Introduction
Less than two weeks were enough for the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led ‘Operations Room’ to overthrow the tyrannical and bloodthirsty regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. The astonishing speed of this geopolitical shift raises questions about the underlying mechanisms that have allowed an armed jihadist group to govern an area of over 186,000 square kilometres.
The history of the HTS is deeply linked to that of its founding members, including the famous Ahmed al-Chara, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Joulani. Since 2017, they have skilfully executed a dual approach to triumph in the Syrian jihad. Firstly, they have implemented various diplomatic and political manoeuvres to dominate the rival armed groups operating in the region. They have initiated talks not only with their allies and the leaders of north-western Syria’s tribes but also with their opponents. Moreover, these shifts within HTS align with the emergence of a carefully crafted and focused propaganda strategy aimed at both Syria and the West.
This Insight analyses the propaganda and digital use of HTS, a group that has gone from jihadist to insurgent to governing. It draws from a study of the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) and HTS communications and the statements of its political and military leaders on social networks, including Telegram, WhatsApp, Facebook, and X, since November 2024.
HTS and SSG: A Genuine Political Campaign
In 2016, Jahbhat an-Nusra split from al-Qaeda and rebranded as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham. It then merged with other fighting groups to form HTS. This name change was accompanied by a shift in propaganda strategy, indicating a desire to distance itself from al-Qaeda’s global jihadist movement and instead focus on a more Syrian-centric approach. In regions under its control, HTS implemented a dual leadership structure. It entrusted political and religious matters to the Syrian Salvation Government while retaining responsibility for military affairs. In 2019, the HTS aimed to unify military operations in north-western Syria. To achieve this goal, it co-founded the al-Fateh al-Mubeen Operations Room, which brought together various rebel factions. However, al-Chara swiftly assumed control, prohibiting any further formation of alliances.
To promote its project of unifying political and military forces in northwest Syria, HTS has gradually shifted its propaganda from a purely military focus to a broader political and social discourse. In line with this evolution, Ahmed Chara’s public discourse advocated for a three-pronged approach, emphasizing agriculture, manufacturing and public services; gradually unveiling their state-building agendas on social media. Although the HTS does not support liberal democracy or popular sovereignty, its leaders stress online that the state-building project is a collective effort. It started using Telegram, in addition to Facebook and WhatsApp, to showcase its ‘government’s activities.
Figure 1: Example of six telegram channels used by the SSG and HTS authorities. All these channels were still active as of Jan. 2025.
Since its inception, HTS has created tightly regulated propaganda, carefully managing its social media messaging. In 2019, the group effectively created a ministry of propaganda, banning unofficial media and imprisoning zealous speakers. By 2022, specialised units appear on social networks to track down “fake news” attributed to HTS Syrian adversaries or supporters of Bashar al-Assad. The goal is twofold: to protect HTS-controlled area residents from misinformation and to manage information for international observers and foreign media. To achieve the latter, the organisation granted Western and Arab reporters special treatment, including exclusive rights and preferential access to the leaders of HTS and SSG executives. Finally, in November 2024, ‘jihadi journalists’ were sent to the front lines, where some died and became martyred (Figure 2).
Figure 2: L-R: Tribute to two deceased military journalists on Telegram (12 Dec. 2024) and message from the Ministry of Information of the SSG to the family of a journalist described as a martyr on X (07 Dec. 2024).
The Syrian Conquest of HTS: A Blitzkrieg as Told by its Leaders
On 27 November, the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) and HTS launched ‘radea edoan’ (deterrence of aggression) operations. In a statement, HTS military authorities announced the mobilization of forces in the liberated areas to fight against the Assad regime and its Iranian allies.
Figure 3: Announcement of the beginning of the ‘radea edoan’ operations (deterrence of aggression).
Following this, a propaganda effort led by HTS Lieutenant-Colonel Hassan Abdul Ghani was established. This man became known for his daily updates on Telegram and WhatsApp, detailing the campaign’s strategy and progress in each city. While HTS captured cities and opened prisons, people were instructed to stay home, avoid the front lines, and adhere to curfews.
Figure 4: Shaheen Brigade’s (Telegram ‘radea edoan’), 2024.
