The European Union is developing a “Drone Wall”, officially named the European Drone Defence Initiative, consisting of a network of sensors, jammers, and interceptors which will create a shield against drone threats. The project was inspired by Ukraine’s successes in drone warfare as well as recent drone threats and interferences in the airspace of many EU states. As planned by the European Commission, the system was intended to launch in early 2026 and ultimately become fully functional by the end of 2027, although some EU Member States are now reconsidering whether the joint project is feasible for the Union’s defence. Nonetheless, with the ever-increasing use of drone technology by terrorist and violent extremist groups and individuals, this Insight analyses whether such actors pose a threat to the EU Defence Initiative.
There are a few potential methods by which extremists could interfere with the Drone Wall: by launching cheap drones, by jamming or spoofing the wall’s sensor systems, by interfering with command-control systems, or by attacking the wall’s hardware elements. To assess whether extremists within and around Europe fit these scenarios, the analysis examines recent instances of their use of modern technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI), and physical methods of system disruption in violent operations, cyberattacks, and related activities. The analytical part of this Insight examines whether the technologies and tactics previously used by extremist groups and individuals could be used to interfere with, exploit, or circumvent the technical design of the EU Drone Wall. Based on this, the concluding section of the Insight outlines potential downsides, gaps, and/or deficiencies of the Wall in its planned use for the defence of European territory and EU Member States. Accordingly, by comparing documented cases of extremists’ use of advanced technologies with the technical specifications of the EU Drone Wall, this Insight identifies plausible risks and offers policy-relevant recommendations to mitigate them.
Analysis
The European Drone Defence Initiative, commonly referred to as the Drone Wall, is one of the four flagship projects of the European Union’s Readiness Roadmap 2030, which outlines a comprehensive plan for full defence readiness of the EU. The Drone Wall is planned as an advanced, interoperable system intended to detect, locate, and neutralise hostile drones through multi-level detection, tracking, and neutralisation networks. In addition, the Drone Wall is intended to enable precision-strike capabilities through advanced drone platforms. As these capabilities rely on dual-use technologies, the system could also be applied in civilian contexts, such as border protection and disaster response.
The Drone Wall will also be linked to the proposed Drone Alliance with Ukraine. The intended launching period, according to the European Commission’s plan, is in the first four months of 2026, and the initial operational capacity is supposed to be achieved by the end of 2026 and, ultimately, be fully functional by the end of 2027. However, the Drone Wall project is currently stalled, as it lacks political backing from all EU Member States and states located along NATO’s eastern flank are taking the matter into their own hands by developing their own air defence capabilities.
Some security experts, such as Daniel Hegedüs and Sune E. Rasmussen, have expressed criticism of the Drone Wall’s ability to serve as a direct strategic response to Russian hybrid warfare, arguing that EU Member States should instead prioritise helping Ukraine achieve long-range strike capabilities. However, there are no apparent discussions or analyses of how extremist groups, insurgents or terrorist organisations might interfere with the Drone Wall. Yet, there are examples of extremist operations, particularly involving advanced technology and AI, that have shown how such actors could expose vulnerabilities in the Drone Wall through jamming and electronic warfare, cyber intrusion, sabotage and physical attacks.
Since 2024, there have been several reports of documented criminal use of GPS jammers, that is, using interference transmitters to sabotage the tracking systems integrated into cargo logistics centres and vehicles. Generally speaking, misuse of this technology is becoming increasingly common in transport crime across Europe and has also expanded into the digital sphere through hacking of telematics platforms. Therefore, as the Drone Wall system will rely on radar, acoustic, and radio-frequency detection, it is susceptible to jamming, spoofing, or interference with its communications, sensors, or tracking systems.
In February 2025, the Belgian Port of Ostend experienced a cyberattack that targeted its community system ‘Ensor’, which contains data related to the arrival and departure of ships, including crew lists. Although the intrusion did not result in major operational disruption and investigations are ongoing, including assessments of whether the attack constituted an extortion attempt, the incident illustrates how cyber interference with modern data systems can pose risks to command-and-control, sensor fusion, and situational awareness architectures. More precisely, this case shows that such a hostile intrusion could have introduced false positives into the system, while masking the real movements, and compromised automated decision systems by altering routes and schedules.
