These weapons have reportedly reached the TTP through black markets and are increasingly easy to access, according to local sources. The police have also confirmed that leftover US weapons have increased the TTP’s operational capabilities, for example, by enabling access to night vision equipment not available to police forces.
At the same time, the TTP has gradually incorporated newer technologies into its operations. The TTP is using satellite imagery for propaganda and operational purposes. Readily available, relatively inexpensive, and easy-to-modify commercial drones have given the TTP a new capability. These drones were first used in 2024 in the North Waziristan tribal district, targeting security forces on the ground. In 2025, the Pakistani military faced approximately 405 drone attacks by TTP and its affiliates, the majority of which were repelled. Reports also suggest that TTP has acquired basic anti-drone technology, enabling it to reduce the effectiveness of surveillance and drone operations conducted by Pakistani police and security forces.
Tactical Implications of Drone Adoption by TTP
The TTP opted for drone technology, having been inspired by the Afghan Taliban, who started to use it in 2016 to record propaganda videos of their terror attacks. In 2020-21, they began using drones for battlefield purposes. Following in the same footsteps, the TTP initially used drones for propaganda and gradually adopted the technology as a core part of its operational capabilities, such as surveillance, reconnaissance and precision targeting. The TTP uses the imagery created by the drones and sourced from satellites, together with the lethal leftover US weapons, to inflict heavy losses on security forces. TTP militants also produce aerial videos of assaults and breached perimeters, which they integrate into digital media campaigns to instil fear, demonstrate tactical penetration, and undermine confidence in state security.
In December 2025, the group announced the establishment of a special drone unit, ‘Air Force’, led by Maulvi Saleem Haqqani. Over the past several years, the group has steadily improved its proficiency in using quadcopter drones for surveillance and attacks, marking a significant shift in its tactical capabilities.
The scale of militant drone activity in Pakistan has continued its upward trend in 2026. In more than 100 drone attacks in KP during the first half of the year, at least 29 security personnel were killed, and 89 were injured. Although the number of casualties remains relatively limited, it reflects the still-developing nature of militants’ drone capabilities, which are becoming increasingly sophisticated over time. For example, the TTP is acquiring counter-drone technologies to adequately tackle the drone attacks and disrupt the monitoring by police and security forces.
The TTP has acquired Chinese commercial drones and quadcopters in Kabul and other cities of Afghanistan, as well as “recruiting technicians and students to modify these drones to carry bombs or fire projectiles”, according to reporting from the Khaama Press. This indicated that the militants have also turned to Honda motorcycle batteries to power roadside bombs and drones for longer periods, stating that “these batteries last much longer than smaller ones previously used, reducing the risk to bombers during replacements.” However, TTP drones are not advanced and are limited largely to daytime use, but militants are “exploring thermal cameras and engine modifications to improve night surveillance and attack capability”.
Equally concerning is the expanding geographic spread of these attacks. What was once largely confined to districts along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border has now extended into urban and civilian areas. At least 13 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s 40 districts have experienced drone attacks, with militants primarily targeting police stations, military convoys, security checkpoints, and the residences of anti-Taliban militia members. Along with the actual damage on the ground, the psychological impact of drone use by TTP on security personnel can be extremely detrimental to their morale, as they are not sure whether to “look ahead or look up” in anticipation of potential attacks. Security forces in this region historically relied on checkpoints and control of roads and valleys. Low-cost drones have allowed TTP to bypass ground defence. The TTP can conduct aerial surveillance and strike from angles that terrain, forts, police stations and checkpoints were never designed to defend against. This constant stress affects security forces’ patrolling and reduces their operational tempo, according to military sources.
In addition, the TTP uses commercial drones because they are cost-effective and difficult to detect, and they can be combined with other tactics. Drone attacks can augment IED attacks, surprise security forces, and inflict more damage. Moreover, as vehicle-borne suicide attacks are costly and risky, and using quadcopters is cheaper, drones are used by the TTP to enhance its explosive capabilities. The drones can also provide live footage of potential targets and attacks from miles away. Such aerial surveillance allows militants to track troop movements, map patrol routes, and identify vulnerabilities in security perimeters.
TTP’s social media videos clearly show the use of drones and small quadcopters to deliver explosives. This footage shows TTP’s operational sophistication and reach. By portraying themselves as technologically sophisticated and resilient, the TTP can strengthen recruitment narratives, such as projecting the group’s technological potential and impressing young recruits, and reinforce internal cohesion, which has always been a problem for the TTP. Drone technology thus serves a dual purpose of operational enhancement and psychological influence over both supporters and opponents.