Other Syrian jihadist military leaders joined al-Chara in the Radea Edoan operation’s live propaganda. Speakers included: Lt. Col. Hassan Abdul Ghani, head of the al-Fateh al-Mubeen operations room; Amer as-Sheikh, a former Ahrar as-Sham leader who merged his group into the Turkish-backed National Liberation Front in 2018; Jamil as-Saleh, a military leader of Jaish al-Izza; Abu Zubayr as-Shami, an HTS spokesman; and Mohamed Abdel Rahman, SSG Minister of Interior and Chief of Police.
Figure 5: Operations room leaders via its official Telegram channel (28 Nov. and 11 Dec. 2024).
These individuals, many of them wearing military attire with religious insignia on their foreheads, provided real-time, hourly commentary and updates on a blitzkrieg. The updates, mainly distributed via Telegram and WhatsApp, were geared towards Syrian citizens, and Western and Arab media outlets. For instance, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and Enab Baladi (an independent Syrian media organisation) shared many of these briefings.
Figure 6: Top, L-R: Dissemination of the WhatsApp group link for news from the operations room (2 Dec. 2024). Dissemination of the telephone number of the WhatsApp group of the Ministry of the Interior of the provisional government (15 Jan. 2025). WhatsApp group sent by the military operations department (17 Dec. 2024).
The Art of Waging a ‘Pristine’ Conflict
HTS’s communications throughout ‘radea edoan’ operations reveal two key ideas: Firstly, HTS spreads the idea of a clean, deathless war. Indeed, while Syrian fronts are active, HTS’ propaganda channels do not show violent images. Despite intense frontline combat between Assad’s forces and al-Chara-led fighters, ‘radea edoan’ spokespersons on Telegram downplay the violence, portraying a calm and controlled conflict that contrasts the reality on the ground.
Secondly, this story has a spiritual dimension, whereby HTS has advocated for righteous warfare and provided a framework for the mujahideen. Its social media narrative portrays the mujahideen as heroes fighting against the Assad regime and its allies, symbolising good versus evil. This language aligns with the lexical field of faith and holy war.
Figure 7: L-R: A picture of a fighter with the caption ‘With our faith, we lead the battle’; a picture of fighters praying with the caption ‘The mujahideen of the Department of Military Operations are headed for Shuwaihna Hill’ (Nov. 2024); Ahmed Chara congratulates the free fighters who have waged jihad (Dec. 2024).
For instance, when al-Chara changed his kunya (his war name or pseudonym) back to his birth name on 7 December, he sent a message to his ‘brothers’ praising their ‘jihad’ and thanking Allah for their ‘virtue’. It is here that the mujahideen’s arrival in Aleppo is compared to the Prophet’s companions in Medina. On 30 November, they displayed their ghanima (war spoils or booty) on social media, a reference to holy war practices.
Figure 8: ‘Ghanima’ from the Department of Military Operations in the town of Al-Qasimia (west of Aleppo), Dec. 2024.
In line with this, the SSG and the HTS announced the end of military operations and the resumption of public services on social media. For example, on 30 November, authorities allowed bakeries to reopen, and on 2 December, they provided phone numbers for SSG ministries. The group’s Telegram channels, once responsible for propaganda about the conflict, gradually evolved into political forums whereby the transitional Syrian government could be promoted. They also distributed several WhatsApp group addresses to inform the Syrian population of the group’s political decisions.
Figure 9: L-R: Civil security operations: the arrest of drug traffickers via Facebook (13 Feb. 25); security operations in the Hama region via Facebook (11 Feb. 25).
The speed at which this all occurred indicates extensive planning on the part of HTS. The group aims to govern its territory autonomously, leveraging diverse clans and groups. From the beginning, leaders of the HTS and SSG committed to supporting Syrian Sunni society, ensuring its involvement in the political agenda.
