Introduction
Over the past two-plus decades, the intersection of terrorism and modern technology has significantly transformed Africa’s security landscape, enabling extremist groups to operate beyond conventional battlegrounds and exploit digital tools for recruitment, propaganda, and attacks. Among the most pressing of these is the digital financing of terrorist organisations. Boko Haram, a jihadist insurgent group operating primarily in northeastern Nigeria, has adapted swiftly to the evolving digital environment, leveraging financial technologies to sustain and expand its operations. While historically dependent on traditional financing sources like looting, ransoms, and informal donations, Boko Haram has increasingly adopted digital tools, such as mobile money platforms, encrypted messaging apps, and cryptocurrencies, to mobilise, transfer, and conceal its financial assets.
This Insight investigates how Boko Haram exploits these digital platforms to finance its operations and examines the implications for national and regional security. The Insight also analyses the existing counter-terrorist financing (CFT) framework in Nigeria, highlighting critical institutional and regulatory gaps that allow such illicit financial flows to persist. Given the growing role of digital technology in Africa’s financial ecosystem, understanding and addressing the vulnerabilities exploited by terrorist groups like Boko Haram is essential. This Insight offers targeted policy recommendations aimed at disrupting the evolving digital financial networks that sustain groups like Boko Haram, thereby contributing to ongoing efforts in counterterrorism, cybersecurity, and illicit finance regulation.
Mechanisms of Digital Terrorist Financing
Boko Haram’s adaptation to digital technologies has significantly enhanced its capacity to finance terrorism in Nigeria. A 2025 analysis by counterterrorism expert Oge Samuel Okonkwo highlights Boko Haram’s strategic use of cryptocurrencies to fund operations, including weapons procurement and logistics. The decentralised and often unregulated nature of peer-to-peer (P2P) crypto platforms in Nigeria allows the group to receive funds from both local and international sources with relative anonymity. The group’s diversification of funding mechanisms has it embracing digital platforms such as mobile money services, cryptocurrency exchanges, and fintech applications. This shift has enabled Boko Haram to conduct financial transactions with greater anonymity and efficiency, complicating efforts by authorities to trace and disrupt these illicit financial flows.
One prominent method involves exploiting mobile money and Point-of-Sale (POS) systems. A Point-of-Sale (POS) system combines hardware and software that organisations use to process transactions, manage sales, and handle various operational tasks. Traditionally, POS systems were physical terminals located at checkout counters, but modern POS solutions have evolved to include mobile and cloud-based platforms, allowing for greater flexibility and functionality. Further corroborating this, a publication by the Wilson Centre notes that the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) identified a POS agent and nine others linked to a terrorist leader. These individuals, some of whom operated businesses like mobile phone shops and pharmacies, were involved in significant transactions that facilitated the movement of illicit funds. The use of fintech services, which may lack stringent Know Your Customer (KYC) protocols, further facilitates this process. Such activities have been documented in Nigeria’s National Inherent Risk Assessment, highlighting the vulnerabilities within the country’s financial infrastructure.
Cryptocurrencies present another avenue for terrorist financing. Platforms like Binance have been identified as channels through which Boko Haram receives and transfers funds. The decentralised and pseudonymous nature of cryptocurrencies makes them attractive for illicit activities, as they can be difficult to trace. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) has noted instances where individuals, often unaware of the illicit nature of the funds, are recruited to trade cryptocurrencies on behalf of terrorist financiers. This method not only launders money but also integrates unwitting participants into the financing network.
Allegations have surfaced suggesting that certain non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operating in Nigeria’s conflict zones may have inadvertently or deliberately supported Boko Haram and other terrorist groups. Former military officials and investigative reports claim that some NGOs have provided logistical support, including food, medical supplies, and even arms, under the guise of humanitarian aid. For instance, a former Air Officer Commanding alleged that NGOs have used unmarked trucks to deliver supplies to insurgents, complicating efforts to trace and intercept these deliveries. Additionally, there have been reports of NGOs facilitating the movement of funds through informal value transfer systems like hawala, which can obscure the origins and destinations of financial transactions. These activities, if confirmed, highlight the need for stringent oversight and regulation of NGO operations in conflict-affected regions to prevent the exploitation of humanitarian channels for terrorist financing and support.
In response to these evolving threats, Nigerian authorities have initiated measures to strengthen the country’s financial security framework. This includes the implementation of advanced financial intelligence tools and increased collaboration with international partners to monitor and disrupt terrorist financing networks. However, the dynamic nature of digital technologies necessitates continuous adaptation and vigilance to effectively counter the innovative strategies employed by groups like Boko Haram.
Use of Encrypted Messaging and Social Media for Financial Coordination
Boko Haram and its splinter faction, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), have increasingly leveraged encrypted messaging applications and social media platforms to coordinate financial operations, disseminate propaganda, and recruit members. The groups have expanded their digital footprint by using social media platforms to disseminate propaganda and recruit new members. Boko Haram, for instance, has adopted TikTok to host live streams in Hausa, showcasing stolen military equipment and drone footage of attacks. These broadcasts not only serve as propaganda tools but also facilitate real-time interaction with viewers, answering questions and justifying their actions with religious rhetoric. ISWAP has also embraced advanced technologies, employing artificial intelligence for video editing and using surveillance technology to enhance their propaganda efforts.
Encrypted messaging services like Telegram and WhatsApp have become central to these groups’ communication strategies. Telegram, in particular, is favoured for its robust encryption and ability to support large group chats and file sharing, making it an ideal platform for distributing propaganda videos, official publications, and coordinating internal communications. ISWAP has been reported to operate over 50 accounts across Facebook and Telegram, utilising these platforms to claim responsibility for attacks, provide operational updates, and solicit funds. WhatsApp is also extensively used for real-time communication and strategic planning among members.
