In 21st-century warfare, the loudest weapon may not be a missile, but rather the soft hum of a drone overhead. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), commonly called drones, have radically transformed the modern battlefield. Originally developed as tools for reconnaissance and training exercises, UAVs have evolved into complex and sophisticated systems capable of executing high-precision strikes, conducting round-the-clock surveillance, and gathering critical intelligence, all while minimising the risk to human operators. Driven by rapid advances in robotics and precision weaponry, these remote-controlled technologies have become integral to the operational strategies of advanced militaries worldwide, fundamentally altering the very nature of traditional combat.
Yet, what was once the exclusive domain of state actors has become alarmingly accessible to Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs). Over the past decade, paramilitary groups, violent extremist organisations (VEOs), and terrorist factions have increasingly exploited commercially available drones to conduct attacks, disseminate propaganda, and surveil adversaries. From improvised explosive devices dropped from hobbyist quadcopters to swarm tactics and AI-assisted targeting, UAVs are now at the heart of asymmetric warfare. The low cost and global availability of consumer and “off-the-shelf” drones have enabled non-state actor groups such as ISIS, Hamas, and the Houthis to wield aerial capabilities that rival state forces in tactical surprise and psychological impact.
The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War epitomises this shift. Widely referred to as the first large-scale “drone war”, the conflict has become the epicentre for the innovation, adaptation, and weaponisation of UAVs. Both pro-Russian separatists and Ukrainian forces rely heavily on drones for Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR), and precision-guided attacks. Significantly, the widespread use of drone technologies on the battlefield has served as a blueprint that extremist and terrorist groups are increasingly seeking to emulate. Accordingly, while state actors have made significant investments in sophisticated UAV technologies, it is the increasingly active role of non-state actors that demands scrutiny. In this context, the Ukrainian battlefield has become a testing ground for these groups, demonstrating how accessible technologies combined with tactical know-how can empower VNSAs to leverage drone capabilities effectively.
This Insight analyses the intersection of UAVs and violent extremism, using the Russo-Ukrainian conflict as a case study to examine how VNSAs, both within Russia and Ukraine and beyond, are adapting drone technology for their strategic and ideological purposes. By investigating their techniques and operational capabilities, this Insight explores the role of digital platforms in facilitating drone terrorism, highlighting the widespread accessibility and rapid dissemination of UAV technologies in the hands of extremist actors.
From Monopolies to Multiplicities: The Rise of Drone Technology Behind State Control
In modern conflict environments, the term ‘drone’ applies to a wide palette of aerial systems, ranging from multimillion-euro surveillance aircraft to modified hobbyist quadcopters bought online for a few hundred euros. For decades, drones were the exclusive domain of state military powers, embodying cutting-edge, high-cost, and high-complexity technology. Nevertheless, this state-drone monopoly paradigm has shifted with the rapid advancements in technology and robotics.
Contemporary military drones are equipped with sophisticated sensors for ISR missions, relying on features such as real-time data transmission, Artificial Intelligence (AI) for image analysis, and enhanced flight endurance, which enable operations in contested environments. Integrating machine learning algorithms further allows drones to autonomously identify and engage targets with a degree of precision that reduces collateral damage. Moreover, advancements in propulsion technology, such as hybrid-electric systems, have significantly improved stealth capacities. Drones like the AI-equipped “Rusak-S” feature high-speed, low-signature fight capabilities and autonomous terminal guidance.
Figure 1. Description of the Russian FPV-Drone “Rusak-S” equipped with AI elements.
This democratisation of drone technology has transformed UAVs from state-controlled and owned specialised tools to widely accessible devices. Affordable consumer-grade drones, equipped with GPS, advanced imaging systems, and automation software, have allowed VNSAs, ranging from insurgent groups to paramilitary groups, militias, and separatist movements, to harness the same tactical advantages that state-owned aerial capabilities afford. What was once the hallmark of state monopoly, as the symbol of top-tier military power, has now evolved into a contested domain where both state and non-state actors operate with unprecedented access to drone technology.
As asymmetric warfare is fought from the skies, this shift in power dynamics on the battlefield is palpable. While advancements within the commercial drone industry bring considerable advantages, their weaponisation by VNSAs raises alarming security concerns. Non-state actors are increasingly capable of leveraging drone technology to conduct reconnaissance, deliver ordnance with high accuracy, or disrupt enemy operations, thereby challenging traditional military doctrines and reshaping the nature of conflict.
