The Designation of 764 Network: Why Does it Matter?

By Tanya Mehra

16th March 2026 In Insights

The 764 network is an international online sadistic network which operates at the intersection of violent extremism, child sexual exploitation, and other forms of extreme violence, including animal cruelty, self-harm and assisted suicide. Proponents of the network systematically prey on vulnerable youth across multiple platforms, including online communities related to mental health and gaming platforms. 764 is a decentralised, loosely connected network that functions within the larger Com-network, with many offshoots and branches, such as Maniac Murder Cult (MMC) and No Lives Matter (NLM). It is associated with violent accelerationist ideology and nihilist violence while adopting esoteric practices. 

In recent years, law enforcement agencies across the globe have been warning about online nihilist networks that exploit and manipulate minors. This fits in a broader trend in which a growing number of children are involved in violent extremist activities, such as 764. 

In December 2025, Canada formally listed the 764 Network as a terrorist group. New Zealand adopted a similar approach when it designated the Order of Nine Angles (O9A), which is adjacent to 764 and coexists within the same ecosystem. 

These designations are relevant because they place 764 and other nihilist groups within the realm of terrorism rather than treating it solely as a criminal or child-exploitation phenomenon. Such a shift has important legal, procedural and political ramifications. 

Therefore, this Insight examines the significance of designating 764 as a terrorist organisation in Canada, the EU, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). It analyses the different procedures, criteria and consequences of designation; evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of applying a terrorist designation to such networks; and offers practical recommendations for responding to the growing threat posed by the 764 network. 

Designation, Listing and Proscriptions 

The vast majority of individuals and organisations that are listed as terrorists are those linked to jihadism. Only more recently have governments begun to designate right-wing extremists and neo-nazi groups. For instance, in the EU, the Base was the first right-wing extremist group to be listed in 2024, marking a shift in terrorist designations beyond jihadism. In the US, the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) was designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity in 2020.  However, the consequences of such a designation are primarily limited to financial sanctions, which are less far-reaching than those of designation as a foreign terrorist organisation (FTO). In 2024, the Nordic Resistance Movement and the Terrorgram Collective were also added to the US’ SDGT list. 

By contrast, countries such as the UK and Canada have been comparatively more proactive in listing right-wing and neo-Nazi organisations. The first far-right group proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000 in the UK, the National Action, dates back to 2016, followed by numerous designations in the years that followed. These include neo-nazi groups such as Sonnenkrieg Division, Atomwaffen Division and most recently, MMC. As of February 2026, seven right-wing extremist organisations are proscribed in the UK. Canada has a similar trajectory, with the first designation in 2019 being for Blood & Honour and its military wing Combat 18. Over the years, groups such as Atomwaffen, the Proud Boys, and the Three Percenters were added. As of February 2026, Canada has listed 10 right-wing extremist groups under its Criminal Code.

This gradual shift in expanding designations beyond jihadist organisations reflects the evolving terrorism threat landscape more accurately. Whilst jihadi and jihadi-inspired attacks remain persistent, threats emanating from the far-right spectrum have become equally a concern in many Western countries. In addition, anti-institutional extremism is emerging as a threat. The debate over whether the designation of nihilistic extremist groups – arguably perceived as a new category consisting of groups such as 764 – fits within the broader trend of terrorist designations.

Based on my earlier research by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism conducted on the legal pathways to counter 764, it important to distinguish that each country and region, in this case the EU, has their own set of rules when an individual or organisation can be designated, which criteria have to be met, available review mechanisms and what the consequences are (see table below). In general, the listing process is carried out by an executive body, based on intelligence assessments, and triggers significant legal consequences.

Advantages of Designations 

By designating a group, a government signals an unequivocal political condemnation that its activities and narrative are unacceptable. Designation also serves as a warning to the public to refrain from joining or supporting designated groups. Considering the nature of crimes associated with 764, including systematic exploitation of minors and their glorification of violence, the designation underscores the gravity and seriousness of the crimes. Furthermore, with reportedly over 5000  victims of the network, its designation also acknowledges the scale and seriousness of the problem.

