According to the United Nations, the Islamic State’s most successful regional financial offices include al-Karrar, al-Furqan, and al-Siddiq. This series breaks down each office’s operations, with part two investigating al-Furqan. To read part one, click here.
Introduction
The Islamic State (IS) and its affiliate groups in West Africa and the Sahel remain resilient to the counterterrorism efforts of local and international authorities. Overseeing these groups is Maktab al-Furqan (the Furqan office), an elusive organisation likely based in Nigeria that provides local IS branches with operational guidance and international funding under the purview of the General Directorate of Provinces (GDP). According to UN reports, Al-Furqan is one of the three most successful financial branches of the Islamic State’s General Directorate of Provinces (GDP), along with the Somalia-based al-Karrar and the Afghan-based al-Siddiq. This Insight will examine what we know about al-Furqan, the organisations it oversees, its financial role in broader IS operations, and the potential threat this confluence of interests could pose moving forward.
What We Know About Maktab al-Furqan
Maktab al-Furqan derives its name from Abu Mohammed al-Furqan, the former IS minister of information who died in a US airstrike in Raqqa, Syria, on 7 September 2016. The organisation also shares its name with al-Furqan Media Foundation, a propaganda arm of the IS. Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Ali al-Mainuki, a Nigerian national born in 1982, currently leads Maktab al-Furqan on behalf of the GDP, having served in senior roles since around 2018.
Personal differences between al-Mainuki and Boko Haram leader Mamman Nur reportedly contributed to a public and acrimonious split between the two organisations in 2016 that weakened the IS’s regional presence. However, al-Furqan remains one of the Islamic State’s “most vigorous and best-established regional networks.” In 2023, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken imposed sanctions on al-Mainuki and three others concerning their senior roles in the IS organisation, freezing any assets and blocking all asset transfers associated with him in the global financial system.
According to a May 2024 report by the US Department of Treasury:
“The ISIS branch in West Africa engages with the formal financial sector by using bank accounts to transfer money. Al-Furqan Office, which has a strong base in Nigeria and oversees ISIS-West Africa and other ISIS branches in the Sahel, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Cameroon, Niger and Chad.”
The Department of Treasury also assessed that unlike its more successful counterpart, Maktab al-Karrar, al-Furqan is likely seeking additional income due to a lack of stable revenue. Nevertheless, al-Furqan has protocols in place that maintain the regional financial structure of IS operations. For example, it reportedly collects 50 per cent of funds generated by the larger Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in Nigeria and redistributes them to smaller branches in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad, which fall under the purview of the newly restructured Islamic State–Sahel Province (ISSP). Moreover, with Nigeria now the world’s second-largest cryptocurrency trading market, al-Furqan likely plays a pivotal role in regional and global IS finance.
According to experts, with Nigeria’s nearly US $60 million in cryptocurrency transfers in 2023 and an estimated 33% of Nigerians investing in cryptocurrencies, the IS and other terrorist groups can easily hide their transactions within this growing centre of trading activity. The US Treasury also claims that the IS has been expanding its use of virtual assets in Africa since January 2024, with Nigeria-based Maktab al-Furqan likely playing a role in this process. With the IS reportedly moving away from cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Tether to Monero, which offers enhanced privacy, al-Furqan can likely further disguise its activities within the Nigerian crypto market. Moreover, IS groups increasingly solicit donations in Monero through propaganda outlets such as its Voice of Khorasan publication, and it is possible that the organisation routes some of these solicited donations through entities associated with Maktab al-Furqan, given the scope of Nigeria’s crypto market.
Branches Under al-Furqan Remain Resilient Despite Operational Setbacks
Maktab Al-Furqan oversees two provinces of the IS, the ISWAP and the newly restructured Islamic State–Sahel Province (ISSP). ISWAP bases its operations along the shores of Lake Chad in northern Nigeria, where it generates revenue from local taxation on farmers and fishermen, as well as robbing civilians and kidnapping for ransom. The group’s 2016 split from Boko Haram has diminished its local revenue sources, and the two groups continue to vie for territorial control; on 13 January, ISWAP fighters murdered at least 40 local farmers for reportedly straying into their lands. In December 2021, an action group founded by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) found that ISWAP was moving around US $36 million in funds generated in its territories through Nigeria’s legitimate financial system annually, likely with the involvement of Maktab al-Furqan.
The ISSP is primarily centred in northern Mali and is one of the most violent and active terrorist organisations in the Sahel region, with a track record of targeting Malian, Wagner, and US military personnel as well as local civilians. It also receives funding from ISWAP via Maktab al-Furqan. The current literature provides little insight into how Maktab al-Furqan sends funds to the ISSP; however, it likely heavily relies on hawala, informal and largely unregulated financial systems used to send money internationally. Although the ISSP regularly contends with opposing forces such as the al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimin (JNIM) and Russia’s Wagner Group, since January 2023, the group has focused on expanding its territories, particularly in northeast Mali’s Gao and Menako regions.
Northern Mali is a lucrative route for the global narcotics trade, with local traffickers working with powerful cartels in Latin America to traffic drugs through the country’s north into Algeria and onto the European markets. If the ISSP can successfully seize these lucrative trafficking routes, it could become a significant revenue generator for the IS organisation and, with the help of Maktab al-Furqan, could funnel some of this revenue to finance global attacks by other branches, such as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).
Regulatory Environment and Recommendations
Combating the ongoing expansion of IS in West Africa and the Sahel requires a systematic approach to the group’s local finances. Although military and police responses have had a limited impact to date, Nigerian authorities have initiated regulatory responses to the country’s growing cryptocurrency market in part due to concerns over terrorist financing. These responses include restricting banks and other financial institutions from trading in cryptocurrencies and limiting such transactions to regulated peer-to-peer platforms. These regulations aim to curtail cryptocurrency use in illicit activities like terrorist financing by requiring platforms to conduct transactions through approved channels and disclose key information about those involved in trading. In April 2024, Nigerian authorities secured a court order to freeze the assets of 1,146 suspicious accounts related to unauthorised forex trading, money laundering and terrorist financing.
The limited amount of information available on IS and Maktab al-Furqan’s financial activity in West Africa requires further research by international law enforcement, financial institutions, and fintech companies. Because IS networks rely heavily on Monero, a cryptocurrency that offers enhanced privacy compared to Bitcoin or Tether, industry professionals and international law enforcement should work closely with Nigerian authorities to trace suspicious transactions that may be associated with al-Furqan or the groups it oversees.
Hawala networks likely play an important role in IS’s growing influence in West Africa, especially regarding transfers between groups facilitated by Maktab al-Furqan. Limiting the use of such networks could play an essential role in limiting IS expansion in West Africa, particularly as ISSP relies on transfers facilitated by Maktab al-Furqan that, if left unchecked, could facilitate its seizure of highly lucrative narco-trafficking routes. Recently, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) adopted new licensing guidelines with the aim of combating hawala by offering competitive rates and more reliable services. As Nigeria’s legitimate fintech sector continues to grow, global fintech firms should work to foster its development by sharing best practices related to cybercrime and counter-terrorism.
Figure 1: The donation solicitation page at the end of most Voice of Khurasan issues. Obtained via Jihadology.
Adam Rousselle is a researcher focused on illicit finance, weapons technology, macroeconomics, geopolitics, and more. He has been featured in The Jamestown Foundation, The Hudson Institute, Nikkei Asia, The Wall Street Journal, and others. He is the co-founder of www.btl-research.com.