This Insight contributes to GNET’s PhD Researcher Series, highlighting emerging academic voices in the field of countering violent extremism and terrorism online.
On 1 June 2025, two men broke into a military facility outside of Seattle, Washington, and attempted to steal thousands of dollars of equipment. After tracing the case to a nearby home, law enforcement officers quickly discovered more than $20,000 in cash, a collection of Nazi paraphernalia, and a stockpile of weapons. Authorities arrested the two suspects—both reportedly military veterans—and charged them with robbery, assault, and theft of government property. Reports would later indicate that the duo operated a tactical equipment and training company called “Sovereign Solutions,” noting that the brand’s “SS” logo appeared to mirror a symbol popular among neo-Nazis.
Though the theft of equipment from the military by extremists is not a new phenomenon—white supremacists have stolen weapons and ammunition from military bases dating back generations—the suspects’ digital footprint provides unique insight into their involvement in online extremism. Even as the criminal case against these individuals remains ongoing, their open-source history sheds light on cross-platform posting strategies, transnational networking approaches, and the nexus between online organising and offline criminal activity.
To better understand these trends, this Insight will examine the suspects’ online activity across three platforms: an Instagram page, a YouTube account, and a website for “Sovereign Solutions.” As part of this analysis, I will explore how the account owners appear to have tailored posts to evade detection by automated moderation tools, including by adapting their messages across different platforms. Consequently, I will discuss the challenges that emerge from uneven approaches to content moderation, highlighted by the fact that multiple Sovereign Solutions social media accounts remain active nearly two months after the arrests.
What is Sovereign Solutions, and How Did They Operate Online?
According to Washington state business records, the two suspects registered Sovereign Solutions as a limited liability company in March 2023. This timing coincides with the beginning of their alleged criminal activity, as one of the suspects acknowledged to a law enforcement officer that the pair had been stealing and reselling military equipment for approximately two years. Although open-source researchers can’t determine whether the suspects sourced all of the merchandise on the Sovereign Solutions website from these robberies, the origin of this equipment will no doubt be of interest to criminal investigators.
Sovereign Solutions, however, did not exist simply as a platform for selling tactical gear. Across several social media platforms, the company sought to establish itself as a recognisable brand, as well as a hub for training and networking. The Sovereign Solutions website, for example, advertised in-person marksmanship courses, and its Instagram page maintained a “Story Highlight” that promoted customers displaying branded merchandise at military facilities. To be clear, there is no indication that any Sovereign Solutions-affiliated individuals have used the company’s products to carry out violence. Nevertheless, by using online platforms to support a range of activities, Sovereign Solutions effectively bridged the gap between e-commerce, extremist rhetoric, and real-world organising. These activities offer a clear example, as Cynthia Miller-Idriss has written, of how extremist “symbols and iconography move between online and offline spaces.”
A closer examination of Sovereign Solutions’ posts and products also reveals the extent of their engagement with white supremacist extremism. In addition to the clear homage to Nazi symbolism in their logo, Sovereign Solutions’ social media pages promoted familiar extremist themes and references. On Instagram and YouTube, their posts featured imagery frequently associated with white supremacist movements, including the Valknot and black sun. Patches associated with a notorious Weimar-era anti-communist paramilitary unit also appear in several posts across Sovereign Solutions’ social media feeds, as well as the equipment recovered at the suspects’ home. Another Instagram post from 20 April appears to commemorate Adolf Hitler’s birthday, a date frequently celebrated by white supremacists. In addition to these recognisable symbols, Sovereign Solutions’ social media pages also allude to violence against left-wing activists, and their website advertised a “Professional War Crime Committer” t-shirt.
Figure 1: The Sovereign Citizens Logo and one example of Sovereign Citizens merchandise.
Beyond their main social media activity, as the extremism researcher Kate Ross has pointed out, a “Sovereign Solutions Athletics” account remains active on Instagram, though it only displays a single post. This account, which links to the main Sovereign Solutions website, predates both the incorporation of Sovereign Solutions LLC and the beginning of the suspects’ alleged period of theft of military equipment. That said, the account’s promotion of “militant athleticism” aligns with broader trends in the white supremacist ecosystem, which began to emphasise physical fitness around the same time period.
Evading Content Moderation
Though clearly engaged in the spread of extremist ideology, Sovereign Solutions’ accounts also relied on subtler approaches to maximise engagement with their target audience while minimising the likelihood of an account takedown. One post, for example, references a fictitious “Samuel H. Ide raid,” invoking a decade-old Internet hoax to intentionally misidentify the perpetrator of a mass shooting. These thinly-veiled references allow users to generate content that is easily recognisable to members of their in-group, but would not necessarily raise the alarm of outside observers or automated tools.
Other aspects of Sovereign Solutions’ posting strategy illustrate what the scholar Tamar Mitts has termed “cross platform content adaptation,” or the conscious decision by threat actors to tailor content based on the user’s perception of differing content moderation thresholds across social media sites. On Instagram, for example, a video of men wearing night vision goggles and firing rifles featured the caption “Pro-tip: antifa can’t see at night 😈”—an implicit endorsement of violence against an identified out-group. On their YouTube page, however, the same video was simply captioned “[REDACTED] can’t see at night 😈.” The posts, which convey a nearly identical message, reflect the account owners’ awareness of moderation thresholds and reveal a conscious effort to avoid crossing those boundaries.
