Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), better known as drones, have been on the rise among violent extremist and terrorist actors globally. Drones are versatile pieces of technology, ranging from their programmability, manoeuvrability, autonomy, flight range, sensor equipment, and various accessories such as cameras, weapons, and explosives. As a result, these types of aircraft are increasingly used in a wide variety of offensive and defensive operations. Their use includes, but is not limited to, surveillance, aircraft jamming, smuggling of illicit goods, attacks on civilians and private infrastructure, as well as military personnel and posts. This broad spectrum of drone applications is evident in cases such as the Ukrainian SHARK light aircrafts used to jam Russian drones, and the Islamic State West Africa Province’s (ISWAP) drone-attacks on military bases in Lake Chad Basin region.
As global trends have shifted and drone use has become more widespread, these modern weapons have also become an increasingly popular choice for violent attacks by non-state actors across the African continent. More precisely, drones have become an attractive choice for violent extremist groups’ direct attacks, dropping improvised explosive devices (IEDs), monitoring the movements of opponents and armed forces or observing positions of the attack targets. Armed non-state actors in nine African countries, namely Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan, have acquired and used military drones for reconnaissance, explosive attacks, as well as propaganda dissemination. In addition to the multiple ways in which they can be used for gathering valuable intelligence information and conducting armed attacks, drones have also come into the focus of African extremists due to their affordability and the ease with which they can be obtained. Yet, besides getting them on the commercial market, extremist groups often collect drones from the battlefield or acquire them through illegal channels.
Given the security implications of evolving extremist tactics across Africa, this Insight examines the most significant cases of drone use by terrorists on the continent. Considering the limited scholarly literature on the topic, this research also aims to fill a critical gap in understanding new tools of asymmetric warfare in various regions of Africa. Although the first cases of the dangerous use of autonomous aircraft by African non-state actors were recorded at the end of the last decade, the following case study analysis is limited to investigating developments from the first half of 2025 in order to provide the most up-to-date analysis. This Insight also offers practical recommendations for mitigating and combating the dangerous use of drones by specific violent non-state actors.
Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya
Al-Shabaab is an al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist group predominantly based in Somalia, but with specific operational activity spread to Kenya as well. To achieve its goal of imposing a strict rule of Sharia law and overthrowing the official Somali government, this jihadist group mainly uses guerrilla tactics, suicide attacks and, more recently, drones for reconnaissance and tactical planning.
There are several reports which indicate that this terrorist group has been actively using drones for surveillance purposes as well as to facilitate and execute attacks aimed at both state and non-state actors across East Africa since 2020. One of the most recent cases occurred in February 2025. In the reported incident, Somali armed forces successfully intercepted two of the group’s drones during their reconnaissance operations over Galgaduud in the central area of the country.
Islamic State in Somalia Province (IS Somalia)
Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) is a designated terrorist organisation affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Currently, the group is actively launching violent attacks in Puntland state, South-Central Somalia, as well as Somaliland. For the first time since its establishment, ISS has used drones in its combat operations against Puntland Security Forces (PSF) and the US troops deployed in the state at the beginning of 2025, with an aim to defend its strategic positions in the Cali Miskat Mountain.
Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) in Mali and Burkina Faso
Menacing drone activity by another al-Qaeda affiliate active in the Sahel, Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), has significantly increased in 2025. Initially, JNIM started using these modern weapons for its offensive operations aimed at the civilian population, armed forces, and self-defence militia, the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP). However, in February 2025, JNIM employed first-person view (FPV) drones, initially designed to provide real-time images and videos of the scenery, to drop plastic bottle IEDs onto several military posts in the town Djibo in Burkina Faso. Later on, in March, JNIM conducted six drone attacks, mainly dropping similar types of IEDs attached to quadcopter drones on military bases across both Mali and Burkina Faso. Although the drone-based explosions in the northern and eastern parts of Burkina Faso did not cause any material damage or human casualties, their drone attack on Segou area in Mali resulted in the death of one militia member and serious injuries to about a dozen others.
Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in Nigeria
Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) is a branch of Boko Haram, with operational activities in the Lake Chad Basin. The earliest reports on the group’s use of drones for surveillance of Nigerian military movements, disseminating propaganda, and precise targeting for explosive attacks date back to 2020. Over the years, their drone operations have shown an increasing sophistication, and the group has collaborated with IS to gain tactical and operational assistance. In March, ISWAP insurgents conducted a multipronged and coordinated attack by using weaponised drones on the Nigerian armed forces in Borno state in the North-East geopolitical zone of the state. The deaths of many soldiers, the exposure of confidential information, and the destruction of military equipment from these attacks have prompted the Nigerian army to launch numerous counterinsurgency drone strikes, resulting in the deaths of nearly 100 Islamist militants.
Conclusion and Practical Recommendations
The rapid and vast increase in terrorist groups’ use of UAVs presents a significant global security threat. In a more specific geopolitical context of Africa, and predominantly in the Sahel region, jihadist groups have been using drones at nearly every operational level: from offensive attacks that include explosive droppings on civilian and military targets, to reconnaissance, propaganda dissemination, and more. Counter-drone strategies still need to take into account the geopolitical, security and economic context in which they are employed. Creating an adequate strategy to combat violent drone attacks cannot be a one-size-fits-all approach, as it must also align with the designated, non-state actors, targets and states’ military capabilities.
Counter-drone strategies and initiatives aimed at violent non-state actors, such as the analysed jihadist extremist groups, should consist of comprehensive sensor-based observation activities using long and short-range radars, optical systems, acoustic systems, GPS tracking and similar. As demonstrated by JNIM’s use of FPV drones to deliver IEDs, deploying sensor-based short-range radar systems at key military bases could help detect and disrupt low-flying quadcopters. All intelligence gathered should be thoroughly analysed within the state’s military operational control centre to support informed tactical and strategic planning. In each of the African states examined, effective counter-drone strategies should be tailored to the specific ways extremist groups are employing UAVs, ensuring targeted and adaptive responses.
As the analysis has shown, Al-Shabaab is using drones primarily for reconnaissance operations in Somalia and specific surveillance activities in Kenya. A specific case of ISS drone activity was aimed at the Puntland Security Forces and US troops deployed in Somalia. In a similar manner, JNIM mostly uses FPV drones to drop improvised IEDs on military posts, while the ISWAP drones have shown to be, and still are, a strategic means of waging information warfare. Based on the analysis’ results, counter-offensive strategy to combat these security threats must be multi-faceted. First and foremost, technology manufacturers, such as those specialised in drone production, should strive to advance early warning systems, which are enabling states and their security institutions to forecast drone attacks. More precisely, advanced detection systems that would provide real-time information on potential assaults should be an integral part of the most critical military posts and security institutions across Africa. As a preventive measure, surveillance at borders and commercial markets should be strengthened to identify drone trafficking routes and disrupt the channels through which Islamist extremist groups acquire UAVs.
Given that many groups operate transnationally, stronger collaboration with regional and international organisations, institutions, and tech consortia is essential. Exchanging intelligence on attack planning, drone transfers, and emerging tactics can help curb the use of these weapons innovative by non-state actors. In other words, effective cross-border operations require cross-border intelligence and response as well as regional surveillance networks to intercept drone-based threats.
Finally, although some African military forces have started responding to the extremist drone attacks by using UAVs themselves, governments and militaries must strive to develop and improve their drone systems to ensure strategic and tactical advantage during defensive operations. A good example is explosive-laden Kamikaze drones designed to strike targets by crashing directly into them, which the Nigerian military acquired this year. Not only do these types of drones represent a genuine enhancement of Nigerian military capabilities in surveillance, reconnaissance and counter-insurgency operations, but they are also a huge step forward in reducing the state’s dependence on foreign suppliers of drones, as they are produced by a Nigerian tech firm. All in all, this move by the Nigerian authorities is an example of how other African states analysed in this paper can improve their drone capacities.
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Nina Kurt is an MA student in Security Intelligence and Strategic studies with a BA in International Relations and Diplomacy. Nina has several years of work experience as a researcher and analyst in the Security and Defence researcher of Finabel in Brussels, at the European Stability Initiative in Berlin, West Africa Network for Peacebuilding in Ghana, and FOMOSO in Switzerland. In addition, she has also completed an Internship at the UNDP, she is a freelance researcher and writer who has authored and co-authored works on human rights, geopolitics, security and peacebuilding that have been published and awarded several times by various online magazines and scientific journals.
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