In the Afghanistan-Pakistan region’s evolving threat landscape, terrorist groups have been slow in adopting technologies such as drones and generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) for their operations. This is due to several factors, namely the availability of more lethal weapons such as small and light arms; the lack of technical expertise; and utilitarian considerations – the efficacy of more technologically advanced weapons versus the costs involved in developing and using them. However, this dynamic underwent a shift in 2024 as two key trends point towards the nascent adoption of drones and AI in the region.
Against this backdrop, this Insight explores how terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, namely the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its affiliates, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), and Baloch insurgent groups, are incorporating these two technologies in their operations, the threat they pose, and implications for the region’s security landscape. It will also outline counter-terrorism recommendations for governments and technology companies to mitigate the threat without disrupting their permeation in the wider society.
The Technology Adoption Curve
Research by Gartenstein-Ross, Clarke and Shear highlight four phases in which terrorist groups adopt technologies: the ‘early adoption’ phase where terrorist groups’ adoption of emerging technologies is marked by a high rate of failure and underperformance; the ‘iteration’ phase where technological adoption is refined as it undergoes substantial commercial improvement; the ‘breakthrough phase’ where groups hone the use and adoption of a particular technology and significantly improve the success rate; and the ‘competition’ phase where terrorist groups innovate while showing resilience to persist with the use of technologies as countermeasures are enhanced, triggering a cyclical pattern.
Currently, certain terrorist groups’ adoption of emerging technologies in Afghanistan and Pakistan falls somewhere between the first and second stages, where they are trying to break into the iteration stage to improve their capabilities. The same authors note that it would be “myopic to interpret a violent non-state actor’s early attempts as ‘failures’ and later attempts as ‘successes’ in a binary fashion. Thus, while failures may mar efforts by Afghanistan-Pakistan-based terrorist groups at present, it would be imprudent to discount them as irrelevant.
Drones
Between July and September 2024, there were at least six suspected drone attacks by the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group, a conglomerate of anti-Pakistan militant factions. The attacks occurred primarily in the North Waziristan tribal district and were targeted at security establishments on the ground. The drones used were relatively low-tech – commercial Chinese-made DJI quadcopters, which were used to drop rudimentary improvised explosive devices (IEDs) onto targets on the ground. The devices were found to be locally assembled, plastic bottles filled with 400-700 grams of explosives, which were detonated with grenades.
Then, in October 2024, a video circulated by regional analysts showed militants of Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI), a group affiliated with Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, operating what looked to be a DJI Matrice 350 RTK drone. In February 2025, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) carried out an alleged attack on a Pakistani security forces check post in Sararogha, South Waziristan, using a quadcopter drone laden with explosives. The type of drone used was unclear, and the attack caused minimal damage. In May 2025, the Pakistan Army noted an investigation into an alleged drone attack by the TTP in North Waziristan.
Figure 1: Alleged TTP drone attack in South Waziristan.
The use of commercial quadcopters by these groups mirrors the Afghan Taliban’s use of these weapons and the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria during the 2016-2017 period, where the latter had used improvised drones to a great level of efficacy in attacks against coalition forces on the ground. This also demonstrates a certain level of cross-border and cross-conflict learning among terrorist groups in the region. The easy availability of commercial drones has facilitated this shift in modus operandi by Pakistani terrorist groups, which are known to have stuck to traditional attack methods such as suicide bombings prior to this.
The type and use of drones by terrorist groups is dependent on three factors: territorial control, technical capability and external support. Terrorist groups in Pakistan who have limited territory and external support are dependent on commercially available hardware that is either purchased or smuggled, reflected in the types of drones used so far. It is currently unclear whether groups such as the TTP have received any external technical assistance with regard to drone technology from regional groups like the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda (AQ). However, there has been increased collaboration between the two in recent times. The groups’ access to systems like the DJI Matrice indicates some level of inter-group knowledge and resource transfer.
ISKP, on the other hand, has demonstrated clear intent in weaponising drones. Over the last year, IS-affiliated Rocket.Chat channels released five manuals explaining ways in which commercially available drones can be weaponised for terrorist attacks as part of a series titled ‘Modern Warfare’. The manuals were targeted at lone actors who may be inspired to carry out attacks on behalf of the group. The group also released several other manuals threatening attacks on the Paris Olympics using drones.
Figure 2: Example screenshot from one of the IS drone manuals. Source
The efficacy of drone use by Pakistani terrorist groups, however, “has not had much of an impact in terms of damages”. This may be due to the rudimentary nature of the drones used. It further points to the nascent stage of their development and adoption. This, however, cannot be dismissed as terrorist groups may increase in proficiency over time and with sufficient resources.