Figure 2: Contrasting “Sovereign Solutions” posting strategies on Instagram and YouTube.
Uneven Platform Enforcement
Beyond Sovereign Solutions’ online presence, a review of platform decision-making in the aftermath of the suspects’ 2 June arrest provides valuable insights into how social media companies have treated Sovereign Solutions’ accounts differently. According to a New York Times report, LinkedIn removed the company’s page immediately after the arrests. Based on this author’s review, however, Sovereign Solutions’ main Instagram page remained active for several weeks following reports of the arrests in Washington state. And as of this writing, the Sovereign Solutions YouTube page remains active, perhaps attributable to both a lower volume of posts, as well as the account administrators’ decision to censor words such as “antifa” that might trigger automated moderation tools. The company’s main website also remained online until late July, despite advertising the sale of potentially stolen equipment.
Though it is difficult to determine the exact cause of these platforms’ distinct approaches, the consequences of the fractured content moderation landscape are clear. As Mitts writes, “divergence in content policies across platforms is what allows militant organisations to build resilience to moderation—even on large, highly regulated sites.” In failing to respond promptly and uniformly, social media companies undermine the impact of any single platform’s moderation efforts and provide other extremists with lessons for evading detection in the online ecosystem.
Policy Outlook
What lessons might social media companies learn from this case? Mirroring existing efforts to coordinate responses to terrorist and violent extremist attacks, platforms should consider opportunities to coordinate content removals in the aftermath of the arrest of prominent violent extremist actors. To be certain, the utility of such post-hoc interventions is fundamentally limited, and they should not serve as a substitute for preventive approaches. Nevertheless, they could help deter broader networks, stem the spread of extremist content online, and limit the likelihood that influential detainees will serve as an inspiration to like-minded actors.
Such coordination shouldn’t require a significant expenditure of resources, particularly for users who cross-link to each of their social media accounts. These cases provide a relatively straightforward opportunity for cross-platform cooperation in the immediate aftermath of a high-profile arrest. Moreover, given the inherent nexus to criminality, post-arrest coordination might also allow for more robust efforts to moderate content that lacks a clear nexus to a designated terrorist entity—a perennial challenge for moderating right-wing extremist content.
Beyond these implications for technology companies, many questions remain unanswered as it relates to Sovereign Solutions’ broader network and customer base, both within the United States and beyond. Have service members participated in Sovereign Solutions training? Would the display of Sovereign Solutions merchandise while on duty constitute a violation of military regulations? And to what extent did the company serve as a platform for international collaboration?
Even a cursory review of Sovereign Solutions’ Instagram account revealed that commenters and supporters have self-identified as service members or military veterans. Other posts highlighted the presence of Sovereign Solutions merchandise at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton in southern California. Sovereign Solutions also claimed a handful of “unit clients,” including individuals identifying with the U.S. Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment, the United States Coast Guard, and a squadron of the Royal Australian Air Force.
Given recent federal efforts in the United States to deprioritise programs to counter racially motivated violent extremism, the likelihood of a broader investigation into Sovereign Solutions and its network remains uncertain. European and Five Eyes services, however, should remain vigilant that extremist movements that originate in the United States often cross borders. In this context, international partners might also consider whether they have established sufficient mechanisms for sharing information that resides within the holdings of the military criminal investigative services—the agencies that are often responsible for cases involving service members. Recent arrests in Canada reinforce the importance of addressing extremism within the ranks of the armed services, as a group of anti-government extremists reportedly plotted to seize land in Quebec City. Somewhat similarly to the case of Sovereign Solutions, the defendants—two of whom were military members—used an Instagram account “to promote weapons, share information about training, and provide advice on survival,” according to a recent GNET Insight.
Conclusion
Though the corporate operations of Sovereign Solutions appear to be disrupted by the arrest of its two founders, the case demands ongoing attention. Government officials should seek to better understand how these individuals apparently managed to steal military equipment from the same facility for years, and technology platforms should examine how a company managed to profit from it’s Neo-Nazi extremism during the same period. Perhaps just as importantly, the case remains relevant because it reveals the ongoing challenge of synchronising platform moderation efforts—even after certain actors have been exposed as violent extremists.
Lastly, although authorities have detained the company’s founders, we should not assume the ultimate demise of either the Sovereign Solution brand or the suspects’ involvement in extremist spaces. In the past, at least one other white supremacist who participated in the dissemination of stolen military equipment maintained a long and deadly career in extremist movements, even after an initial arrest. For all of these reasons, it would be a mistake for both technology companies and law enforcement officials to view the arrest of Sovereign Solutions’ founders in isolation.
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Joseph Stabile is a researcher of political violence and white supremacist extremism. He previously worked as a policy strategist at MITRE, a federally funded R&D center, where he conducted research and provided strategic planning support to the US government. Before joining MITRE, he worked as a research assistant at Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies and fellow at National Security Action. His writing can be found at outlets such as Just Security, Inkstick Media, and the George Washington Program on Extremism.
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