In response to these challenges, Nigerian authorities have been working to enhance their counter-terrorism financing efforts. The Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) has been instrumental in monitoring cash economies, illicit trade, and digital transactions to disrupt illicit financial channels. For instance, the NFIU identified a network involving a Point of Sale (POS) agent and several others linked to a terrorist leader, highlighting the evolving methods used to move illicit funds. Additionally, the NFIU has begun collaborating with the emerging technology and innovation sector to use technologies like blockchain, artificial intelligence, and big data to combat financial crimes.
Despite these efforts, the decentralised and encrypted nature of the communication platforms used by Boko Haram and ISWAP continues to pose significant obstacles. The groups’ adeptness at leveraging advanced digital technologies and exploiting regulatory weaknesses highlights the urgent need for a holistic and coordinated approach to counter-terrorism financing. This approach should prioritise strengthening digital financial oversight, fostering enhanced cybersecurity cooperation, and partnering with technology companies to create effective strategies for monitoring and disrupting the use of encrypted platforms in terrorist operations.
Challenges and Gaps in Nigeria’s Counter-Terrorist Financing Framework
Nigeria’s efforts to combat terrorist financing, particularly in relation to Boko Haram, face significant challenges and gaps that hinder the effectiveness of its counter-terrorism financing (CFT) framework.
One of the primary issues is the exploitation of the financial sector by terrorist groups. Bureau de Change (BDC) operators, POS devices, and wire transfers have been identified as channels through which illicit funds are moved. According to Nigeria’s 2022 National Inherent Risk Assessment of Terrorism Financing, approximately 19 companies were identified between 2019 and 2022 as connected to unlicensed money exchangers. These entities allegedly used their businesses to mix illicit funds with legitimate transactions, facilitating the movement of resources tied to terrorism financing. These illegal money exchangers often operate outside regulatory oversight, implementing minimal preventive measures, thus providing a conduit for moving illicit funds.
Furthermore, the banking sector, despite being subjected to stricter regulations aimed at increasing transparency and identifying suspicious transactions, continues to offer opportunities for terrorist financing. Studies have illustrated that current measures employed by banks have proven ineffective due to knowledge gaps surrounding the concrete methods terrorist financiers employ.
Another significant challenge is the lack of coordination among law enforcement and regulatory agencies. Effective information sharing is crucial in combating terrorism financing; however, there seems to be a lack of coordination among various agencies and institutions. This hinders the ability to track and intercept suspicious transactions and apprehend those responsible for financing terrorism.
Capacity gaps within law enforcement and regulatory agencies further exacerbate the problem. These institutions must be adequately equipped and trained to detect and disrupt the financial networks of terrorist organisations. Without the requisite capacity, it becomes incredibly challenging to investigate and prosecute individuals involved in financing terrorism. The judicial process also presents obstacles. Government agencies, financial institutions, law enforcement bodies, and civil society organisations have identified the need for a timely judicial process as a critical measure to strengthen Nigeria’s capacity to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Delays in prosecuting terrorism financing cases risk undermining the overall effectiveness of the country’s counter-financing of terrorism (CFT) framework.
Conclusion
The evolution of Boko Haram’s financing strategies, particularly through digital platforms, underscores the complex interplay between technology and terrorism in Nigeria. The group’s adept use of mobile money services, POS systems, and informal financial networks has enabled it to sustain operations and evade traditional financial surveillance mechanisms. Investigations have revealed that Boko Haram cells have utilised mobile payment platforms operated by major telecom providers to facilitate fund transfers across Nigeria and neighbouring countries, exploiting regulatory gaps and weak enforcement in conflict-affected regions.
Efforts by Nigerian authorities to counter these financing mechanisms have led to significant developments, including the conviction of 125 Boko Haram militants and financiers on various terrorism-related charges in a mass trial last July. These convictions highlight the government’s commitment to disrupting the financial networks that support terrorism. However, challenges persist, particularly in regulating informal financial systems and ensuring effective coordination among various agencies. The Nigerian government’s response has involved enhancing its counter-terrorism financing efforts through the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). These agencies have been instrumental in monitoring cash economies, illicit trade, and digital transactions to disrupt illicit financial channels. The Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) has been instrumental in identifying and disrupting illicit financial channels, yet the extensive use of cash and informal economic activities in regions like the northeast complicates surveillance and enforcement efforts. Additionally, the EFCC has discovered and closed over a thousand accounts used for terrorism financing, emphasising the need for technological solutions to track financial flows.
Nigeria must address several critical areas to enhance the effectiveness of its counter-terrorism financing (CTF) strategies. Strengthening regulatory oversight of informal financial systems, such as traditional savings schemes and barter transactions, is essential. Leveraging technology and fostering cross-sector collaboration can improve intelligence gathering on non-traditional threats. Additionally, enhancing international cooperation through deeper intelligence-sharing agreements and capacity-building programs will reinforce Nigeria’s ability to detect and disrupt illicit financial flows that sustain terrorism.
Furthermore, addressing the root causes of terrorism, such as poverty, inequality, and social injustice, is essential in the long-term strategy to combat extremism. President Bola Tinubu has emphasised the necessity for Africa to take a comprehensive approach to combating terrorism, not only through might but by addressing these underlying issues. By combining robust financial intelligence measures with socio-economic development initiatives, Nigeria can work towards dismantling the financial networks that sustain Boko Haram and restoring peace and security to affected regions.
Abraham Ename Minko is a senior researcher and policy analyst in Peace, Security, and Conflict Resolution. He is completing a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations at Istanbul University in Türkiye. His research interests are UN Peace Operations, Terrorism and Counter Violent Extremism, Peace and Conflict Resolution, Mediation and Negotiation, International Humanitarian Law and Armed Conflicts, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding.