Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a UN-designated terrorist organisation and statistically the deadliest terrorist outfit in Pakistan, has undergone extensive ideological, organisational and operational transformation since 2018. Notably, evolution in the group’s propaganda production, dissemination and multilingual tailored messaging has been at the core of this transformation, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Recently, however, TTP has used satellite images in a propaganda video for the first time. While terrorist networks with global footprints like ISIS and Al Qaeda have previously used satellite imagery, TTP’s adoption of this technology—and the dissemination of propaganda derived from these images across its social media channels—marks further technological strides by the group.
This Insight will examine how TTP is using satellite imagery to enhance the impact of its propaganda. The Insight will also explore the operational impact of space technologies, such as the convergence of satellite images with GPS for drone operations, in the overall operational and propaganda domain for TTP. It will conclude with offering policy recommendations to mitigate the negative outcomes of space-based technologies in the hands of violent extremist organisations like TTP.
Satellite Imagery Integration into TTP Propaganda
Following the Pakistan Army’s operation Zarb-e-Azb (2014-16), which sought to dismantle terrorist groups and their safe havens, TTP was reduced to a mere fraction of its previous strength, with many factions announcing their split from the TTP umbrella organisation. When Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud took over as the Emir (the top leader) of the TTP in 2018, significant changes were implemented to the group’s messaging, as well as its strategic and operational modus operandi. Mehsud was not only able to bring the splinter militant factions back into the fold of the TTP, but also extended the group’s reach to the relatively uncharted territory of Balochistan province. While expanding TTP’s appeal as an umbrella organisation for other militant groups was a significant development, an equally important shift under Mehsud has been the reorientation of the group’s operational strategy. Speaking to BBC Urdu, the former Inspector General of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police, Akhtar Ali Shah, explained that, unlike in the past, where TTP carried out indiscriminate violence through suicide and vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks in marketplaces and mosques, the group’s tactics have become more calculated under Mehsud. They are now directed primarily at government installations, security forces, and civilian collaborators. Indiscriminate targeting in earlier years led to extremely negative sentiments among the population about TTP and provided the requisite impetus for security forces to launch large-scale operations like Zarb-e-Azb.
Since 2018, TTP’s propaganda has emphasised that its struggle is directed against the state rather than the public, warning civilians not to collaborate with the government in its war against terrorism, which officials term “Fitna al Khawarij” and “Fitna Al Hindustan”. In the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the pro-government and anti-TTP local tribal groups, previously called ‘Aman Lashkars’, have been a part of the government’s strategy to combat TTP in the region. In its first known instance, a recent propaganda video used satellite imagery from a publicly available mapping service to highlight a compound, serving as a warning to pro-government tribal militias about the consequences of their collaboration with the state. The use of satellite imagery appears to be a multipronged strategy, not only as a value-added component to propaganda but also as a means to expand the group’s reach in terms of human intelligence (HUMINT).
Figure 1: A snippet from the TTP Propaganda video shared on social media channels showing an alleged compound of the pro-government tribal group, warning them to surrender.
The diffusion of internet access among the general populace in the tribal areas of Pakistan, one of the most impoverished regions and a hotbed of militancy over the last two decades, has been significantly slower due to security concerns, compared to the rest of the country. However, since the merger of FATA with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the situation has gradually improved in the last few years, albeit not at the pace anticipated at the time of merger. Nevertheless, people from this part of Pakistan are comparatively more accustomed to digital tools, such as virtual mapping software for navigation, than they were in the past. The notion of incorporating satellite imagery, with which civilians are now familiar, is a classic psychological operation and marks an evolution in TTP’s propaganda dissemination. It is clear that TTP aims to instil the fear that no one is out of the organisation’s reach, as the houses of alleged government collaborators are shown in the propaganda videos. Marking the alleged pro-government militia compound in the recent video was intended to show that the group is aware of the pinpoint location of civilians who are aiding the forces in the war against terrorism. At the same time, it validates another aspect of the group’s strength in its protracted war against the Pakistani government.
