Insurgents and terrorists have been exploiting drones for intelligence gathering, propaganda, and attacks on civilian and military targets for years. The accessibility and affordability of drones have enabled jihadist groups to possess airpower, which was previously an exclusive preserve of state security agencies, thereby transforming asymmetric conflict dynamics. In particular, the increasing adoption of drones by the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) is revolutionising the conflict landscape in the Lake Chad Basin region. ISWAP’s recent integration of drones into its operations mirrors “tactics used in conflict zones across the Middle East” and in the Russia-Ukraine war.
As drones become a critical component in modern warfare, their capabilities have been demonstrated by Ukrainian soldiers, mitigating the human risk on the battlefield. ISWAP’s use of drones, particularly in their military operations, has increased in intensity amid the war in Ukraine. In March, ISWAP targeted a Nigerian military base with drones before advancing its ground assault, killing 16 people. Moreover, knowledge-sharing between the parent Islamic States and their affiliates has further reinforced the drones’ adoption and adaptation, which complicates existing counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in the Lake Chad Basin region. As the use of drones is intensified by jihadist groups like ISWAP, it creates a climate of fear and security concerns for the civilian population and the regional security architecture. Therefore, this Insight examines the changing dynamics in the theatre of conflict with the renewed efforts and recent adoption of drones by the ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin region. It further uncovers the challenges that the increased use of drones poses for regional counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in the region.
Figure 1: Use of Technology by ISWAP
ISWAP and Drone-Enabled Insurgency
ISWAP, which is also known as Wilāyat Garb Ifrīqīyā, is a splinter group of Boko Haram that operates in and around the Lake Chad Basin region. It has been considered more of an administrative arm, and “generally spares Muslim non-combatants,” compared to Boko Haram. ISWAP has recently extended its territorial expansion from north eastern Nigeria to the north west, where it competes with other terror groups like Ansaru. ISWAP leverages local grievances and strategic military capability to assert its footprint in the Lake Chad Region and beyond. While ISWAP’s operational strategies differ from those of other terrorist groups like Boko Haram, its values are based on targeting state security forces but preserving the civilian population. Although a total adherence to such principles is nearly impossible when engaging military forces. These principles contravene Boko Haram’s ideological orientations, which were based on attacking and killing both the state security personnel and the civilian population indiscriminately.
In October 2014, ISWAP members requested information from Syrian Jihadist members about unarmed drones. Unarmed drones in this context are drones used by the civilian population without capabilities for military exercises. Syrian-based Islamic State jihadists responded with video instructions about how to convert these drones for militant operations. These include conversion, coupling, usage, operational, and technical knowledge. Such interactions demonstrate a historic example of technical collaboration between IS affiliates throughout the adoption of emerging technology. This collaboration marks the starting point of the usage of drones by insurgent groups in Africa. ISWAP has also used drones for surveillance and propaganda, motivated by other jihadist groups in Mozambique, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Libya.
In many cases, ISWAP has adapted quadcopter drones to carry out surveillance and monitoring of military targets. A quadcopter drone is an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) designed with four rotors. Each rotor is equipped with a motor and propeller. ISWAP has taken advantage of several porous borders in the region to transport these drones into their enclaves. The group has historically leveraged these porous borders because they are ungoverned spaces or have limited state presence, allowing them to operate with impunity. Further, it leverages arms trafficking networks and smuggling routes to access these devices and hardware.
ISWAP often reconstructs these drones to deploy explosive devices to carry out attacks on specific targets. In 2018, ISWAP began to deploy these drones to carry out strategic operations against the military bases. From 2022, ISWAP relied on small drones, often used for intelligence gathering purposes, and to promote propaganda videos. ISWAP combatants use such drones to display their movement and training of recruit fellows. , Such a trend highlights a radical transformation in the way and manner ISWAP employed drones in its operational engagement with the military forces. For instance, in June 2022, the group successfully deployed a drone to ambush the Nigerian military convoy, which resulted in massive casualties. The subsequent deployment of drones against military targets has been recently intensified.
In December 2024, with the use of drones, ISWAP unleashed terror on Nigeria’s military formations, including the Nigerian military’s Forward Operating Base Wajiroko in the northeastern Damboa region, where five military personnel were injured. The troop stationed at Wajiroko, Borno state, efficaciously repulsed ISWAP attacks on Christmas Day. Moreover, the succeeding attacks were carried out by ISWAP in Damaturu in Yobe State and Abadam in the Lake Chad Basin region. Subsequently, ISWAP launched another drone attack on Nigerian military bases in Gubio, wounding five military personnel. Before ambushing the Nigerian military, it is believed that ISWAP employed a surveillance drone before launching attacks on a military convoy.