Within this context, the ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia illustrates the dual reliance on drone capabilities by both state forces and extremist groups. This evolution demands careful analysis as it highlights how these emerging technologies empower VNSAs in Russia and Ukraine, yet also beyond the war zone in ways previously unimaginable.
The Ukraine Conflict as the First Drone War: A Blueprint for Violent Non-State Actors
The Russo-Ukrainian conflict has been widely referred to as the “first full-scale drone war” in contemporary history and the first “3D printing” conflict. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Ukrainian drone production was nearly non-existent. However, in the first half of 2024, Ukraine manufactured 25 times more artillery than the entirety of 2022, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated, “the total number of drones we are now capable of producing annually in Ukraine is 4 million.” The Russian Federation, in turn, is reportedly to acquire around 100,000 low-altitude drones monthly from domestic manufacturers and foreign allies.
Figure 2. A single batch of domestically produced drones before their distribution to Ukrainian soldiers.
Figure 3. Two Russian soldiers standing in a hangar filled with FPV drones.
In this sense, drone technologies have become indispensable weapons in the war. As the conflict epitomises a pivotal shift in contemporary military practice, where emerging technologies and evolving military techniques are reshaping traditional concepts of combat, both parties to the conflict have capitalised on the advantages of remotely operated drones, which limit spatial constraints and minimise human costs.
However, this innovation hub for drone warfare comes with high costs. The unprecedented integration and deployment of UAVs into the battlefield function as an open source that has empowered VNSAs to access the same technologies, emulating state actors’ military innovations.
Within Russian far-right paramilitary groups, the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) has been reportedly operating paramilitary training camps in Russia and eastern Ukraine, deploying inexpensive First-Person View (FPV) drones for reconnaissance and harassing strikes. Since the escalation of the war in 2022, the supremacist militant and extremist organisation has revived its paramilitary wing, the Imperial Legion, intensifying recruitment and paramilitary training efforts, showcasing its focus on enhancing its asymmetric warfare strategies in the ongoing war.
The open-source nature of many military technologies, amplified by international media coverage, has lowered the barrier to entry for VNSAs. Terrorist groups beyond the conflict zone are increasingly observing and adapting Ukraine and Russia’s drone innovations to suit their own operational needs. Hezbollah, for instance, appears to be taking a page from Ukraine in repurposing Soviet-era drones. The group has been converting Tu-143 Reys reconnaissance drones, originally designed for surveillance, into jet-powered cruise missiles, a tactic first pioneered by Ukraine during the early stages of the war. This showcases technical proficiency in integrating these drone technologies into their military arsenals.
Importantly, the Russo-Ukrainian War revolutionised the integration of AI into drone technology. As non-state and terrorist groups have gained access to UAVs, AI-assisted modifications have turned drones into autonomous assets for ISR, predicting enemy movement, and improving target acquisition and strike accuracy. Groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis rebels, and ISIS now deploy such systems in combat for surveillance, intelligence gathering, and targeted strikes.
Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, Kyrylo Budanov, linked Hamas’ 7 October 2023 attacks on Israel to possible Russian training or imitation of Russian drone tactics, previously unseen in Hamas’ drone use.
However, the Ukraine war demonstrates that drone warfare is not solely dictated by cutting-edge sophistication; equally important are factors such as speed, agility, and scale across spatial, temporal, analytical, and operational dimensions. In other words, while technological sophistication is crucial, large-scale drone deployment enables coordinated, precise, and multi-vector attacks that can overwhelm and surprise the adversaries.
This emphasis on scale and agility has underscored the strategic value of small and commercially available drones. Russia’s war on Ukraine remodelled these systems, underlining their accessibility and versatility, often sourced from websites and online marketplaces. For instance, the rise of First Person View (FPV) and DJI drones, which are increasingly faster, more durable, and capable of longer flight durations, have been deployed by Russia and Ukraine for targeted, large-scale attacks. According to military experts, Hamas employed similar tactics during its 7 October attacks. Drawing parallels with Ukraine, Hamas’ tactics appear to reflect a deliberate attempt to emulate battlefield strategies pioneered in Eastern Europe.
