Guns by Drone: The Rise of Drone-Assisted Firearm Smuggling on Israel’s Southern Border

By Dr Yannick Veilleux-Lepage

5th June 2025 In Insights

Introduction

Israel has witnessed a sharp uptick in a previously rare tactic: the use of commercial drones to smuggle firearms across its southern border with Egypt. This emerging trend in drone-assisted weapons smuggling is notable not only for its operational novelty, but also for what it reveals about the evolving nature of cross-border threats in modern conflict environments. While drones have been widely used by non-state actors for surveillance and attacks, their adaptation for logistical purposes, particularly the covert delivery of rifles, pistols, and ammunition, marks a significant tactical shift.

This Insight examines the recent emergence of drone-enabled smuggling along the Israel-Egypt border, marked by over ten confirmed interceptions involving modified commercial UAVs since October 2024. While attribution remains incomplete in several cases, Israeli media and IDF spokespersons have linked these incidents to Palestinian militant groups, though no independent verification has confirmed responsibility. These incidents nonetheless highlight the technical adaptations, payload profiles, and strategic implications of drone-assisted smuggling. The Insight argues that this development is not merely an isolated innovation but a potentially replicable tactic that could reshape logistical operations for non-state actors in other conflict zones. By analysing how this tactic has emerged in Israel, the Insight aims to draw broader lessons for counterterrorism, border enforcement, and global drone regulation efforts.

Drone-Assisted Smuggling

Drone-assisted smuggling refers to the covert use of unmanned aerial vehicles to transport illicit goods, such as firearms, explosives, narcotics, mobile phones, and cash, across borders or into restricted areas like prisons. Unlike traditional smuggling routes, drones offer low-risk, GPS-guided alternatives that bypass ground-based security infrastructure. They are typically small, inexpensive, and difficult to detect, making them especially attractive to organised criminal networks 

In the prison context, drone drops have rapidly become a preferred method for smuggling high-value contraband. Beyond prisons, drone-assisted smuggling is increasingly used by transnational criminal networks to move goods across borders. UAVs are now part of the operational toolkit of cartels, traffickers, and militant groups operating in highly monitored environments. In 2023, Jordanian forces intercepted at least nine drones carrying crystal meth from Syria, part of a wider trend in which Syrian networks export captagon and methamphetamine to Gulf markets. Similar activity has been observed on the India–Pakistan border, where drones carry opiates and synthetic drugs. In the Western Hemisphere, Mexican cartels regularly use drones to deliver drugs across the U.S. border at hard-to-monitor sites. Brazilian gangs and Colombian cartels have adopted UAVs not only for smuggling but also for reconnaissance and attacks. In Europe, authorities are confronting similar challenges: in 2023, Spanish police intercepted a fixed-wing drone carrying 150 kg of cocaine from Morocco, and have also recovered underwater drones transporting over 200 kg of narcotics across the Strait of Gibraltar.

Terrorist Drone-Assisted Smuggling

Despite growing concern, the terrorist use of drone-assisted smuggling has remained largely theoretical. In 2016, Don Rassler published a landmark study on terrorist use of UAVs, which included a typology outlining various ways in which terrorist groups might exploit drone technology. Among these, he identified “smuggle/courier services” as a potential use case, noting: “Drones can also be used by terrorist groups to smuggle or carry matériel into a protected facility, across a denied area (i.e., an international border or other sensitive location), and to ferry items (i.e., messages, money, or phones) that might be too risky to send via human couriers.” Other scholars have also discussed the possibility that drones could be used by terrorist actors to facilitate smuggling operations. However, a study examining over 600 incidents of terrorist drone use, published by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), found no confirmed cases of drones being used for smuggling purposes.

However, in recent months, forces from the IDF’s Paran Brigade, tasked with securing Israel’s southern border with Egypt, particularly the stretch from Nitzana to Eilat, have encountered a new phenomenon: drone-assisted smuggling of weapons into Israel. According to IDF spokespersons, the Paran Brigade has thwarted at least 10 attempts to smuggle firearms using drones, in what some media outlets have described as preparation for terrorist attacks inside Israel by Palestinian militant groups. 

The following table summarises confirmed drone interception incidents reported by the IDF and related security units between October 2024 and May 2025, based on an original analysis of posts from the official IDF X account (@idfonline) covering the period from 2021 to the present. Drone identification was conducted using the DroneSec intelligence platform in conjunction with visual analysis by the author. Each case involved an UAV crossing from Egyptian territory into Israel, primarily in the Paran Brigade’s area of operations, which spans the southern Negev Desert, from the Kerem Shalom crossing near Gaza down to Eilat. The table includes details on the type of drone used, the quantity and nature of the weapons seized, any additional equipment recovered, and which unit carried out the interception. 

