Introduction
In July 2024, two Singaporeans were issued Restriction Orders under the Internal Security Act (ISA) after having been separately radicalised by the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. Restriction Orders are applied in Singapore if the offence is not serious enough for incarceration, Order of Detention. Individuals with a Restriction Order are placed under restrictions, which include the inability to leave the country without permission, among other restrictions. The first was An’nadya binte An’nahari, a 33-year-old public servant, and the second was a 14-year-old student. Upon investigation, authorities found that both advocated violence against Israelis and Jews and were willing to commit attacks in Singapore. In both instances, they were radicalised through online extremist exposure.
This was not the first time Singaporeans have been radicalised by online extremist narratives about the Israel-Hamas conflict. There have been others who were also radicalised by various extremist narratives online, from Islamist extremist groups to far-right ideologies. This requires an understanding of how radicalisation processes transpire in Singapore.
This Insight will discuss the processes of online radicalisation in Singapore, providing an in-depth analysis of how individuals become susceptible to extremist ideologies. By examining the ideological, personal, social and technological influences, we unpack vulnerabilities that extremists seek to exploit digital platforms to amplify their influence during the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, this Insight argues that organisations’ solutions against online extremism should not be confined to online policies. Offline policies are also critical in developing resilience against extremist narratives circulated online.
Role of Ideology
Among other things, ideology is significant in the formation of extremist groups and movements. It allows extremist followers to share a common goal, a sense of brotherhood and provide meaning for their struggle. The 14-year-old youth who was issued a Restriction Order was aspiring to fight for the Black Flag Army (BFA) and die as a martyr. A similar case was reported in April 2022 where Radjev Lal S/O Madan Lal, a 29-year-old Singaporean, was detained for being willing to partake in armed violence with the BFA to kill the “enemies” of Islam. The BFA is a religious rhetoric or prophecy adopted by Islamist extremist groups, which claims that the Army of the Black Flag will rise in Khorasan – modern-day Afghanistan – to usher in the end of times. The BFA is not used in reference to a specific group.
This desire to fight for the BFA stems from the apocalyptic Hadith of the Black Flags, which mentions that ‘there will emerge from the Khorasan black banners which nothing will repel until they are set up in Jerusalem.’ In another narration, the hadith or Prophetic Saying states, ‘When the black flags come from Khorasan go to them, even if you have to crawl on ice, for among them is the Caliph from Allah, the Mahdi.’
Far-right extremist ideology also has a presence in Singapore. Two recent ISA cases involving local youths highlight how they were influenced by the Great Replacement narrative – a conspiracy theory claiming that native populations, often depicted as white and Christian, are being intentionally replaced by the elite with immigrants. The first was a 16-year-old Protestant Christian who was detained in December 2020 for planning to conduct terrorist attacks against Muslims at two mosques. He was convinced of the far-right extremist rhetoric that Islam is a religion that supports violence and that Muslims should be marginalised and even fought against. The youth’s anti-Muslim sentiments are not entirely unexpected, as Singapore has seen instances of non-violent Islamophobia. This was also backed by a survey in 2019, which saw some 15% of Singaporeans find Muslims “threatening.”
The second, a 16-year-old Chinese student issued with a Restriction Order in November 2023, had been exposed to far-right ideologies since 2022. He developed an intense hatred towards African Americans, Arabs, and LGBTQ+ individuals. Despite not being white, he identified himself strongly as a white supremacist and intended to conduct attacks overseas for this cause. Dr Kumar Ramakrishna, a professor of National Security Studies, explained this phenomenon of “Multicultural White Supremacy,” where non-whites spreading far-right narratives are not unheard of; in fact, it has been happening in the West.
Beyond ideology, there are other motivations that drive an individual onto the pathway of radicalisation.
Quest for Identity
Most extremist groups exploit the innate human need to be part of a social group to recruit and radicalise. Terrorist recruiters promote a common narrative structure: the mere presence of “them” threatens “our” very existence. Therefore, violence against “them” is justified for the survival of “us”. This is reflected in Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s “Call to Global Islamic Resistance” and Andres Breivik’s “White Replacement Theory.” Both argue that the survival of either the Muslim or Western identity is dependent on the destruction of the “Crusader West” or non-European immigrants, respectively. Similarly, conflicts such as the ongoing Israel-Gaza war can also be simplified through such a narrative lens to justify violence against civilians.
The propagation of these narratives is most conducive when communities are socially isolated and othered, when a clear “us” and “them” can be established. In most of Southeast Asia, terrorists are radicalised through offline networks such as kinship, friendship, or scholarship – the close nature of such networks can facilitate the isolation of terrorists against mainstream influences. A study in Indonesia shows that only 9% of all convicted IS-affiliated terrorists were radicalised online. Terrorism scholar Sidney Jones has argued that some “inherit jihad” as the binary us-versus-them worldview is passed on from one generation to another. Terrorist-sponsored madrasas (religious schools) were also used to isolate and indoctrinate students. In most situations, offline radicalisation occurs more frequently than online radicalisation because isolated communities reinforce one’s communal identity and the need to defend it.
Singapore’s Unique Online Threat
The threat of online radicalisation in Singapore is quite unique in the context of Southeast Asia. Singapore is a multicultural, cosmopolitan society without active terrorist groups operating within its society, at least not since the discovery and decimation of the Jemaah Islamiyah group in 2001-2002. As such, the cyberspace has become a substitute for face-to-face radicalisation. As social media platforms optimise content based on the user’s preferences to increase consumption, the curated content serves as an echo chamber that reinforces and amplifies the user’s worldview. As a result, virtual spaces have become an outlet to isolate individuals from the melting pot of cultures and social harmony, rendering the “us versus them” narrative more conducive. According to the recently published Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report 2024, 52 self-radicalised individuals were dealt with under the ISA. An assessment from the United Nations Security Council also highlighted an expected increased risk of online radicalisation due to the increased dependence on social media for socialisation.
Youth and Adolescent Deviancy
The radicalisation of youth is not unprecedented in Singapore. Between 2014 and 2020, 71% of detainees with terrorism-related charges were youths under 35 years old, and 6% were adolescents under 20 years. The proportion of youths being detained under the ISA is consistent with global trends; in 2004, psychiatrist and counter-terrorism consultant Marc Sageman found that the average age of terrorists is 25.6 years old globally and 29.4 years old in Southeast Asia. However, the proportion of adolescents detained for terrorism charges in Singapore between 2020 and 2022 was high.
During the period of the global pandemic, five adolescents under the age of 20 were detained for terrorism-related charges. This constituted 66% of all ISA detainees detained during 2020 and 2022. Four of the detainees, including a 15-year-old male detained in 2022, had harboured the intention to conduct attacks locally. [1] Adolescents were reported to be self-radicalised through innocuous games and online forums. The increasing number of adolescents being radicalised in Singapore is rightfully concerning.
Youths and adolescents are not only susceptible to radicalisation; they are also prone to criminal influences. Between 2020 and 2022, there has been an observable increase in affective crimes, which include sex-related crimes, domestic violence, and animal abuse, with a sizeable proportion of youth and adolescent offenders. Overall, adolescents are most susceptible to anti-social behaviour as they might not have developed the psychosocial maturity to regulate their emotions and impulses.
Combatting Online Extremism Offline
Overall, Singapore is not immune to the effects of identity-driven propaganda and adolescent deviancy, which can foster a conducive environment for online radicalisation. Despite Singapore’s vulnerabilities, it remains resilient against extremism. It was reported that the recent 14-year-old male detainee was unsuccessful in his attempt to recruit his classmates to participate in his cause. Therefore, Singapore can remain optimistically vigilant against identity-driven extremism.
Ultimately, online extremism cannot be defeated with a pure virtual strategy. Content takedowns and online counternarratives only address the symptoms and do not nip the problem in the bud. The discussion above demonstrates how online “self-radicalisation” is still heavily influenced by the individual’s physical environment. Therefore, investments to counter online extremism should include offline mechanisms to improve social and psychological resilience.
Social Resilience
Social cohesion and inclusion are the first line of defence against extremist propaganda. Studies have shown that increased contact time can reduce prejudice between identity groups. Therefore, physical social mixing is a key strategy against extremism as it increases the contact time between groups that might develop prejudice against one another. To this end, Singapore’s pervasive social mixing policies are an anti-virus against the “us-versus-them” rhetoric. Nevertheless, Singapore can further improve its resilience against extremism.
Countering violent extremism should go beyond top-down or official formal engagement and deradicalisation programmes. Besides social mixing policies, it is crucial for adolescents to develop multiple social identities to reduce the distinction between the in-group and out-group. This can be achieved by encouraging adolescents to make friends beyond the classroom through co-curricular activities, enrichment programmes, hobby groups, community service and interfaith circles. The exposure to varied communities introduces adolescents to different social roles and helps them learn how to navigate the social norms of different communities. Naturally, this will also reduce the chances of social isolation. Comprehensive social mixing and socialisation can improve the community’s resilience against extremist narratives.
Psychological Resilience
Psychological resilience helps individuals to cope with stress and adversity. As extremists often exploit pre-existing grievances, the ability to manage one’s anger, frustration, and sense of alienation can prevent one from being swayed by extremist ideologies. A report from the European Union highlighted that mental health issues are becoming more prevalent among lone-wolf terrorists. While the causal mechanism between mental health and terrorism has not been established yet, programmes to support the mental health of individuals and communities can also be considered as a discrete counter-radicalisation strategy.
Therefore, the Singaporean government has launched a national mental health strategy and provided resources for individuals and families who seek to nurture their mental well-being. The Internal Security Department (ISD) also invested in building psychological resilience by partnering with the Ministry of Education. Since 2007, ISD has collaborated with schools and institutes of higher learning on various counterterrorism and counter-radicalisation activities such as talks, workshops, seminars, and webinars. School principals, teachers, counsellors, and student welfare officers have been trained to spot tell-tale signs of radicalisation. More importantly, schools constantly strive to develop critical thinking skills, promote open-mindedness and provide safe spaces for students to express their thoughts and concerns. These are invaluable life skills to guard against extremist rhetoric and beliefs at any age.
Kenneth Yeo and Ahmad Saiful Rijal are Associate Research Fellows with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.