However, pursuing a listing is not purely symbolic; depending on the consequences of listing, certain behaviour is criminalised, allowing the prosecution of terrorist-related offences and unlocking special investigative tools. In the US and the UK, membership of a designated group constitutes a criminal offence, whereas in Canada, participation is criminalised. 

Another advantage, especially for EU countries, is that designation leads to enhanced international cooperation in investigations and prosecutions. This means that relevant bodies, such as law enforcement, judicial, and intelligence agencies, can rely on the widest possible assistance with respect to listed groups. Given that 764 is an international network with perpetrators and victims spanning the globe, international cooperation is essential. 

Finally, terrorist designations are helpful for online platforms. While most platforms have adopted their own community standards and content moderation policies, ambiguities around the type of online content can often lead to inconsistent enforcement. For instance, the broad range of harm associated with 764 can fall within different categories: it can be terrorist content, child sexual exploitation material or gore content. It could also consist of implicit extremist content – content that promotes hateful, anti-democratic, or violent ideologies through subtle, ambiguous, or coded language,  which may at first glance appear to be legal rather than explicit calls to violence. A formal designation provides greater clarity and enables platforms to act more swiftly, as they can rely on governments’ assessments of what constitutes terrorist content rather than making such determinations themselves. 

Disadvantages of Designations 

One challenge in designating a network such as 764 concerns its organisational structure. Unlike traditional terrorist groups, 764 lacks distinct leadership, membership roles, and a hierarchy, utilising both mainstream and fringe platforms for different purposes. It is a loosely connected network operating within a wider online constellation of the Com-network. 764 functions more as a brand – as an ‘overcoat’ – that can easily be replaced by another without changing the core activities or narratives. This dynamic contributes to the constantly splintering and rebranding. The fluidity and overlap between different online offshoots such as CVLT, Court, Kaskar, Harm Nation and 764 blur the boundaries and challenge applying terrorist designations as this framework is built on identifiable identities. 

There is concern that designating 764 could be counterproductive. Within the online extremist ecosystem, violence for the sake of violence is often more important than an ideological drive. The framework of composite violent extremism refers to individuals whose beliefs are ambiguous, mixed, fused or convergent, and also applies to many of the 764-network. It appears that members are not necessarily ideologically motivated and are more driven by status and notoriety.  The more heinous the crime, the greater the shock effect contributes to the status within the 764 ecosystem, which is also referred to as clout chasing. A terrorist designation may amplify this and contribute to their perceived significance. 

However, one of the most significant questions about its designation is whether the actions of 764 can be perceived as terrorism. This goes beyond a conceptual understanding and has many legal and policy implications. While each of the terrorist listing systems have their own criteria, the determination hinges on the ideological requirement. In the UK, and to a lesser extent in Canada, a group or entity can be listed if it is engaged in terrorist activities carried out in whole or in part for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial, or ideological cause. In the US and in the EU, there is no explicit ideological requirement. In the EU, terrorist acts are defined as intentional acts which may seriously damage a country or international organisation, committed with the aim to seriously intimidate a population, compel a government or an international organisation to act (or refrain from acting), or to seriously destabilise or destroy a country’s fundamental structures. The EU listing procedure relies on a decision of a competent authority regarding an investigation, prosecution or conviction for terrorist offences, so the ideological threshold could technically be relevant at the Member State level. However, in most EU countries, the ideological requirement is not part of the legal definition, but it can play a role during sentencing and lead to higher sentences, like in the US. 

Another way of determining whether the activities of 764 can be considered as terrorism is to look at the trajectory of how crimes associated with 764 are being investigated and prosecuted in practice.  

In the overwhelming majority of court cases, crimes committed by 764 and its offshoots are being prosecuted as serious crimes such as creating and distributing child sexual material, grooming, sextortion and (attempted) murder, often leading to substantial prison sentences. In only a few cases are links to terrorism found. 

