Introduction
The Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) has faced territorial and operational setbacks following a large-scale ground offensive by Puntland security forces. The offensive began in late 2024 and has intensified through early 2025. Bolstered by multiple US and UAE airstrikes and intelligence support that eliminated senior ISS leaders, the campaign targeted the militants’ strongholds in the Cal Miskaad mountains of Bari in Somalia’s semi-autonomous Puntland region. By late February, Puntland forces had reportedly repelled the group’s offensive attacks, recapturing key strategic military bases and villages, including Shebaab, which served as the group’s operational hub.
However, despite being on the defensive, ISS has continued to mount frequent guerrilla attacks, having recently engaged in fierce clashes with Puntland forces in the Miraale Valley, also in the Cal Miskaad range. In IS’s weekly Al-Naba newsletter of April, ISS claimed to have killed and injured over 300 Puntland troops over the past two months to frame its strategic resilience as a form of victory. ISS’s ability to launch large-scale, sophisticated attacks like the 31 December SVBIED attack on a military base in Bari, which killed scores of Puntland soldiers, and its continued resistance to air and ground offensives, underscores its enduring threat.
Amid this backdrop, Somali-speaking ISS supporters have ramped up their online propaganda targeting the US, UAE, and Puntland forces, deeming them as primary enemies that are hindering the group’s expansion in Somalia. This Insight explores the core narratives pushed by Somali IS supporters on Telegram, as well as recruitment and fundraising efforts led by ISS, Oromo, and Amharic propagandists in Ethiopia and Kenya for the group.
Narratives
ISS vs Puntland
Leading the anti-Putland propaganda efforts is the nascent pro-ISS outlet Manjaniq Media, which is active on Telegram. In its propaganda, Manjaniq encourages hijrah of potential recruits to Somalia despite the aggressive crackdown on the group (Figure 1). In its propaganda posts, Manjaniq portrays Puntland forces as demoralised, depleted, and ill-prepared to confront ISS’s guerrilla tactics. It alleges that ISS’s persistent landmine and IED attacks, and complex suicide operations have eroded Puntland’s combat effectiveness further, claiming that despite robust US and UAE aerial support, the forces continue to falter against the group. Supporters argue that the tactical withdrawal of ISS fighters from certain contested areas should not be construed as a sign of weakness but a deliberate strategy to disorient and psychologically wear down the Puntland forces.
Figure 1: Manjaniq Media’s plea for Hijrah to IS’s Wilayah Somalia.
To showcase their battlefield victories, Puntland forces have circulated footage of territorial gains and graphic images of killed fighters in their Telegram channels. However, ISS supporters accuse them of waging a social media propaganda war to mask their battlefield defeats (Figure 2), fearing a loss of both international and local backing for its campaign. They argue that Puntland has overstated the significance of “capturing strategically less relevant” villages like Shebaab and other areas in Togjaceel Valley, inflated casualty figures of militants, and falsely claimed the killing of senior ISS operatives along with their families to present these operations as decisive setbacks for the group. In response, ISS supporters have widely shared images of killed Puntland soldiers and commanders (Figure 3), claiming that Puntland forces are desperately trying to conceal their substantial manpower losses. They have also increasingly threatened civilians and prominent Puntland clerics like Sheikh Mohammad Haji Yusuf who have vocalised their support for Puntland’s offensive against the group.
Figure 2: ISS claims Puntland is waging a media propaganda war against the group.
Figure 3: Propaganda poster showing images of injured and killed Puntland forces in clashes.
Sympathisers have also directed their hostility toward Puntland’s president, Said Abdullahi Deni, accusing him of exploiting US and UAE-funded resources meant for combating ISS to enrich himself, labelling him as an apostate. They portray him as a weak and corrupt leader who struggles to assert authority over Puntland’s fragmented security institutions. Allegations include allocating key posts within Puntland security forces based on tribal patronage and clan loyalties, and leveraging the security apparatus to suppress political dissent. Mocking the tensions and frequent standoffs between the UAE-financed Puntland Maritime Police Force and the US-backed elite counterterrorism unit, the Puntland Security Force (PSF), they claim these internal rifts within the Puntland Defence forces will play into the hands of militants.
