The last few years have seen an increase in research efforts detailing how extremist actors are seeking to exploit video games, digital gaming spaces, and gaming culture. This mounting evidence of extremist activities in the gaming sphere has prompted intense discussions on how to prevent and/or counter violent extremism (P/CVE) across the heterogeneous gaming ecosystem. While gaming-related P/CVE efforts are still in their infancy, several approaches have been piloted. These include the development of bespoke P/CVE games to inoculate audiences against extremist influences or educate them about radicalisation, the application of gamified elements in prevention contexts, digital youth work on gaming (-adjacent) digital platforms, and the use of popular commercial video games to play with young target audiences and open lines of communication during shared gameplay. The vast majority of P/CVE approaches in the gaming sphere are aimed at primary prevention. This means that the main target audience are individuals, who are not radicalised, and the goal of these projects is to enhance resilience against extremist influence. Secondary prevention, which addresses individuals who are interested in extremist ideas or on the pathway of radicalisation, and tertiary prevention, which focuses on highly radicalised audiences, have not yet featured prominently in gaming-related P/CVE measures.
To our knowledge, discussions examining how gaming could support interventions aimed at radicalised individuals are rare. In this Insight, we therefore offer a preliminary exploration of opportunities for gaming-related tertiary prevention and disengagement approaches, as well as the challenges that may arise for P/CVE practitioners in the space. Our goal is to inspire more conversations on the application of games and gaming-related approaches in working with radicalised target audiences. The Insight is based on a handbook for practitioners we created in the context of the RadiGaMe project (Radicalization on Gaming Platforms and Messenger Services) and offers five avenues for gaming-related tertiary prevention and disengagement work as well as the challenges associated with them: Identification and first contact, digital disengagement, offline disengagement with a digital gaming component, offline disengagement with an offline gaming component, and working with former extremists in gaming environments.
Identification and First Contact
One possible opportunity for tertiary prevention measures lies in identifying and contacting radicalised individuals in digital gaming spaces such as video games, gaming chats, and on gaming (-adjacent) platforms. This may include text-based communication, voice-based chats, as well as, potentially, approaching users directly in the game via digital avatars. For example, this occurs in popular online games such as World of Warcraft or within user-generated games on platforms such as Roblox, which allow players to interact through their avatars. Approaching users in digital gaming spaces they are familiar with could lower barriers of communication and increase users’ willingness to speak to P/CVE practitioners. Once a conversation begins, practitioners could seek to steer radicalised players to offline disengagement programs and other support structures.
However, practitioners may face several challenges when seeking to identify and approach radicalised individuals in digital gaming spaces. Firstly, it may be extremely difficult to adequately classify a user’s degree of radicalisation solely by examining their online profiles. In many digital gaming spaces, users may post content ‘for the lulz’, that is, to provoke rather than to express their personal ideological beliefs. Research on assessing users’ posting motivations and indicators of actual radicalisation within gaming contexts is not yet available to practitioners. Secondly, there is a tension between seeking to meet individuals in familiar digital spaces and inadvertently creating the perception that such private communication spaces and leisure time activities such as gaming are unduly ‘invaded’ by P/CVE actors. Practitioners could therefore be subjected to backlash. Thirdly, there are issues of access. In order to reach individuals in digital gaming spaces, practitioners must play the game in question and be active in the chats, particularly outside of working hours, as gaming chats are most active when players are not in school or at work. This may require adaptations to digital P/CVE practices and work arrangements.
Digital Disengagement
Rather than re-directing radicalised individuals from digital gaming spaces to offline programs, disengagement practitioners could also attempt to offer entirely digital disengagement formats. This approach could be implemented either via the chat and social networking features on gaming (-adjacent) platforms, allowing practitioners to chat with target audiences bilaterally in a familiar digital environment, either in real-time or asynchronously. Similarly, in-game communication features could be employed to implement anonymous consultations or fully fledged disengagement programs – either via in-game chats or, depending on the game, voice-based communication via avatars. Practitioners could use the act of playing online games with users to establish trust, rapport, and familiarity through shared gameplay experiences. Such approaches could be particularly helpful when trying to reach target audiences who would shy away from offline interactions or even phone conversations. It may be easier for such individuals to open up in a playful environment from the safety of their own home.
