This Insight was published as part of GIFCT’s Working Group on Countering the Financing of Terrorism Online (CFTO). GIFCT Working Groups bring together experts from diverse stakeholder groups, geographies and disciplines to offer advice in specific thematic areas and deliver on targeted, substantive projects.
The United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) recent arrest and subsequent asset freezing of 21 individuals and entities on 12 May 2026, due to their alleged financial ties to Hezbollah, demonstrates the group’s ability to sustain its financial networks beyond Lebanon. Despite recent setbacks, the group has expanded its illicit financing since 2024 by exploiting regulatory gaps and generating revenue through drug trafficking, money laundering and smuggling across several regions. The group successfully expanded its overall financial volume by incorporating diversified revenue streams and broadening its global income networks.
This Insight examines five key financing mechanisms used by Hezbollah: Al-Qard Al-Hasan (AQAH), financial support from Iran and affiliated groups, hawala networks, cryptocurrencies, and online gambling. These mechanisms are highlighted because their informal, transnational, or anonymous nature enables Hezbollah to circumvent counter-terrorism financing measures. The Insight concludes with key takeaways to address those issues.
A Brief Financial Overview
Hezbollah remains financially resilient despite being designated a terrorist group by several Western countries. A France24 report indicates that Hezbollah fighters still receive monthly cash salaries of $500 to $700, well above Lebanon’s minimum wage of $312. According to the November 2024 Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement, Hezbollah has provided “about one billion dollars to 50,000 families affected by the latest war”. The group’s financial resilience has been maintained through a sophisticated, diversified financial network that includes funding through the Lebanese diaspora.
Shell Organisations Funding Hezbollah
Al-Qard Al-Hasan: A Growing Threat with Lebanese Diaspora Links
One of the main cash sources for Hezbollah is the Al-Qard al-Hasan Association (AQAH). Founded in 1983, the foundation provides loans to civilians in areas where Hezbollah has strong support, heavily concentrated in the southern region of Lebanon accordance with Islamic finance principles, the foundation does not charge interest. The group has effectively leveraged the global reach of the Shia Lebanese community to secure financial support, taking advantage of their financial connections to their homeland, often acting as a vital source of economic support through remittances and investments. Through establishing an informal, clan-based network of extended families, partially maintained through expatriates in Africa, Canada, and Australia who participate out of a sense of communal or sectarian duty, the AQAH allows Hezbollah to be highly resilient while exploiting vulnerabilities in the global banking system.
A recent example is a financially linked cell of five individuals that was dismantled by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on 20 March 2026. They were found to be operating within the UAE under a fictitious commercial enterprise through illegal activities linked to money laundering and terrorism financing. This was not the only incident. On 12 May 2026, the UAE had 16 Lebanese nationals and five entities on their terrorist list with links to Hezbollah. However, only the UAE and Kuwait have so far included AQAH-linked individuals on their terrorist lists. This demonstrates a gap in the region’s security, reflecting an absence of collective cooperation to counter threats.
However, despite crackdowns like those in the UAE and Israel’s bombing of some AQAH branches in October 2024, the association continues to operate. Hezbollah announced it would continue to operate the foundation and refused to terminate its services. Israel has recently called on the Lebanese people to withdraw their money from the AQAH, and Lebanon’s central bank has also banned banks and brokerages from dealing with the association. However, the sanctioned association has assisted thousands of Lebanese citizens through its gold and cash loan programs. It has gained global attention as a direct response to Lebanon’s economic crisis, offering an alternative to private banks whose aggressive collection practices and restrictive lending have left many citizens feeling exploited. The heavy reliance of the Lebanese diaspora and domestic population on the AQAH for sending remittances is concerning, as it inadvertently contributes to the resilience of the foundation and Hezbollah.
