Introduction
In November 2024, Nigerian authorities officially declared the Lakurawa group a terrorist organisation and banned it across the country. Operating primarily along the Nigeria-Niger border, the group’s proscription as a terror group has caused controversy among security analysts and local communities. There are debates pertaining to how long the group has been in existence, with some experts attributing the Lakurawa’s arrival to 2017. In light of Lakurawa’s banning and growing notoriety, this Insight examines the recruitment strategies and technological tactics of the Sahel-based group.
Lakurawa’s Emergence and Operational Strategies
In 2017, it was estimated that the Lakurawa was comprised of less than 50 youths from the local communities. However, the group’s population has reportedly increased to more than 200 youths aged 18-35, with the recruited being paid stipends. Aside from promulgating radical Islamism, the group also emphasises holiness, which causes self-isolation from its communities. Several camps were established in Tunigara, Wansaniya, Gwangwano, and Mulawa, located along the Nigeria-Niger borders. These areas are often regarded as Darul Islam (land of the purified/land of Islam).
Another perspective argues that the emergence of the Lakurawa terror group was enabled by porous borders and the collapse of security cooperation among the ECOWAS states following recent military coups in the Sahel. These coups, which triggered sanctions and regional security failures, created opportunities for the group’s unrestricted movement and incursion into Nigerian territory. Furthermore, some have traced the group to its migration from countries like Libya, Algeria, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Initially, members entered border communities under the guise of pastoralists searching for greener pastures for their herds. Over time, seasonal migrations enabled them to build relationships with local populations, gradually embedding themselves within these communities. In 2017, the community leaders invited the group to combat the threat of armed banditry in the Tangaza and Gudu Local Government Areas of Sokoto. Such a relationship resulted in helping communities chase armed bandits – and other non-state armed groups out of the areas. This intervention by the Lakurawa portrays them as mercenaries employed to fight another armed group.
Following Lakurawas’ arrival in Nigeria, the group has used states in the north of the country, like Sokoto and Kebbi, as bases. It resembles other radical jihadist groups in West Africa, including Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and adopted Khawariji’s ideological perspective, similar to Boko Haram. Lakurawas is known to carry small arms, often used to intimidate the local populace into strict adherence to Sharia law. Furthermore, the Lakurawa engage in kidnapping for ransom and cattle rustling, highlighting an environment where terrorists combine ideological and economic pursuit with criminality.
Activities
The Lakurawa operates in five local government areas in northern Nigeria, including Ilela, Tangaza, Gudu, Silame, and Binji. There, they leverage existing grievances among ethnic and occupational groups as well as poverty among the youth population to engender their objectives. The Lakurawa have weaponised the existing rift between farmers and pastoralists, primarily from the Fulani ethnic group, to promote their agenda. At this point, the communities raised the alarm, which resulted in the intervention of the Nigerian army.
Lakurawa continues to recruit from the local population daily. Its membership includes foot soldiers, informants, preachers, and judges who administer justice in tandem with radical Islamism and Sharia law. The Lakurawa has a systemic structure representing hierarchical formation with a feedback mechanism. Among its layers are weapon suppliers, who disguise themselves as nomadic herders from neighbouring countries. Lakurawa does not acknowledge state boundaries or state authority, allowing it to attempt to create a mini-state where it governs, collects taxes, and enforces Islamic law. However, as the group turned against traditional governance systems and the local leaders who initially supported them, the communities began to resist and turn against the group. The emergence of Lakurawa is often considered an importation of jihadism, as the group was originally invited and hired as mercenaries by traditional and community leaders to combat armed bandits threatening local communities.
Lakurawa initially recruited youths to serve as cattle rearers, usually consisting of a one million naira salary (US$645), later reduced to 500,000 (US$322) because of the huge youth turnout. The Lakurawa combined financial inducement and ideological instruments to foster acceptance among these vulnerable communities. The financial incentives offered by the Lakurawas enable them to recruit several categories of youths into several roles, including informants at the community level.
Recruitment Strategies and Technological Dimensions
Aside from the Lakurawa’s weaponry, the group use drones to surveil local communities and military formations across the areas where they operate. In most cases, drones are employed to monitor the movement of Nigerian security forces. The use of drones is a common strategy for militant groups operating around the Niger-Nigeria borders. The Lakurawa terrorist group has leveraged social media to spread jihadist ideology and recruit unemployed youth into violent extremism, often using welfare incentives as a recruitment tool. Using social media to preach sermons is specifically targeted towards encouraging young people to radicalise to jihadism, especially against Western culture and democratic government. Such strategies are part of an effort to establish a Sharia-based system where governance is dictated by the Quran. However, despite their push for radical Islamism, the group has received minimal support from the locals, particularly due to their reliance on violent tactics to engage with the population.
The Lakurawas have spread propaganda via videos and social media to showcase their activities, highlighting the group’s affiliation with the Islamic State. The propaganda often appears in the form of religious messaging, emphasising the religious dimension of the jihadi struggle.
Concluding Remarks
Though still evolving, the Lakurawa terrorist group highlights the intersection of local and transnational security challenges. It has exploited ungoverned spaces and the breakdown of security cooperation following military coups in the Sahel to advance its objectives. To prevent further migration of jihadists from the central Sahel into Nigeria, it is essential for the Nigerian authorities to establish a strategic partnership with the region’s military juntas. Additionally, to counter the use of drones by terrorist groups, the Nigerian intelligence community must enhance its surveillance strategies with advanced technology. Strengthening these capabilities is crucial for monitoring terrorist activities in ungoverned areas, where drones are used for reconnaissance and launching attacks on military and civilian targets. Although the Nigerian parliament proposed a bill seeking to counter terrorist exploitation of cyberspace in the past, it later received resistance from Nigerians and civil society organisations. Nonetheless, a law banning the sharing of terrorist videos online should be implemented to mitigate the recognition afforded to the group. If such a law is enacted, sharing terrorist content by a third party will enable the state to subdue the popularity being given to the terror group. Additionally, security cooperation with the military juntas across the Sahel becomes imperative to curtail the illegal movement of Lakurawa from the central Sahel into communities along the Niger-Nigeria borders. Likewise, building robust aerial surveillance security architecture to effectively monitor the use of drones by terrorist groups should be incorporated into the ECOWAS and G5 Sahel regional security agenda.
Dr John Sunday Ojo is a post-doctoral research fellow at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University in the Netherlands. Dr Ojo is a research fellow at NATO Veteran Initiative Research Institute based in Washington DC, United States. He also holds a research fellow position at the Institute for Research and Policy Integration in Africa (IRPIA) housed at Northern Illinois University in the United States. He obtained a PhD from the University of Portsmouth in the UK. Dr Ojo is a 2024-2025 GNET Fellow.