For example, in Edmonton, Canada,  a teenager was arrested in October 2025 for violating a terrorism peace bond and child pornography offences. Prior to his arrest, he was subjected to a peace bond out of fear that he might commit a terrorist offence in relation to 764 and Com-network.  

In the UK, one individual, from the several 764 related cases in the UK, Cameron F.  pleaded guilty to encouraging suicide, possessing a terrorism manual, and indecent images of a child. He was sentenced to six years prison sentence, and in the sentencing remarks, the court referred to 764 as a “Satanic, Far-Right extremist group”.

The National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Centre (NCITE) examined 31 convictions related to 764 and its precursors, CVLT and Greggy’s Cult, in the US.  The term nihilist violent extremism was used for the first time in a sentencing memorandum in March 2025, as “individuals who engage in criminal conduct … in furtherance of political, social, or religious goals.” However, the first time a person was actually charged with terrorism in relation to 764 was in October 2025. A man from Arizona was charged with knowingly conspiring to provide material support to terrorists under 18 U.S.C. 2339A, which is usually used for international terrorism. The underlying reason for this is that while domestic terrorism is defined under federal law,  it is not criminalised a standalone offence under federal law and therefore cannot be prosecuted as a specific charge. 

Even without the ideological threshold under the EU listing procedure, a group, entity or individual can be nominated by an EU Member State or a third state, and even a single investigation, prosecution or conviction for a terrorist offence may be sufficient to initiate the designation process for 764 at the EU level.

The nature, scale and severity of harm should not be the determining factor to designate, but rather whether the conduct meets the criteria of terrorism and, where applicable, the ideological requirement. One could argue that due to the accelerationist link, 764 meets the ideological requirement. Furthermore, in some of the individual cases, ties with white supremacy and neo-nazi ideology are being overlooked. 

At the same time, an incremental change in the court decisions can be observed, recognising the ideological underpinning of nihilistic violent extremist groups like 764, although the vast majority of 764 cases involve violent and exploitative criminal conduct that are being prosecuted as serious crimes, despite some of the legal challenges. 

Conclusion 

The designation of 764 is important to consider because it reshapes how states investigate, prosecute, and cooperate internationally. At the same time, it raises complex conceptual and legal questions about the nature of terrorism, online extremism, and decentralised digital networks.

Conceptually, there is a risk of conflation. When the activities are motivated by status and revolve around the extremity of violence, sexual child exploitation and coercion by an amorphous online community without an ideological belief, is a terrorism designation appropriate? 

In administrative listing procedures, a person is not being tried in court where fair trial rights such as the presumption of innocence, equality of arms and right to examine witnesses are applicable. Often, lower evidentiary thresholds are being applied, and due to the serious implications, the use of designations should be used sparingly and only when strictly necessary. Whenever prosecution is feasible, it should remain the preferred course. 

As more investigations and prosecutions across multiple jurisdictions acknowledge the ideological underpinning of 764 and similar networks, the momentum to designate 764 is growing.

As the individuals involved are being targeted, recruited, and coerced online, such platforms have an important role to play in better recognising implicit extremist content, particularly because 764 creates content that sits at the intersection of different categories regulated by different hosting platforms. Furthermore, platforms must address cross-platform abuse, which would help identify linkages between 764 that are often overlooked, enabling a more comprehensive understanding of vulnerable persons lured into the nihilistic violent group and the spread of extremist content.

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Tanya Mehra is an Associate Fellow at ICCT. With a background in international law, her research focuses on rule of law approaches in countering-terrorism and other threats to national security. Her work centres on developing effective prosecutorial approaches, policies and measures to counter terrorism, grounded in a strong commitment to the rule of law. Tanya’s recent areas of interest include the use of state threats, CT designation, the involvement of youth in terrorism, online radicalisation, and how to address online extremist content.

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Tags: Nihilistic Violent Extremism, North America