In mid-November 2025, one part of the Warsaw-Lublin rail line in Poland was targeted by acts of sabotage of a terrorist nature, which followed previous acts of sabotage attributed to the Russian intelligence service. This incident involved the use of a military-type C-4 explosive and was intended to disrupt Polish aid to Ukraine by blowing up the train on the move. Although this specific attack does not involve the use of modern technologies like AI per se, it clearly demonstrates how physical sabotage and asymmetric attacks on hardware in border or frontier areas can inflict significant harm on network hubs and connecting infrastructure. Such attacks could also affect radars, sensors, or interceptors positioned along the European Union’s border lines, where the Drone Wall is expected to be deployed. For instance, if the network or communication hub is physically destroyed, the reaction chains, such as interceptors that alert the central system to danger, will be disrupted or delayed. If this occurs, drones could pass through the Wall before a countermeasure can be deployed.
Conclusion and Recommendations
As real-life examples have shown, both state and non-state actors alike can potentially interfere with the EU’s Drone Wall by exploiting technical and systemic vulnerabilities. Although the Defence Initiative is an ambitious and necessary project, it certainly has its own flaws and deficiencies which extremists could exploit.
One of the main technical characteristics of the proposed Wall is its effective detection system, intended to be achieved through a network of sensors that will enable early identification of possible drone incursions. However, the advanced use of interference transmitters, as well as cyberattacks and interference methods targeting data systems by extremists, poses threats such as jamming, spoofing, compromising decision-making, and tracking systems. Moreover, the ultimate goal of the Wall’s detection system is neutralisation and interception of the assailant drones. As things stand now, the counterattacks will be carried out either by traditional means, such as military aircraft, rockets and missiles from the ground or special AI-operated “hunter” drones which are already being deployed in Ukraine. Yet, since this plan involves using missiles valued at one million euros to shoot down inexpensive drones, some critics argue that such a large cost asymmetry renders this threat-interception method unsustainable in the long run. In addition, the sensor-based detection and interception system of the Drone Wall may not be precise or fully functional in certain geographic areas. Put simply, not only could terrain variations cause blind spots or slower response times of the radars and sensors, but extremists could also resort to misleading tactics by using specific camouflage drones that do not trigger the full response of the system.
Given the possibility that nefarious actors could seek to affect the operation of the EU Drone Wall, particularly in regions where the system may face operational constraints or where terrorist and extremist groups are present, it would be appropriate to consider strategies and technical measures aimed at reducing potential risks. In parallel, considering existing critiques regarding the cost-effectiveness of current interception approaches, the EU could also explore complementary, less costly neutralisation options alongside missile-based systems.
As initially planned, the Drone Wall must use a mix of audio-visual and frequency radars, jamming systems, hunting drones and interceptors. Such a multilayered drone defence system should be AI-based, fully automatic, and equipped with a precisely functioning automated decision-making system for the interception of hostile objects.
As with any conventional defence strategy, the Drone Wall must also have an integrated alternative, or rather, a backup network of sensors and radars that would be deployed if the main ones are compromised, destroyed, or sabotaged.
Furthermore, as the Defence Initiative requires active participation of all 27 Member States, their full interoperability and well-coordinated actions must be ensured through joint exercises and by establishing shared intelligence channels. Finally, in the event of a high-alert situation, the EU must ensure that it has safe and fast supply chains, communication networks, and the prompt deployment of technical and military equipment to respond quickly to any attacks.
–
Nina Kurt is an MA graduate of Security Intelligence and Strategic Studies from the University of Glasgow with a BA in International Relations and Diplomacy. Nina has several years of work experience as a researcher, consultant and analyst in the field of IR, security, geopolitics and defence in XN Consultancy in Greece, Fact Finder in the UK, WB Consult in Slovakia, Finabel in Belgium, European Stability Initiative in Germany, West Africa Network for Peacebuilding in Ghana and FOMOSO in Switzerland. In addition, she has also completed an Internship at the UNDP and is a freelance researcher and writer who has authored and co-authored works on human rights, geopolitics, security and peacebuilding that have been published and awarded several times by various online magazines and scientific journals.
–
Are you a tech company interested in strengthening your capacity to counter terrorist and violent extremist activity online? Apply for GIFCT membership to join over 30 other tech platforms working together to prevent terrorists and violent extremists from exploiting online platforms by leveraging technology, expertise, and cross-sector partnerships.