Puntland has actively mobilised local tribal clans in the Bari region, enlisting them to provide manpower and intelligence to counter the growing threat from ISS. In response, ISS sympathisers accuse President Deni of coercing tribal leaders to send young men from their clans to fight in exchange for greater political and economic autonomy over their areas.
ISS has traditionally focused on recruiting from, as well as reportedly committing atrocities against the Ali Saleeban sub-clan. This sub-clan is part of the Majerteen clan in Puntland, to which ISS’ leader, Abdul Qadir Al-Mumin, belongs. There have also been reports of recent defections and the surrender of senior Somalia ISS militants, including many foreign fighters, to authorities. In a March broadcast, ISS’s primary East African media outlet, Al Hijratain Radio, addressed these issues with propagandist Feldu claiming that Somali fighters have recently defected from its ranks due to fear of clan abandonment, pressure from tribal elders, and retribution from the Puntland government. Meanwhile, pro-IS Somali Majerteen media sought to translate these broadcasts into Arabic and English to expand their outreach.
ISS vs US and UAE
Manjaniq Media has ramped up its anti-US propaganda. Its commentaries claim that US airstrikes either failed to hit the fighters or ended up targeting civilians, highlighting their operational incompetence. They depict Deni and Somalia’s President Hassan Mohamud as beholden to US interests, symbolised in a propaganda poster where they appear as puppets under Donald Trump’s control (Figure 4). They claim Puntland’s President Deni has treated his own Puntland forces as expendable in defending the US’ strategic interests (Figure 5).
Figure 4: Trump controlling various Somali leaders and Puntland leaders.
Figure 5: Supporters claim Puntland is fighting the US’s war against ISS.
Supporters also mock the failure of US intelligence agencies in hunting down IS Caliph Abu Hafs Al-Hashimi Al-Qurashi and ISS leader Abdul Qadir al-Mumin, who survived a US airstrike in May 2023. They claim that despite the US spending substantial resources, it has been unable to limit the IS’ caliph’s identity, and instead relies on disinformation and false leads to trace their identities by trapping Muslims. They claim that their leaders’ strategic silence and lack of public appearances are part of a deliberate strategy to maintain secrecy, which makes IS’ robust internal security and governance structures too difficult to infiltrate.
Sympathisers also slam the US for focusing on a few ISS fighters with repeated airstrikes, while overlooking the threat from thousands of Al-Shabaab militants attacking Somali forces in Central Somalia as a part of their recent offensive. They allege that, like the Taliban, Al Shabab would impose a form of moderate Sharia law after seizing power in Mogadishu – one that is palatable to the West in exchange for economic aid and assistance in fighting ISS. They also criticise Al-Shabaab as a stagnant defensive force, accusing it of failing to confront the Puntland army despite its long-term operational presence in the Cal Miskad mountains, where ISS has been vying for strategic control with Al-Shabaab (Figure 6).
Figure 6: Supporters’ criticism of Al Shabab.
The UAE’s leading support for Puntland has also drawn intense scrutiny from Somali IS sympathisers. They allege that under President Deni, Puntland functions as a UAE protectorate by using Puntland’s leadership and Puntland Maritime Force as proxies, an operational strategy it has followed throughout the African theatre to expand its geopolitical footprint. The UAE-trained Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) is accused of protecting Emirati companies engaged in mining operations and exploiting Puntland’s natural resources. Deni is being held complicit in facilitating UAE airstrikes that ISS claims killed innocent civilians alongside militants (Figure 7).
Figure 7: ISS blames Deni for civilian deaths and destruction from US-UAE airstrikes.
Fundraising and Recruitment Efforts
With an estimated 700–1,500 fighters, ISS has evolved in strength. The group has attracted foreign recruits from Middle East countries and mainly East African countries of Ethiopia and Kenya with its amplified media propaganda primarily targeting the Amharic and Oromo-speaking Muslims in these countries. ISS’ media outreach is mainly strengthened by Al Hijraytain Radio, which produces broadcasts in Somali, Oromo, and Amharic languages. It addresses dense theological and religious topics, conflict updates, and the group’s perspectives on global security events. Al Hijratain’s March and April broadcasts have heavily focused on presenting ISS’ viewpoint on its current operational trajectory against the US and UAE-backed Puntland campaign. Another leading media propaganda outlet, Voice of Munasir, also produces new releases and translates IS’s official news broadcasts into Amharic.