Implications for COIN
Pakistan’s counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has traditionally combined kinetic military operations with non-kinetic measures to counter TTP. Through major military operations including Operations Rah-e-Raast, Rah-e-Nijat, Zarb-e-Azb, Radd-ul-Fasaad, and Azm-e-Istehkam, the state significantly disrupted terrorist networks, reclaimed militant-held territory, and achieved a notable, albeit temporary, reduction in terrorist violence. While these operations effectively dismantled physical sanctuaries and restored the state’s territorial control, the emergence of commercially available drone technology has altered the operational environment.
Since 2024, Pakistani security forces have started to rely on drones in their COIN and counter-terrorism initiatives. In KP, security forces have foiled at least 375 drone attacks in recent years across Bannu, Bajaur and North and South Waziristan, reflecting a shift in militant tactics from conventional attacks to technology-driven aerial warfare. In response, Pakistan has deployed anti-drone systems and drone nets to strengthen the protection of security personnel. However, this has led to significant confusion among the local population. It is often difficult to determine whether the drone attack was carried out by militants or security forces. This ambiguity complicates COIN efforts, which rely on winning the local population’s trust and support.
A further challenge is disrupting militants’ access to drones, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), spare parts, and related components. Markets in Afghanistan and Pakistan have both emerged as procurement hubs for TTP. Although Pakistan has undertaken cross-border actions targeting suspected drone manufacturing and assembly facilities in Afghanistan, sustained disruption requires significant intelligence, financial and logistical resources. Without limiting these supply networks, TTP is likely to expand its drone capabilities.
Effective counter-drone coverage along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is yet another challenge. Political tensions, contested borders and the region’s mountainous terrain complicate the installation of advanced surveillance systems, including anti-drone sensors, biometric screening technologies, and integrated monitoring mechanisms. The Afghan Taliban have repeatedly opposed or dismantled sections of Pakistan’s border fencing, raising doubts about the feasibility of deploying more sophisticated surveillance infrastructure. The approximately 2,600-kilometre mountainous border makes comprehensive coverage difficult. Counter-drone efforts therefore require a broader approach combining border management, intelligence cooperation, targeted interdiction of supply networks, and diplomatic engagement with Afghan authorities.
A Way Forward for Pakistan
Keeping in view the challenges raised by TTP acquiring and using drones, Pakistan has taken certain important steps to counter this security challenge. For example, the KP provincial government banned drone flying in March 2026, which restricts civilian drone use but lacks any enforcement mechanism against militant operators who already evade the law. KP police have set up a dedicated drone training school in Nowshera and are also coordinating with the army to get trained in the use of anti-drone technology.
One such training exercise, Maiden Strike, was dedicated to quadcopter and FPV drone tactics. In November 2025 and February 2026, the military employed drones as part of its efforts to take out terrorist infrastructure inside Afghanistan. More importantly, it has upped the ante, increasing the number and scale of Pakistani counter-terror operations that utilised drone strikes and reconnaissance missions in the border areas. But there is more Pakistan can do to effectively counter the drone threat, especially keeping in view the fact that there is a global tendency on the part of the militants to adopt technology for the purpose of terrorism.
A key requirement is to further invest in cost-effective counter-drone technologies. Pakistan is currently producing a spider anti-drone system, SAFRAH drone-damaging guns, and RAAST detection radar. Pakistan needs to develop a layered detection and intercept system like the one the US used in Syria, combining kinetic, non-kinetic, and shelter aspects. Pakistan has worked on the kinetic and shelter aspects through acquiring anti-drone technologies and using nets; however, it further needs to work on how the drones are controlled and navigated by the militants.
Moreover, this anti-drone technology should be effectively deployed on the porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and also within the areas of tribal borderland regions to be used effectively against the militants. Lastly, better coordination among the police, security forces, and other civilian institutions is needed to monitor the TTP’s adaptation to and use of modern technology. Maintaining a database of TTP activities will enable the state to prepare an effective response, target militants, and control collateral damage.
Pakistan’s experience with the militants acquiring drone technology travels well beyond South Asia into states in the Middle East, Africa and Asia that are coping with or may face a similar threat, for example, the use of drones by Houthis in Yemen, al-Shabaab in Somalia and ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin. Set against these cases, Pakistan’s experience of tackling TTP looks less like an isolated domestic crisis and more like an instance of a broader global trend. It is crucial to understand that militants are innovating faster and more cheaply than states’ institutional procurement and their security doctrines allow. The shared lessons across the Middle East and Africa, and now in the case of Pakistan, are that layered detection and interception capability must be paired with sustained pressure on the supply chains and networks behind these drones, because no single technological fix has yet proven sufficient on its own in any theatre where this threat has emerged.
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Dr Sadia Sulaiman is an Associate Professor at the Area Study Centre for Africa, North and South America at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan. Dr Sulaiman holds a PhD in Strategic Studies from Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. She is the author of three books and numerous research articles in renowned local and international journals.
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The views and opinions expressed in this Insight are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those of GNET or any of its partners.