In 2016, Colombia signed a historic peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP), a far-left guerrilla group rooted in Marxist-Leninist ideology, officially ending more than five decades of armed conflict with the country’s largest insurgent organisation. The accord marked a turning point in Colombian history, allowing the demobilisation of thousands of combatants.
The Colombian armed conflict has involved multiple actors, including the State, left-wing guerrilla groups, right-wing paramilitary forces, and criminal organisations linked to drug trafficking. Despite the peace agreement with the FARC-EP, violence and armed disputes persist in some regions, particularly in areas with a long-standing presence of conflict and illicit crop cultivation, which remains the main source of financing for illegal armed structures. This ongoing violence has also been marked by the assassination of thousands of social leaders and hundreds of former combatants since 2016, underscoring the fragility of the post-conflict context.
After the 2016 accord, several dissident factions of the FARC-EP rejected the peace process and chose to remain active. The largest structures include the Estado Mayor Central and Segunda Marquetalia, although other groups also operate independently. Together with the National Liberation Army (ELN), a guerrilla founded in 1964, and various narco-paramilitary groups, these organisations continue to dispute control over territories and illegal economies.
In 2025, violence has intensified in several key regions due, in part, to the increase in cocaine production and fighting over control of illegal economies. On 10 June, southwestern Colombia experienced a wave of 24 coordinated terrorist attacks in a single day, claimed by FARC-EP dissident groups. Meanwhile, since January, the Catatumbo region has witnessed an increase in fighting between FARC-EP dissidents—particularly the 33rd Front—and the ELN, causing a humanitarian crisis with tens of thousands of people forcibly displaced, and leading to the suspension of peace talks with the ELN.
The ELN and FARC-EP dissident factions have not only intensified their actions in historically affected regions, but have also expanded their activity in digital spaces. In this context, digital platforms have become increasingly important for these groups, who use them to maintain visibility, disseminate propaganda, and appeal to younger audiences in areas where state presence is weak.
This Insight analyses how these two far-left guerrilla groups use social media to improve their digital communication and youth recruitment tactics. It examines their online presence and platform use to maintain territorial influence. In addition to drawing on existing Colombian research, the analysis includes data collected through Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) methods, based on searches conducted in June 2025. From a larger pool of identified accounts, a sample of 20 Facebook accounts, 10 TikTok accounts, and 6 Telegram channels was selected for content analysis.
Digital Communication Strategies of the ELN and FARC-EP Dissidents
The digital presence of ELN and FARC-EP dissidents has reshaped their communication and control practices. Each platform serves a different purpose: WhatsApp and Facebook are often used for territorial control and communication with residents in areas under their influence, and TikTok is more oriented toward engaging younger audiences. The ELN, as a long-established group, maintains a more structured and controlled digital strategy, while the fragmented and often rival FARC-EP dissidents show more uncoordinated activity.
While the original FARC-EP also aimed to increase the group’s visibility in the past, their communications followed strict clandestine protocols. Today, members of dissident groups often maintain public profiles across social media platforms and openly share content from their camps, including images with uncovered faces and visible weapons—something unimaginable under the previous FARC-EP structure. This shift in the dissidents’ online behaviour is partly attributed to younger generations who grew up using mobile technology, but also points to a lack of internal discipline and ideological cohesion— bringing them closer to criminal networks than to ideological insurgencies. Meanwhile, ELN members, although active on digital platforms for various purposes, do not reveal their faces in the same way, and maintain a higher level of operational safety.
Figure 1. FARC-EP dissidents’ insignias, uniforms, and weapons identified on a Facebook account.
Traditional printed leaflets have been largely replaced by direct digital communication. Guerrilla groups use platforms like WhatsApp and Facebook to issue statements, impose mobility restrictions, and announce “armed strikes” or curfews. This was evident in June 2025, during confrontations between two FARC-EP dissident groups in the region of Guaviare, when the Amazonas Bloc declared a five-day “armed strike” and circulated on social media a communiqué prohibiting movement between 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., along with other restrictions, such as the ban on motorcycle helmets and vehicles with rolled-up windows.
Figure 2. A leaflet shared in 2024 on a Facebook account ordering the local population to stay indoors, keep away from military bases, police stations, and banks, and suspend school activities.
WhatsApp plays a key role in controlling civilians living in areas under guerrilla influence. It is a common communication channel used by armed groups to interact with local communities. Due to its widespread availability, often included for free in Colombian mobile phone plans, WhatsApp is commonly used even in rural and remote regions. One notable tactic is the use of WhatsApp chains—messages repeatedly forwarded to spread information widely. Armed groups use these chains to amplify fear, spread threats, and sometimes circulate recruitment messages.