Notably, these low-cost drones require little to no formal training, with basic piloting skills that can be easily acquired via online tutorials. In turn, this enables VNSAs to modify them with AI-based software or hardware upgrades and replicate state-level tactics to meet operational needs, executing bomb-drop missions and kamikaze-style attacks. Since the beginning of the Ukrainian war, growing concerns over the adaptation of civilian drones for military purposes have risen in Yemen. Recently, the Yemeni National Resistance Forces, also known as the Guards of the Republic, captured DJI MAVIC3 drones, a FVP model deployed in Ukraine, exemplifying the Houthis’ advancements in drone technology compared to local rivals.
The Role of Digital Platforms in Drone Terrorism
In the Russo-Ukrainian War, a digital ecosystem of logistics platforms, intelligence systems, and weapon guidance has become central in shaping battlefield dynamics. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces increasingly rely on open-source code and low-cost components. Hobbyist devices such as Raspberry Pi, which can be purchased from hardware stores or major retailers like Best Buy, have become integral to military operations, allowing for rapid availability and innovative applications in warfare. But this low-cost technology is a double-edged sword.
As the war increasingly relies on open-source software, the barriers to accessing these tools and replicating lethal capabilities are falling. Reverse-engineering software, exploiting leaked battlefield applications, and modifying open-source drone control systems are well within reach for VNSAs. 3D printing has further exacerbated the rise of “do-it-yourself” weaponry, allowing citizens and non-state groups to manufacture their own weapons. By investing a few thousand euros in raw materials, non-state actors create weapons that were once the exclusive domain of well-funded state armies.
Figure 4. FPV drone frames being assembled by a Ukrainian civilian
Figure 5. Self-made FPV drone built by a Ukrainian citizen and modified for thermal imaging.
Many non-state groups actively participate in digital platforms such as Telegram and dark
web forums, where they closely watch developments and techniques deployed on the battlefield. These online spaces facilitate information sharing and best practices, enabling participants to access 3D printing blueprints for fixed-wing drones and tutorials on overriding commercial drone software to evade geolocation and radar detection.
Terrorist groups have mastered the power of online propaganda and coordination. Among such actors, the Task Force Rusich, a neo-Nazi paramilitary unit with ties to the Wagner Group and actively involved in the ongoing war in Ukraine, has reportedly documented its activities via its Telegram channel. By sharing footage to inspire new recruits, the group bolsters its mythos of far-right extremism, thereby reinforcing its sense of community and purpose. Concerningly, in 2023, the Rusich group announced on its official Telegram account a planned Russian chemical attack against soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, indicating intentions to deploy chloropicrin from drones.
Figure 6. UAV allegedly modified by the Russian Rusich Group to carry a Chloropicrin grenade.
Conclusion
The Russo-Ukrainian War has not only amplified the use of UAVs in modern warfare but has also advertised it on an unprecedented scale. The widespread media coverage of drone strikes and battlefield applications has turned the conflict into an international demonstration of how modern wars are fought with brains over budget. For digital tech companies, this visibility has acted as a powerful marketing tool, highlighting the effectiveness of their products in real-world scenarios. However, for the global security community, it is a warning: drone proliferation and the spread of dual-use technologies are accelerating. And the next battlefield may not be defined by borders but by bandwidths.
This evolution in warfare underscores the profound implications of technology in modern conflicts, where accessibility and innovation can radically alter the balance of power. As the barriers to entry for VNSAs to develop and deploy UAVs fall, the responsibility to anticipate and mitigate risks rises. It is, therefore, crucial that digital and technology companies adopt concrete strategies to promote the responsible development and use of drones. By engaging with policymakers, digital companies must develop responsible security frameworks, such as consumer-grade drone technology, and regulatory frameworks to ensure adequate usage while preserving innovation. While military technology must advance and adapt to the battlefield, so must the misuse by non-state actors be prevented.
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Matilde Gamba is a recent Master’s graduate in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University, with a Bachelor’s degree in European Studies from Maastricht University, where she focused on international relations and hybrid warfare. Her research explores the nexus between state violence, transitional justice, and global accountability efforts, with particular attention to the legal responses to mass atrocities. Matilde has investigated post-authoritarian justice in Latin America, contributed to a research lab on international accountability in Ukraine, and authored a thesis examining impunity for state actors in the Philippine during Rodrigo Duterte’s War on Drugs. Her current interests lie in the security implications of emerging military technologies and the evolving landscape of international law in conflict settings. LinkedIn.
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