Since October 2024, pro-ISIS propagandists in the Amharic and Oromo media landscape have escalated their covert fundraising and recruitment efforts, leading ISS supporter discussion groups and operating independent advocacy channels on Telegram. They present these platforms for “IS supporters living in Ethiopia,” encouraging them to resolve their doubts about IS’ creed and methodology. Two prominent Ethiopian Amharic and Oromo-speaking IS recruiters operated separate Telegram channels until January 2025, directing the vetted recruits to Ethiopian fighters in Somalia and facilitating their hijrah to that country.
A female IS supporter in one of the Telegram groups also claimed that a few militants entered Somalia with the help of these recruiters. They also urged the Ethiopians in the ranks of Al Shabaab to repent for their sins by defecting to ISS. During Ramadan, Amharic-speaking propagandists circulated a new crowdfunding campaign in Telegram groups, moderated these discussion channels, and facilitated connections between vetted donors and ISS operatives. They were instructed to transfer funds through hawala networks to ISS facilitators and supporters in Ethiopia by providing their bank account details. Somali IS propagandists had also, in the past, urged supporters to contact the media propagandist administering the Radio Al-Hijratain Telegram channel for sending money transfers.
Though there is a larger presence of the Ethiopians in the ranks of ISS, the group has not been able to consolidate its operational presence or launch large-scale attacks inside Ethiopia. Amharic ISS sympathisers in their discourse have often focused on the absence of IS cells in Ethiopia, hoping for the establishment of Wilayah Ethiopia. Propagandists instead encourage them to join ISS in Somalia if they want to wage jihad against the Ethiopian government. Somali ISS propagandists have also criticised the Ethiopian fighters who recently surrendered to Puntland forces as hypocrites and “insincere opportunists lacking true commitment to jihad.” Supporters have also threatened defected foreign ISS fighters against revealing their whereabouts to authorities, claiming that defections are divine tests meant to purify and strengthen their ranks.
In ISS supporter propaganda, Ethiopia has been labelled as part of a crusader coalition led by the US, “invading Muslim lands” by launching airstrikes inside Somalia, killing innocent Muslims. They implore young Muslims to distance themselves from Ethiopian political parties, and imams” who promote Ethiopian patriotism and nationalism that corrupt the Muslim faith. Condemning Ethiopian Muslims for turning to demonstrations in the face of perceived religious persecution, they encourage them to carry out attacks inside Ethiopia, claiming that one such attack would incite other Muslims to carry similar lone wolf attacks inside the country.
Conclusion
ISS supporters also employed AI models like Chatgpt and other animation software to create memes and Ghibli-style portraits. They aim to show IS fighters humiliating an “enemy soldier”, referring to Putland’s forces, to blend satire with propaganda. While the extremist jihadist propaganda in Amharic, Oromo and Somali scripts has traditionally evaded scrutiny and moderation on platforms like Telegram, since February, supporters have reported on the deletion of their primary discussion groups and accounts. They claim that the regular digital crackdown won’t deter them from expanding their presence. Some advise against following Telegram bots of IS-linked propaganda outlets to avert account takedowns and suggest using profile pictures and usernames that do not overtly reveal their support for the group, along with using alternate encrypted applications like Zangi messenger. ISS’ online recruitment and financial activities have not been as overt as its counterpart IS’s Wilayah Khurasan in Afghanistan. However, several Oromo, Amharic, and Somali-speaking IS propagandists —who moderate supporter forums on Telegram—have acknowledged direct contact with foreign ISS operatives, especially foreign fighters. Acting as intermediaries, they connect vetted supporters wanting to send donations or potential recruits to ISS operatives, bolstering ISS’s online recruitment and fundraising campaigns. Thus, rigorous monitoring of their echo chambers and digital footprints could provide intelligence agencies with critical leads and help map connections to the official ISS media network, aiding in dismantling its media and financial infrastructure.
Mona Thakkar is a Research Fellow at ICSVE, where she focuses on monitoring militant jihadist groups and their financial networks. X: t16_mona