Generative Artificial Intelligence
The propaganda pattern of terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan also witnessed a subtle but consequential shift in May 2024 when ISKP claimed responsibility for an attack on foreign tourists in Afghanistan’s Bamiyan province using AI. In the 52-second video, a male news anchor dressed in Western attire claimed the attack in Pashto language using text-to-speech and text-to-video tools. The video, which used the logo of “Khurasan TV,” imitated the layout of a mainstream Afghan news channel.
Figure 3: ISKP’s AI-generated video claiming an attack on foreign tourists in Bamiyan, Afghanistan. Source
Since then, ISKP has produced at least eight more AI-generated videos using backgrounds of Afghan and Pakistani media channels. The group has urged its followers to produce AI-generated propaganda materials in Urdu and Persian languages as well. These videos were shared on Telegram, Rocket.Chat, and Threema, and their circulation were amplified by sharing and resharing of unofficial channels.
More recently, an AI-generated propaganda video by Baloch insurgent groups has also been circulating on X. Though the video is quite raw and uses very basic techniques, it shows that groups other than ISKP are adopting AI for propaganda operations. Though the TTP has not adopted AI thus far, they will likely do so in the future, given the trends by other groups in the region. The stiff competition between different terrorist groups in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre compels them to learn new skills to retain their relevance in the extremist sphere.
Figure 4: An AI-generated presenter outlining the charter of free Balochistan.
Despite gradual improvement and better production quality with each new AI-generated video, some technical glitches have persisted, like poorly coordinated hand gestures, lip movement and audio synchronisation problems. ISKP has shared several manuals in its encrypted social media channels, urging its supporters to learn AI and encouraging them to benefit from free online courses.
Two key trends are discernible for ISKP’s AI-generated propaganda videos. As generative AI evolves, it will become easier for ISKP to enhance its technological prowess and improve its output quality. ISKP has developed its strategy of using AI by avoiding disparaging terms and flagged language to exploit moderation gaps, amplify visibility, and ensure the longevity of its output. The impact and efficacy of the group’s use of AI on propaganda and recruitment, however, is yet to be seen.
Implications
There are several implications for the incipient adoption of emerging technology by groups in the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict theatre. If these groups can pass the iteration phase and enter the breakthrough phase, these technologies may substantially facilitate the groups’ operations. The use of drones, for example, has the potential to put significant pressure on counter-terrorism forces as it did in Iraq and Syria in 2016-2017. The ease of access and the decreasing capability threshold of these technologies add a layer of complexity to the issue. As groups get better at using these technologies, the likelihood of more frequent and lethal attacks will increase.
As AI, for example, develops and can generate more sophisticated videos, it has the potential to attract the younger, tech-savvy generation into the ranks of terrorist groups. In this regard, the case of Hamza (Salafi Madni) is worth mentioning. In 2023, Pakistani authorities arrested 19-year-old Hamza in Islamabad for his alleged role in developing propaganda for ISKP. He was attracted to the group’s propaganda and media output and was eventually absorbed into their decentralised media team, developing a network spanning Canada and Germany. Similarly, slick, AI-assisted media output may have an additional pull towards the younger generation.
Conversely, the use of technology by terrorist groups may also warrant an increase in counter-terrorism actions against them. This was seen in Iraq and Syria during the height of IS’ use of drones. Thus, it remains to be seen how groups in the region weigh the costs and benefits of incorporating these technologies in their operations.
Conclusion
Although the adoption of technologies by groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan remains nascent, they should not be taken lightly. Regional governments and security forces must work to deny these groups access to expertise, hardware, territory and external support, which play crucial roles in the adoption of new technologies. Identifying and interdicting key experts within the groups and supply chains is critical to preventing access to these technologies.
With regard to drones, recent counter-terrorism operations by the Pakistani government have shown them using quadcopters to drop munitions on terrorist hideouts. Indian authorities have also made use of similar commercially available quadcopters in counter-terrorism operations, alongside more sophisticated ones belonging to their drone fleet.
Figure 5: Pakistani government forces dropping an IED on a terrorist target.
Pakistan has also developed more sophisticated capabilities, such as the Spider Anti-Drone system, which uses AI to detect, track, and intercept hostile unmanned aerial vehicles. It also operates an advanced drone fleet comprising indigenous designs such as the Shahpar and Burraq, aiding counterterrorism efforts.
Private-public partnerships are also crucial when dealing with dual-use technologies. Government and security agencies in the region must develop close working relationships with tech companies to mitigate the misuse of technologies by malicious actors. National and international frameworks and guiding principles must be put in place collectively by nations to foster the safe development and evolution of these technologies. Af-Pak remains a challenging terrain when it comes to terrorist threats. With the evolution of emerging technologies, regional governments must stay ahead of the curve to mitigate the potential threats.
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Abdul Basit is a Senior Associate Fellow at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, a specialist unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
Rueben Dass is a Senior Analyst at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, a specialist unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
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