Nevertheless, practitioners may face a range of challenges when seeking to implement entirely digital forms of tertiary prevention and disengagement in online gaming spaces. Firstly, although some online formats have been trialed during the Covid-19 pandemic, disengagement work still largely relies on offline interactions with radicalised individuals – for instance, in Germany only 4% of all P/CVE programs are delivered online, most of them primary prevention efforts rather than disengagement approaches. There are therefore very few tested approaches that could be adapted to digital gaming spaces and it is unclear what would be needed to implement such programs successfully.
Secondly, like P/CVE in general, tertiary prevention and disengagement programs are often organised on a national level and seek to serve target audiences in a certain country. The online gaming sphere, however, connects millions of users across the globe, and many gamers frequently communicate in English even if it is not their mother tongue. Hence, practitioners may be unable to identify the users their programs are aimed at or accidentally overstep their mandate when communicating with users from other countries. Digital gaming spaces may best be served by transnational disengagement programs, which would require a drastic change in the highly nationalised P/CVE landscape.
Thirdly, there are important data protection issues practitioners need to grapple with, including where their conversations with radicalised individuals are stored, how it can be guaranteed that the chats will not be moderated or deleted, and who has access to this material. Many tertiary prevention and disengagement approaches rely on confidentiality and the promise that practitioners do not provide information to police and law enforcement agencies. In online games or on gaming (-adjacent) platforms, such confidentiality may not be possible, particularly if the platform or game company in question has a policy mandating that discussions about illegal activities are forwarded to police and law enforcement organisations. Consequently, new working arrangements and cooperation agreements between disengagement professionals and platforms or game companies should be put in place before disengagement work in digital gaming spaces is attempted.
Offline Disengagement with Digital Gaming Component
Many disengagement programs take place in an offline context and usually include bilateral meetings between a radicalised individual (often referred to as ‘client’) and a disengagement practitioner – often in prison settings or in other offline settings such as phone and in-person consultations facilitated by EXIT programs. While it has not yet been trialled, it may be possible to integrate digital gaming elements into disengagement work in offline settings. This could take various forms. For instance, video games could be used to support narrative biographical approaches by allowing clients to express themselves and their story via digital avatars. For example, clients could:
- Create avatars to represent themselves, their strength, and weaknesses;
- Show the kind of person they would like to become by making a ‘future self’ avatar;
- Choose their ‘level’ in relation to important disengagement factors such as family support, social network, occupational or educational plans; this self-assessment could then be used by the disengagement practitioner to discuss with the client how they could ‘level up’ in certain areas and how they can be supported in doing so;
- Update their avatar and levels as the disengagement process continues to offer visible signs of progress and further motivate clients;
- Discuss potential reactions to future obstacles, such as what the avatar would do if they were to encounter a challenge such as a former friend from the extremist group or an event that may lead the client back towards extremist ideology;
- Show their pathway to radicalisation in a digital, fictional setting rather than having to speak about it directly.
Employing a digital avatar may make it easier for clients to discuss difficult issues and increase their willingness to think through future scenarios in a safe, fictional setting. Doing so could support disengagement practitioners in obtaining important information about the client and allow them to discuss certain attributes of ‘the avatar’ rather than the client themself, which may reduce the risk of backlash from the participant, particularly when discussing difficult issues.
While such avatars could be created in existing commercial video games, it could also be fruitful to develop entire bespoke digital disengagement games. These games could support key components of disengagement work, for example, by making perspective-taking with victims of one’s crimes ‘playable’ and thereby facilitate reflection about these activities. But such games may also offer entirely new avenues and opportunities for disengagement work. This may include, for instance, awarding points or badges for completed (personalised) challenges, such as resisting the urge to log into an extremist forum for a certain number of days or attending all official appointments scheduled in a certain period of time.