Guerrilla groups often use the app to threaten and intimidate local leaders, including Indigenous, environmental, and religious leaders, as well as journalists and activists. These threats are often delivered via text or voice messages and typically include warnings of violence, forced displacement, or death.
On 2 July 2025, a mass grave was discovered in the region of Guaviare containing the bodies of eight missing religious and social leaders who had disappeared three months earlier. Evidence indicates they were killed by a FARC dissident group. In that region, violent extremist pamphlets have been sent on WhatsApp chains to rural community councils and are used as a tool to intimidate the population.
Telegram as a Tool for Propaganda and Messaging
The ELN maintains a coordinated communication strategy on Telegram, operating multiple channels used for both propaganda and operational purposes. They regularly share guerrilla-themed music, tributes to revolutionary figures, updates on police or military presence, and videos of captured rival fighters —particularly from the 33rd Front, with whom they remain in conflict. These videos frame dissidents as drug traffickers with no ideological motivation, in contrast to the ELN’s self-image as a political movement. They encourage desertion—especially among youth—sharing testimonies of those who switched sides, portrayed as abandoning criminality for ideological conviction. The ELN also blames the 33rd Front for attacks on civilians and the use of drones in combat. According to the Colombian army, both groups have incorporated drones into their operations.
Figure 3. Screenshot from a video published on the ELN’s Telegram channel.
Figure 4. Screenshot from a video shared on Telegram featuring the testimony of a captured member of the FARC-EP 33rd Front, recorded by the ELN, including a call for young members of the group to desert.
In contrast, the FARC-EP dissident groups do not maintain such an organised communication strategy on Telegram. Segunda Marquetalia appears most active, sharing propaganda, music, and camp-life videos—often reposted from TikTok. However, the main Telegram channels linked to Segunda Marquetalia ceased activity in 2021 following police intervention. At the time, Commander Jesús Santrich—later killed in combat—used one of these accounts to issue threats against the Colombian president and journalists.
Online Youth Recruitment in Colombia
Although recruitment by armed groups has a long history in Colombia—with over 18,000 minors affected between 1996 and 2016—it has evolved with the rise of social media, as recent trends show. The Colombian Ombudsman’s Office reported 533 cases of forced recruitment in 2024 alone, though the actual number is likely higher due to underreporting. The department of Cauca in southwestern Colombia remains the epicenter and, alarmingly, 50% of the minors recruited were of Indigenous origin. Recruitment disproportionately affects children and adolescents from marginalised communities—particularly Indigenous, Afro-Colombian, and rural populations—revealing the selective and structural nature of this violence, and a pattern that calls for stronger protection frameworks led by both the State and Indigenous authorities.
Figure 5. An individual who appears to be a minor with a firearm, identified in one of the Facebook accounts associated with the FARC-EP dissidents.
The primary actors behind these practices are the FARC-EP dissident factions, and the platforms widely used for recruitment are Facebook and TikTok. These armed groups target minors who are especially vulnerable due to issues like school dropout, dysfunctional family environments, and extreme poverty. In these contexts, the promise of income, social status, power, and access to goods like motorcycles becomes a powerful lure. Ideological appeal plays a secondary role—what initially draws young people in are these material incentives, while indoctrination tends to come later. A recent trend is the emergence of “technological recruits”: minors with digital skills who operate drones, manage propaganda and communications, often gaining special status.
Despite ongoing investigations by journalists and law enforcement, recruitment practices persist. Platforms have not effectively addressed the spread of associated accounts, which often resurface under new names. In addition, engagement with guerrilla content leads to algorithmic amplification of similar material, deepening exposure, and the risk of normalisation of armed group narratives. Some guerrilla groups now mimic the logic of online “challenges,” encouraging minors to post videos in exchange for small payments, gradually drawing them into drug-related tasks or recruitment. Particularly concerning is the use of already recruited minors to lure others, often under pressure to meet quotas by promising jobs or economic opportunities.
Although both Facebook and TikTok appear to limit search results for the main names of guerrilla organisations to news or informational content, more targeted and specific queries lead to large volumes of material directly related to these groups. Across both platforms, guerrilla-affiliated users frequently share content depicting weapons, uniforms, guerrilla insignia, camp settings, and, in some cases, visibly underage individuals in combat gear.
Figure 6.Video footage depicting daily life in FARC-EP dissident camps.
On Facebook, several users openly state in their bios that they belong to dissident groups and specify units or fronts. As part of this research, during a single day of targeted searching, 97 accounts were identified whose usernames referenced dissident fronts—an indicator of how openly affiliation is declared. They share official statements and even post videos explicitly calling on young people to join their ranks. While it is possible that some of the accounts are operated by intelligence services, the volume and consistency of such content indicate a broader pattern of unmoderated guerrilla-related content that potentially violates community guidelines.
Figure 7. A Facebook bio in which the user states affiliation with the FARC-EP dissidents and writes: “Killing is not a sin, the sin is leaving them alive”.
On TikTok, official statements are absent, yet the platform’s potential for drawing young users closer to guerrilla networks may play a critical role in the recruitment. Many videos attract comments from users asking how to join the organisation or how to find work related to coca cultivation, and these questions are often met with answers in the comment sections. This dynamic is particularly visible in videos featuring raspachines—coca leaf harvesters—who film themselves working, dancing, or sharing daily routines in coca fields. While these workers are not necessarily or explicitly part of the armed groups, these videos often trigger inquiries about joining such groups or working in illicit economies, and some accounts are visibly linked to FARC-EP dissidents.
TikTok hosts extensive content showing coca plantations and, in some cases, cocaine production labs. Although coca cultivation is legal in Colombia for scientific, medicinal, and ancestral uses, none of the identified videos reflect these contexts. Given that Colombia accounts for 67% of global coca cultivation and cocaine production is reaching record levels, platforms should adopt a more robust and context-specific moderation approach.
Figure 8. One of numerous TikTok videos featuring harvesters working in coca plantations.
Figure 9. A high-reach TikTok post encouraging recruitment into one of the FARC-EP dissident groups, followed by multiple inquiries from interested individuals.
On TikTok, the use of encrypted symbols is widespread. Certain emoji combinations act as informal markers of affiliation: the Colombian flag paired with a ninja emoji is very common, as are plant emojis (typically alluding to coca leaves) and stacks of money, referencing incomes obtained from drug trafficking. A red prayer beads emoji also recurs, which may symbolise either group membership or spiritual protection.
Figure 10. One of the emoji combinations widely used on TikTok by members of the FARC-EP dissidents.
Music plays an important role on TikTok, where it serves not only as a narrative tool but also as a key mechanism for discovery. Songs that glorify guerrilla life and narcocorrido music are frequently used, and by exploring audio tracks, users are often led to other related videos and accounts. In this way, music becomes a gateway into broader guerrilla-related ecosystems.
Taken together, these elements raise questions about how these platforms continue to struggle with moderating such overt content, especially given that much of it appears to contradict their own community guidelines. TikTok, for instance, prohibits violent and hateful organisations, including extremist, political, and criminal groups. Its guidelines cite organisations designated by the United Nations but also suggest a broader definitional scope. Although FARC-EP dissidents and the ELN do not appear on the UN Security Council Consolidated List, they clearly align with several of TikTok’s stated criteria.
Facebook, on the other hand, bases its moderation on the U.S. government list. The ELN has been listed as a terrorist organisation since 1997, and the FARC-EP dissidents were added in 2021. The original FARC-EP was removed in 2016 following the peace agreement, but was re-listed after the rise of dissident activity. This inconsistency across official designations, coupled with unclear enforcement practices on the platforms, likely contributes to the persistence of guerrilla-affiliated content online.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The Colombian armed conflict has extended beyond territorial control into the digital space. Guerrilla groups now use social media not only for propaganda and social control, but also for recruitment, especially of youth. These strategies vary between groups and are tailored to the specific characteristics of each platform.
Despite growing concerns, current moderation efforts remain ineffective. Guerrilla members continue to share content that openly displays their identities, affiliations, and even illicit crop cultivation. This exposes the urgent need for contextualised moderation led by individuals with deep local knowledge, supported by better-trained human moderators and automated tools.
Given the increasing evidence—raised by Colombian institutions and media—of youth recruitment through digital platforms, social media companies must adopt proactive measures to protect the most vulnerable users. This includes reassessing how they define and track extremist groups, updating their reference lists, and reinforcing policies on weapons, armed groups, and drug-related content in the Colombian context.
In a fragmented landscape, identifying content requires understanding the names, structures, and evolving dynamics of local groups. Addressing online recruitment effectively demands coordinated, interdisciplinary action involving the State, tech companies, researchers, educators, families, and Indigenous authorities.
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Urszula Mrozowska has worked as an online safety analyst, specialising in hate speech, extremism, and disinformation, including climate-related and electoral disinformation, on social media. She has worked in the tech industry, focusing on investigating these issues across Spain, Latin America, and Poland. She holds a Bachelor’s in Linguistics from the University of Barcelona and a Master’s in Latin American Studies, completed between the University of Warsaw and the Andean University Simón Bolívar of Ecuador. Previously, she conducted research in Business and Human Rights, investigating corporate human rights violations and their social and environmental impacts.
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