The data on drone interceptions between October 2024 and May 2025 reveals several notable trends.

While drone-assisted smuggling of firearms across the Egypt-Israel border is a relatively recent phenomenon, with the first reported instances occurring in October 2024, there has been a marked increase in such activities in recent months. Notably, more than half of the documented incidents have taken place within the first five months of 2025. This uptick may be attributed to ongoing efforts by Israeli forces to counter traditional smuggling methods, particularly the use of tunnels from Egypt into Gaza.

Smuggling tunnels have long been a critical component of Hamas’s logistics and military strategy. These tunnels, especially those under the Philadelphi Corridor, a narrow strip along the Egypt-Gaza border, have facilitated the clandestine movement of weapons, fighters, and goods into the Gaza Strip. Despite Egypt’s efforts to dismantle these tunnels, including flooding and destruction operations, many remained operational and were instrumental in arming Hamas.

Following the October 7, 2023, attack by Hamas on Israel, the Israel Defense Forces intensified their focus on these smuggling routes. Israeli forces uncovered and destroyed numerous tunnels, some large enough to accommodate vehicles, underscoring the scale and sophistication of the network. The IDF’s operations aimed to sever the supply lines that allowed Hamas to replenish its arsenal and sustain its military activities.

The coinciding timing of these IDF actions with the emergence of drone-assisted smuggling suggests that drones have become an alternative method for transporting weapons. Existing literature on terrorist tactics indicates a “substitution effect,” where increased countermeasures against one method lead to the adoption of alternative tactics. While this concept is often applied to targeting strategies, the same logic can be extended to other operational aspects, including smuggling. However, the evidence for this substitution remains limited. The seizures reported to date (56 firearms across 10 incidents) are modest in scope. Moreover, while analysts have attributed the drone activity to Palestinian militant groups, definitive attribution remains unclear. Without greater insight into the volume of undetected shipments or the actors involved, it would be premature to characterise drone smuggling as a functional replacement for tunnel-based logistics.

Secondly, nearly all drones intercepted are believed to be DJI models, primarily the Matrice 300 RTK and the FlyCart 30. Notably, the DJI FlyCart 30 appears to have been employed on at least three occasions (on 28 March, 29 April, and 1 May) where it was used to transport 9 to 10 M16-type rifles per flight. Given that an M16 rifle weighs approximately 3.5 kg, this implies a total payload of 31.5–35 kg, placing it well beyond the capacity of most commercial drones.

Figure 1: IDF intercepted DJI FlyCart 30 drone carrying nine M16-type rifles near the Egypt-Israel border.

Operationally, the use of these drones raises critical questions about how they are being piloted and over what distances. The DJI Matrice 300 RTK has a maximum transmission range of up to 15 kilometres (in ideal conditions), while the DJI FlyCart 30 extends this to 20 kilometres. If these drones are being flown over longer distances, or across zones with poor signal coverage, this would suggest more advanced operational planning. To overcome these distance limitations, operators may be employing GPS waypoint programming for autonomous flight, using relay teams to maintain line-of-sight control across segments of the route, or even signal repeaters deployed near the border. However, none of these approaches are trivial, and each would require both technical know-how and coordinated planning, further underscoring the tactical intent and sophistication behind these smuggling efforts. The key question is not only what is being flown, but how such flights are being reliably executed in contested, monitored airspace.

Visual analysis of photos released by the IDF reveals a range of field-level modifications designed to optimise these drones for illicit arms transport. Most notably, several drones have had their undercarriages modified to accommodate custom cargo mounts. Beyond these structural cargo adaptations, many drones also show extensive use of duct tape, zip ties, and reinforced fabric straps to secure their payloads. These improvised fasteners anchor weapons directly to the drone frame or stabilise external racks. In one image, the arms of a drone are wrapped in padded material, possibly to protect internal wiring from vibration damage or to help maintain balance during flight. Some units also appear to have altered landing gear, either extended or removed entirely, to make room for larger cargo compartments or to allow for suspended payloads that would otherwise touch the ground during landing. A notable example is the DJI Agras T30 drone intercepted on 31 October 2024, which was carrying four rifles and one pistol. This hexacopter had its original liquid tank removed, though the spray tube guide rails along each rotor arm were still visible, as were the mounts for the drip sprayers near the motors, and a custom lower cage was installed.