Hezbollah’s Diverse Financing Network Beyond AQAH
Iran – Still Hezbollah’s Main Backer
The relationship between Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the fundamental pillar tasked with safeguarding Iran’s clerical regime, has been strong. Hezbollah functions as a critical strategic asset for the IRGC as part of its self-styled ‘Axis of Resistance’, and the group relies heavily on state funding from Iran. According to U.S. estimates, Iran’s funding of Hezbollah has surpassed $700 million annually. Nevertheless, notwithstanding this heavy financial backing, Hezbollah has also sought an additional $2 billion from Tehran to support the group’s rehabilitation, given its reduced size and capability as a result of the intense conflict following October 7th, 2023. According to a U.S. Treasury Department report in November 2025, the IRGC transferred more than $1 billion to the group over 10 months in 2025 through the Quds Force, the overseas branch of the IRGC, despite international sanctions.
Bayt Al-Mal is also another unofficial source of funding for Hezbollah. While not as popular as AQAH, it is responsible for preserving Hezbollah’s assets and investments. In addition to its role as an intermediary between Hezbollah and the banks, it operates directly under the supervision of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Naim Qassem. With the aim of disrupting the flow of funds to and from the group, the U.S. has sanctioned this network alongside other senior members who worked as intermediaries to facilitate transfers. Although the internal treasury of the IS and Hezbollah’s Bayt Al-Mal share identical names, Hezbollah’s Bayt Al-Mal maintains total operational autonomy and is entirely disconnected from other regional networks.
Iraqi Shia Militias’ Hezbollah Funding Campaigns
Iraqi Shia militant groups also contribute to funding Hezbollah. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq, the Iran-backed militia in Iraq, launched a campaign, ‘Faithful to the Promise’, to collect donations for the Lebanese and Iraqi people. Donors are directed to deliver funds to designated representatives whose contact information is circulated across 16 Iraqi governorates. Money is then channelled through informal intermediaries, effectively bypassing banks and licensed money transfer mechanisms. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq has also donated its March 2026 salaries to support the Iranian and Lebanese people. Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya, another Iraqi militia backed by Iran, has similarly launched a donation campaign for Lebanon and Iran, describing them as the lands of Jihad.
Hidden Transactions, Exploited Systems
Hawala Networks¹ and Other Exploited Systems
Since the war with Israel, Hezbollah has become more dependent on cash transfers through intermediaries and trusted connections in Hawala networks to avoid banking channels. It was reported that Iran funds the group through Hawala networks in Dubai.
The group has also increased its reliance on business-like entities around the world. A global network of 16 business entities and individuals was sanctioned last March. Alaa Hassan Hamieh, a former official with the Investment Development Authority of Lebanon, utilised a complex structure of front companies and family-linked associates to launder funds and generate capital for Hezbollah’s operations. Since 2020, this international network, spanning several countries, including Lebanon, has illegally diverted over $100 million.
Furthermore, the group was reported to be involved in the illicit Captagon drug trade, as the U.S. has sanctioned individuals involved and associated with Hezbollah. In 2025, Hezbollah reportedly had to divert its sources of revenue due to U.S. sanctions and increased scrutiny. Consequently, the group has focused on narcotics smuggling and money laundering activities in Latin American Free Trade Zones besides oil and liquefied natural gas through Lebanese business networks, generating millions of dollars.
Cryptocurrency: Why Hezbollah Is Using It
In addition to more traditional financial avenues, Hezbollah has also taken to using cryptocurrencies to strengthen its financial resilience, most notably Tether, as this platform allows for the anonymous movement of funds internationally.
This has been evident with Binance, a cryptocurrency network, which has failed to block the flow of hundreds of millions of dollars to Hezbollah in cryptocurrencies through suspicious accounts. Most of the money in those accounts was sent from four cryptocurrency wallets linked to Tawfiq Al-Law, a Syrian individual, accused of transferring illicit funds to Hezbollah, the Houthis, and a company linked to the Assad regime in Syria.
Illicit Online Gambling
The black market for illegal gambling is another source of funding for Hezbollah, as it is gaining popularity in Lebanon among the youth due to the economic adversity resulting from the ongoing conflict. The group utilises it as a secure channel to generate hidden profits through anonymous accounts that bypass standard identification protocols. Hezbollah operates through gambling sites like Stake through a wide range of ‘fake clients’, who control the software in and outside Lebanon, in Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Africa. These operators attract players who transfer funds through cryptocurrencies or unregulated payment companies. By exploiting ‘know your client’ weaknesses and transaction anonymity, the group conceals its clients and activities. It then profits from the players’ losses if it owns the site or receives a share for providing illegal gambling sites with security protection.