In March 2025, ISWAP penetrated the Wulgo axis where the Lake Chad intersects with the arid countryside of northern Nigeria. It was claimed that ISWAP disguised as pastoralists were on a weekly mission to the market. Cameroonian troops experienced a deadly drone attack launched by the terror group, which claimed 25 military personnel. The attack was carried out by the group using cheap recreational drones that were reconfigured for explosive purposes. A more recent attack on Nigeria’s military bases by ISWAP was witnessed on May 12, 2025, which claimed the lives of four military personnel in the Marte area of the northern part of Borno state. While ISWAP succeeded in taking hostages of some military personnel, military arsenals were also looted by the insurgents. One crucial component that made such an operation successful for the ISWAP was the use of drones. It was claimed that two drones were initially deployed by the terror group before the attack. The successful attack reveals the fragility of the existing counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies. This demonstrates the inherent danger in new technological innovation. Terrorists’ access to such technologies through black markets without regulations offers a battlefield advantage in asymmetric warfare, further endangering critical infrastructure, the civilian population, and military formations.
Challenges and Government Response to Drone-Induced Insurgency
The thorough adoption of drones by ISWAP is part of the global trend by both state actors and violent extremists to integrate unmanned systems as a critical military mechanism for offensive and defensive purposes. One of the major challenges faced by the military forces in countering terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin region is the lack of anti-drone equipment. This has created a lacuna in existing traditional counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. The emergence of armed drones in the battlefield has necessitated counter-drone strategies by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) comprising Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon (Niger has recently withdrawn from the regional security outfit), saddles it with the responsibility of combating terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin. Since ISWAP has incorporated the use of drones into its Jihadist operational agenda, especially in unleashing terror on Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) and military targets, authorities in the Lake Chad region have prohibited the use of flying drones, highlighting the security implications. Moreover, the Nigerian state has embraced the use of EDM4S Sky Wiper, made in Lithuania, that counter drone control signals, interrupting their data broadcast and routing signals. The SkyWiper has the capability of crashing drones and forcing them to return to their operational source.
Conclusion and Way Forward
The deployment of drones by ISWAP could redefine regional counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in the Lake Chad Basin region and beyond. ISWAP has recently assessed the militaristic operational capabilities of drones in asymmetric warfare. ISWAP must have learned from other groups, like JNIM in Burkina Faso and Boko Haram, that have also developed similar technological strategies using drones for offensive and defensive operations. Weaponising drones by ISWAP highlights how innovative a violent extremist group could be despite the regional security efforts in curtailing insurgency and terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin region. It is evident that ISWAP has developed more sophisticated adaptive capacity using drones, creating a complex environment for military forces to counterterrorism in the Lake Chad Basin region. It is high time that security forces adapt to the new wave of techno-insurgency that requires a new level of technological orientation. There is an urgent need to redefine counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operational strategies, especially regarding the use of counter-drones. The deployment of technological equipment, including radar, jamming devices, among others, to detect and deactivate jihadist drones becomes crucial in modern asymmetric warfare in the Lake Chad Basin region. Such action will safeguard military infrastructure, the civilian population, and military bases from drone attacks. Moreover, knowledge of routes and how ISWAP purchases drones is needed to understand the acquisition sources. Importantly, regulating the drone market and partnering with tech companies to prevent ISWAP’s access to drones is required.
Security forces need a more sophisticated technological approach to deal with the new developments in asymmetric warfare. The regional security alliance commands a new approach by investing in technological defence, incorporating effective advanced capabilities and anti-drone operational bases. These bases are to be equipped with tracking equipment to identify and eliminate jihadist drones and further locate their communication networks and operational sources. This approach will prevent collateral damage resulting from ISWAP’s aerial threats.
Blocking access to the drone market will preserve the civilian population and military forces from ISWAP’s drones that have been employed to carry out attacks against civilian and military targets in the Lake Chad Basin region and beyond. Further research into its drone adoption and operational dynamics should also be encouraged to understand the deeper technological capability of the terror group. To achieve this, a collective regional effort is needed. Furthermore, it becomes crucial to invest in air defence systems capable of detecting and taking down violent extremist drones in the Lake Chad Basin region.
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Dr John Sunday Ojo is a post-doctoral research fellow at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University in the Netherlands. Dr Ojo is a research fellow at NATO Veteran Initiative Research Institute based in Washington DC, United States. He also holds a research fellow position at the Institute for Research and Policy Integration in Africa (IRPIA) housed at Northern Illinois University in the United States. He obtained a PhD from the University of Portsmouth in the UK. Dr Ojo is a 2024-2025 GNET Fellow.
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