Figure 2: IDF intercepted a modified DJI Agras T30 drone carrying four rifles and a pistol. Field adaptations included a custom cargo cage, stripped sensors, and improvised fasteners—indicating deliberate repurposing for arms smuggling.

Several drones appear to be missing their factory-installed sensors or visible payload cameras, likely due to intentional removal for weight reduction or to limit traceability. Stripping such components could prevent post-capture forensic analysis, especially if parts like GPS modules or telemetry logs are absent. Lastly, evidence of dual battery bays power packs have configured these platforms to extend flight range and increase lifting capacity. Taken together, these adaptations show a methodical effort to optimise commercially available drones for covert arms smuggling, demonstrating both technical proficiency and operational intent.

Lastly, the nature of the payloads transported by these drones provides critical insight into the strategic intent behind the smuggling operations. The vast majority of intercepted drones were carrying military-grade firearms—primarily M16-type rifles, AK-pattern rifles, pistols, and accompanying magazines. Ammunition was also included in several cases, indicating that these deliveries were designed to supply fully operational combat kits, not just isolated components. While the total volume intercepted may appear modest, the tactical innovation and coordination involved suggest an effort to establish an alternative supply route in response to Israeli countermeasures. These are not opportunistic or ad hoc payloads—they reflect deliberate procurement and packaging choices that prioritise tactical utility, discretion, and ease of downstream distribution. Taken together, the payload profiles paired with the customised drones point to a methodical trial of drone-based delivery infrastructure, not yet a dominant supply line but one with clear potential for expansion. This makes drone smuggling not merely a logistical workaround, but an emerging enabler of future armed activity that merits close monitoring.

Implications and Conclusions

The pattern of drone-assisted weapons smuggling on Israel’s southern border represents more than just a localised tactical shift. It offers an early warning of how commercially available drone technologies are transforming the global security landscape. The cases documented between October 2024 and May 2025, involving modified DJI Matrice drones delivering rifles, pistols, and ammunition from Egypt into Israel, illustrate a key evolution: the operationalisation of aerial smuggling as a reliable alternative to traditional routes like tunnels or vehicular transport.

At a strategic level, this development signals a broader diffusion of military capabilities to non-state actors. What makes this trend particularly concerning is its accessibility. Off-the-shelf drones with long-range and high-payload capabilities, when combined with basic field modifications, are now capable of executing precision logistics tasks that were once the domain of state militaries. The use of wire mesh cages, stripped sensors, and extended battery packs to smuggle full combat kits points to a level of tactical maturity and standardisation that could be replicated in other theatres of conflict. The case in Israel shows that drone smuggling is not merely a workaround; it is a scalable, repeatable tactic with the potential to reshape battlefield logistics and insurgent capabilities worldwide.

This Israeli case provides a blueprint for how militant or criminal actors elsewhere might adapt to heightened border security. As states invest in counter-tunnel systems, AI-assisted border monitoring, and physical interdiction, adversaries are likely to shift upward to the air. Already, we have seen similar adaptations in Latin America, where cartels use drones to smuggle drugs and conduct surveillance.

To counter this emerging threat, governments, regulators, and manufacturers must respond at multiple levels. States should continue to invest in layered aerial denial systems specifically tailored to detect and neutralize smuggling drones—not just weaponized UAVs. Border enforcement agencies must begin to treat drone-based logistics as a core operational risk, not a fringe concern. Additionally, investments in drone forensics, route pattern mapping, and predictive surveillance will be essential.

At the same time, manufacturers of commercial UAVs, particularly market leaders like DJI, have a critical role to play. This includes enforcing geofencing standards, expanding no-fly zones near sensitive borders, and implementing firmware-level payload restrictions. More ambitiously, drone makers could be incentivised or required to integrate tamper-evident systems, modular flight logs with secure data storage, and enhanced remote identification features. Although these “design-against-crime” measures would not eliminate malicious actors, they could increase the complexity for non-state actors attempting to engage in drone-assisted smuggling. However, as long as high-performance UAVs remain readily available on the commercial market, their appropriation by militant groups will continue to pose a persistent and evolving security challenge.

Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, PhD, is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Economics at the Royal Military College of Canada. His research focuses on the intersection of technology, terrorism, and the evolution of terrorist tactics. He is also the Scientific Director of Pier Point Consulting, a firm specializing in providing analysis and threat assessment related to the misuse of emerging technology.

Dr Yannick Veilleux-Lepage

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Tags: Drones, Hamas, Middle East