From Wartime Propaganda to Diplomatic Discourse
Beginning on 10 December, the propaganda of the Operations Room shifted. Al-Chara, previously discreet, became more prominent, along with other figures from the Syrian jihad, HTS, Fateh al-Moubin, and SSG. The transitional government is using Facebook, X, Telegram and WhatsApp to communicate with civil society in Syria. Several key topics are of note:
Firstly, al-Chara emphasized his ongoing battle against Bashar al-Assad and Iran: On 10 December, he vowed to bring Syrian war criminals to justice. On 12 December, he pledged to combat Iranian counter-intelligence in Syria. Communication on this matter is accomplished through words (encouraging supporters of Assad to identify themselves) and visuals (publishing photos of arrests, conflicts, and a deceased Syrian leader).
Secondly, HTS propaganda sought to reassure internet users, including journalists and international observers, regarding the treatment of religious minorities. Al-Chara pledged protection, publishing photos with Druze leaders and Christians in Damascus. However, this speech faced criticism from some minority groups and prompted protests by hundreds of Christians in Damascus after a Christmas tree was burned in Souqaylabiya, a predominantly Orthodox Christian town.
Thirdly, politics has played a crucial role in communication: On 18–19 December, a provisional government chart was released on Telegram, assigning key positions to HTS/SSG members, jihad veterans, and al-Chara’s inner circle, including his brother to lead the Ministry of Health.
While reports focused on the Foreign Minister’s Saudi Arabia visit, al-Chara is the true face of the interim administration. From 15 December to 5 January, propagandists circulated images of his meetings with officials from the UN, UK, US, EU, and several Middle Eastern and European nations.
Figure 10: A poll asks ‘would you vote for Ahmed Chara?’ 71% say ‘yes’, via Telegram (Dec. 14).
The SSG has long used Telegram for security-related communications, but recently it has intensified its use. ‘Men in Black’ units, known for their heavy armament, have been deployed in anti-drug operations, arresting dissidents, thieves, and murderers. They have also been praised by the transitional government.
Figure 11: L-R: ‘Men in Black’ units, Official SSG civil security channel via Telegram (10 Dec 2024) and via X (16 Dec. 2024).
Implications and Conclusions
HTS and SSG propaganda has shifted toward a more political discourse, especially since the launch of the ‘radea edoan’ operations. While many SSG-operated Telegram channels remain active, their messaging has become more nuanced, emphasising the political and diplomatic goals of the transitional Syrian government. political. The SSG’s governance model in northwestern Syria (2018–2024) is now being promoted as a template for today’s Syria. In fact, al-Chara’s team now seems intent on applying these political principles nationwide, using social media to publicise its policies, to reassure international observers and the Syrian population, and to showcase its political actions. In essence, the transitional government has embraced social media networking as a foundational tool to control the narrative.
Figure 12: L-R: Media coverage of the political and diplomatic exchanges, meetings of the transitional government via X (08 Feb., 19 Feb. and 15 Jan. 2025)
However, the announced dissolution of HTS and its collaboration with other armed groups in the Operation Room necessitate reintegrating its leaders into the administration or military. Many of these figures, including al-Chara and his associates, are former members of the Syrian jihad or veterans of the GSS/HTS.
As part of his domestic and international propaganda efforts, Al-Chara is attempting to charm the West with promises of improved security and human rights in Syria. Despite being absent from the communication sphere, Sunni religious leaders will play a significant role in future governance. And while appearing to have ended its transition, HTS still faces challenges in maintaining public safety and reviving its economy.
Finally, these elements allow us to formulate the following recommendations:
- It is important that the media and international observers analyse the social media posts of HTS to understand the political project of the Syrian transitional government. For example, the leaders of Syrian clans or armed groups, religious figures, industrialists and intellectuals promoted on social networks provide essential clues as to who will be involved in the transitional government project.
- It is essential to understand that these posts and publications have a political and diplomatic purpose. It is therefore important to cross-check this information with other sources, such as independent Syrian journalists.
- There is the question of the role of technology companies in the management of these communication spaces. In the case of the ‘radea edoan’ operations, the official media did not disseminate violent images, but it can be seen that several platforms were saturated by the messages of the military operations directorate. However, to prevent political communication from becoming political propaganda on social networks, it would be necessary to be able to verify or qualify the information disseminated. This point is all the more important as applications, messaging services, and platforms have become information spaces for the media, administrations and observers from all over the world.