Examples from Europe: Legal Differences Legitimise Hezbollah Funding Campaigns
Through fundraising activities in Germany and the United Kingdom via various Islamic institutions and Shiite donors, Hezbollah has been exploring and exploiting financial opportunities across the continent. Its activities there have been coordinated through Hezbollah’s External Security agency, specifically its Business Affairs Component, which has longstanding ties to Latin American drug cartels.
Division within the European Union (EU) over Hezbollah’s classification has made its activities possible; some countries classify the entire group as a terrorist group, while others, including France, classify Hezbollah’s military and political wing as two separate entities. This disparity creates a legitimate environment that allows the group to operate within Europe, including collecting donations through religious and charitable institutions, which gives it the ability to legitimise its financial campaigns within the EU.
In Germany, for example, charities such as “the Lebanon Orphans Project” collected donations through local banks to “Hezbollah” as humanitarian aid, and these funds were used in part to support the families of Lebanese who were killed in attacks or battles with the Israeli army. Since being outlawed by German authorities in 2014, it has subsequently rebranded itself as ‘Colours for Orphans’.
Another example is the debate in the United Kingdom surrounding the Zayer Charitable Organisation. The student associations across multiple British universities raised thousands of pounds for Zayir UK, an entity lacking official recognition from the Charity Commission. Reports indicate that it functions as the British arm of the Beirut-based Zayer Charitable Organisation, which allegedly maintains links to Hezbollah. While student societies suspended fundraising activities pending investigations, deep concerns remain that donations could be channelled into Hezbollah-backed projects in Lebanon.
These cases highlight how Hezbollah leverages decentralised, low-barrier fundraising methods such as micro-donations, campus campaigns, and third-party intermediaries to avoid traditional banking safeguards.
Key Takeaways
Military strikes alone without an international financial strategy focused on the group’s financial networks are unlikely to significantly undermine its long-term financing capabilities or its capacity to refinance its operations. A unified international legal and financial approach will be needed. So far, countries have succeeded in disrupting financial plots on a unilateral, case-by-case basis, as demonstrated by the UAE’s handling of diaspora networks. However, a collective framework emphasising intelligence-enhanced methods, financial monitoring, secure data sharing, and technology literacy is essential across Arab countries and beyond.
Until then, the group will continue to rely on the AQAH to manage its financial networks and enhance its ability to operate and fund terrorist attacks outside Lebanon; thus, the Lebanese diaspora should be encouraged to boycott the association and turn to other regulated money providers to assist their brethren.
This need for coordination extends to Hezbollah’s legal status in Europe. EU divisions over Hezbollah’s classification enable its political wing to operate and raise funds within Europe through religious and charitable institutions.
Without a more coordinated regulatory response, Hezbollah may continue exploiting online gambling, cryptocurrencies and other financial loopholes. Gambling operators and payment providers should jointly verify all transfers and accept deposits only from verified bank accounts, sovereign-backed payment instruments, or digital wallets linked to identities confirmed through primary biometrics, while prohibiting third-party deposits, anonymous vouchers and unverified cryptocurrencies.
As Hezbollah has exploited the trust and reach of the Lebanese diaspora and Shia communities around the world in the Middle East, Europe and Africa to establish financial pipelines to maintain its resilience, Southeast Asia governments should collaborate to maintain vigilance and strengthen oversight of informal supply channels and community-based fundraising to ensure that local communities are not inadvertently supporting the group’s global agenda.
1. Hawala networks are informal transfer systems that rely on a personal network of brokers called hawaladars, who facilitate the transactions using their own personal trusted circles.
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Dr Ghada Soliman is a Research Fellow in the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. Her research focuses on extremism and terrorism financing in the Middle East and North Africa regions.
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