In a region where Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is one of the most relied-upon sources for counter-terrorist operations, it is equally important for groups like TTP to have a strong network of informants for operational intelligence. Unlike before operation Zarb-e-Azb, the TTP do not hold territory inside Pakistan and operates via Afghanistan. Therefore, the civilian sympathisers on the ground are the group’s eyes and ears. In this regard, the secondary objective of the satellite imagery is to demonstrate the penetration of the group’s informants within the population, reinforcing, with the help of technology, that despite oscillating between Afghanistan and Pakistan, TTP remains aware and apprised of the evolving situation on the ground. The overall objective of incorporating satellite imagery for the first time is ostensibly to demonstrate the group’s reach and dissuade the civilians from cooperating with the government. The incorporation of satellite tech into its propaganda reflects TTP’s inter-group learning, drawing not only from regional actors but also from global terrorist organisations such as the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda. The latter is particularly significant, as the collaboration between Al-Qaeda’s South Asian branch, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), and the TTP is extensively documented. Considering that AQIS has a history of producing sophisticated propaganda items through its media wing, As-Sahab Urdu Media, the possibility of collaboration and the impact of AQIS on the TTP’s evolution of its propaganda machinery cannot be ruled out.
Operational Impact
The use of satellite imagery in TTP’s propaganda video suggests that the group may seek to incorporate such technology to complement its offensive capabilities. There has been an uptick in coordinated attacks on the permanent installations of the government forces in the last few years. Several of these high-profile attacks led to hours-long sieges and resulted in the loss of security personnel and civilians, hinting at the detailed planning.
As the operational utility of drones by TTP has increased exponentially over the past few months, the use of reconnaissance satellite imagery from online map services and drone surveillance appears to be a contributing factor in these well-planned attacks. These capabilities function as force multipliers, transforming the once ragtag group, previously reliant on hit-and-run attacks or suicide bombings, into a more potent militant force. This shift has led to a sharp increase in cross-border raids and the deaths of law enforcement personnel and civilians. The issue is further compounded by the high-end weaponry in the hands of TTP terrorists, left behind after the US withdrawal, turning the intelligence from satellites and drones into lethal losses for the security forces.
Apart from satellite imagery, outer space technologies are becoming an increasingly essential aspect of militancy around the world. Commercial drones, turned do-it-yourself unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), have made their mark in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, and militant organisations like TTP also seem to be learning from their success. For precise targeting, these drones navigate using GPS signals from satellites in space and deliver the payload at specific locations. Consequently, counter-drone technologies are being employed around sensitive buildings in the tribal region, using GPS jamming and other measures against lethal drone attacks.
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
The navigation signals from satellites and mapping services, combined with satellite topographical views, are omnipresent and universally available around the globe, leaving little room for limiting their access to nefarious actors. TTP has been repurposing commercial Chinese drones by mounting explosives on them, hence the satellite navigation signals cannot be blocked at source. The only recourse in this case is to deploy jamming hardware around sensitive installations. However, the Pakistani government can officially request that mapping service providers blur or restrict access to sensitive locations, such as military bases in the tribal belt. It would inhibit the group’s ability to use the imagery for propaganda or operational purposes.
Furthermore, since mapping imagery on free platforms is not constantly updated, it serves as an add-on to propaganda and offers limited operational advantage, making it unsuitable for real-time intelligence of target locations on its own. Private space companies, on the other hand, sell real-time satellite imagery commercially. The revisit time for these satellites could be very short over a specific area, resulting in near-real-time and high-resolution imagery, which could tremendously enhance the group’s operational capability. There are, however, processes in place to ensure that these highly valuable images do not fall into the wrong hands.
There is a cap on the resolution of imagery available for sale on a commercial scale, and US companies, such as Maxar and BlackSky, are regulated by the NOAA Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs (CRSRA) office. Furthermore, certain customer verification mechanisms are in place to ensure the background of potential buyers, and only licensed resellers are authorised to sell satellite imagery to governments, universities, corporations, and NGOs. The problem, however, is that states have been accused of assisting non-state actors for their own geopolitical gain. Hence, there remains a possibility that high-value pieces of intelligence, such as real-time, high-resolution satellite images, could be redirected by governments to assist non-state actors operating on the ‘enemy’ soil. There needs to be a mechanism in place where, if there is irrefutable proof of any foreign government’s involvement in the procurement of such data and its subsequent relaying to militants, it should be blacklisted from procuring commercial satellite imagery going forward.
—
Akash Shah is a Research Officer at Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad. His area of research is the security dimension of Outer Space technologies.
—
Are you a tech company interested in strengthening your capacity to counter terrorist and violent extremist activity online? Apply for GIFCT membership to join over 30 other tech platforms working together to prevent terrorists and violent extremists from exploiting online platforms by leveraging technology, expertise, and cross-sector partnerships.