However, using digital gaming elements in offline disengagement work may come with challenges. Firstly, practitioners report that it is currently unclear to them what knowledge and skills they would need in order to use such elements and how they could acquire the necessary insights to apply digital gaming approaches effectively. Secondly, gaming approaches may not always be suitable and relevant in all circumstances or for all clients. Some clients may benefit from digital gaming elements while others may react negatively. (Former) Islamists, for instance, may consider gaming as haram (forbidden). Practitioners, therefore, need to carefully consider in which situations gaming is (not) useful for their work.
Opportunities for Collaboration with Formers
There is a long tradition of including former extremists in P/CVE efforts, because it is believed that first-hand accounts and stories relaying personal experiences with radicalisation and extremist engagement are perceived as particularly authentic and therefore resonate well with target audiences. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that formers could also support gaming-related P/CVE approaches. The US-based disengagement organisation Life After Hate is currently piloting a Discord server, “The Daily Former”, which offers individuals interested in leaving extremist groups and networks the opportunity to contact both former extremists and experienced prevention practitioners. According to Life After Hate, the main premise of the approach is to engage these individuals “where they digitally live” – to use the gaming-adjacent platform Discord, because the target audience is already familiar with this digital space and does not need to be motivated to move to a different platform to receive support. Additional avenues to include formers may be, for instance, to livestream talks, Q&As, or gaming activities such as let’s play videos with former extremists via gaming-adjacent streaming platforms such as Twitch or Kick. Furthermore, several police agencies are currently offering young people the opportunity to play popular video games such as FIFA or Rocket League with and against police officers to build trust in police forces and lower barriers to communication with (potentially at-risk) youth. Similar projects could feature the opportunity to play with and against former extremists. The shared experience of playing may encourage target audiences to engage with formers’ stories, ask questions, and, potentially, motivate them to also take steps to leaving extremist environments.
However, such approaches do not come without challenges. For instance, livestreaming sites often allow audiences to engage in live chats. These are difficult to moderate in real-time and could pose an issue when streaming content with formers, particularly when extremist actors seek to initiate backlash or exploit such chats to disseminate their propaganda. Content associated with former extremists may also be subject to moderation, deletion, and deplatforming – particularly if automated content moderation tools falsely flag such content as extremist rather than counter-extremist, an issue that has been reported for P/CVE efforts on social media, including the Jamal al-Khatib campaign whose videos were initially restricted by YouTube and Twitter (now X) due to being falsely identified as propaganda. Therefore, it is crucial for practitioners to collaborate with the platforms in question before implementing campaigns with formers and for platforms to not only allow such content but to adapt their automated tools to prevent important P/CVE projects from facing restrictions and deletions.
Conclusion
Gaming-related tertiary prevention and disengagement work has not received considerable attention so far. However, as the digital gaming environment is consistently increasing in popularity and reach, it is becoming an increasingly relevant social space – particularly for young people. This Insight demonstrated that the social aspects of gaming offer new avenues and innovative opportunities to integrate gaming into tertiary prevention and disengagement work. However, there are currently many unresolved challenges for disengagement practitioners in the space. We therefore call for a multi-stakeholder dialogue, including P/CVE practitioners, gaming (-adjacent) platforms, gaming companies, researchers, and funders of P/CVE projects to discuss this matter further and tackle the obstacles to piloting gaming-related approaches in disengagement programs.
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Linda Schlegel is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), where she co-leads the RadiGaMe project and researches extremist activities in digital gaming spaces. She is also a Research Fellow at modusIzad, where she explores new avenues for digital P/CVE approaches, and a founding member of the Extremism and Gaming Research Network (EGRN).
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Vivienne Ohlenforst is a Research Fellow at modusIzad and a member of the RadiGaMe project, where she co-develops gaming-related disengagement approaches. She investigates disengagement processes from various ideological phenomena, with a focus on supporting and empowering case workers through evidence-based practices.