Introduction
Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthis, has quickly expanded from a local insurgent group in Yemen to a powerful regional organisation, wielding sophisticated military technologies that can disrupt maritime trade, challenge regional powers and redefine modern asymmetric warfare. The group’s use of drones, ballistic and cruise missiles, and cyber capabilities has grown since 2021, and the implications have been grave not just for regional security but the environment as well. As its attacks grew in strategic waterways such as the Red Sea, the resulting environmental damage, from oil spills to disrupted marine biodiversity, has ignited a silent environmental crisis with significant global ramifications. At the same time, the Houthis have capitalised on the climate vulnerabilities of Yemen and Yemeni people, leveraging their control over water and agricultural resources as an assertion of authority in a fragmented country. This Insight examines the converging dynamics of conflict, technology, and environmental collapse in Yemen and argues that the establishment of sustainable peace in the country requires the integration of environmental concerns and equitable resource governance into international peacebuilding efforts.
The Houthis and Tech-Driven Warfare
The nature of warfare in the Middle East is undergoing a substantive transformation, marked by the integration of advanced technologies into non-state insurgencies. At the forefront of this shift is Yemen’s Houthi movement, whose strategic deployment of drones, cruise missiles, and cyber operations has enabled asymmetric actors to challenge conventional military powers and redefine regional deterrence dynamics. From conducting long-range drone strikes deep inside Israeli territory to attacking global maritime commerce in the Red Sea, the Houthis have evolved into a major actor in modern asymmetric warfare. Its operations not only reflect deep ideological alignment with Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” but also an adaptation to the demands of twenty-first-century conflict.
The Houthis began as a Zaydi Shia revivalist movement in the 1990s but turned into a militant group under the leadership of Abdul-Malik al-Houthi after the group’s founder, Hussein al-Houthi, was killed in 2004. They grew rapidly during the 2011 Arab Spring, peaking in 2014, when they took over Yemen’s capital, Sanaa. This was the beginning of the civil war and humanitarian disaster that has pitted Houthis in battle against a Saudi-led coalition, which backs Yemen’s internationally recognised government. Over the years, the group has used regional instability and foreign intervention to expand its territorial control, casting itself as a defender against Western and Gulf state interventions.
The Houthis’ use of advanced technology is vital to its continued engagement in warfare. The group has evolved from a localised insurgent group into a regional disruptor with the capacity to execute coordinated, high-precision strikes. For example, on 19 July 2024, a Houthi drone succeeded in flying over 2,600 kilometres to hit Tel Aviv, bypassing Israel’s advanced air defence systems and causing civilian casualties (the first of its kind since the Houthis began its operations against Israel in October 2023). On 25 March 2025, Yahya Sarea, a spokesman for the Houthis, claimed responsibility for missile and drone strikes on Israel’s Ben Gurion Airport and US naval vessels in the Red Sea, including the USS Truman. The attack reportedly employed ballistic and cruise missiles, including the hypersonic Palestine-2 missile, and succeeded in obstructing a US operation in the region.
The Houthis’ adoption of drone warfare has been a key driver of this shift. The group has multi-use systems like the Rujum drone, which can deliver a payload (any equipment, device or cargo that the drone can carry and deliver to perform a specific task) and return for reuse, a more economical and flexible choice for repeated strikes. Its drone capability also includes the Qasef-1 and Qasef-2K models with a range of up to 150 kilometres, and long-range Sammad-2 and Sammad-3 drones, which can target areas up to 1,500 kilometres away. These drones — mostly Iranian-designed and locally assembled — have provided Houthis with a needed capability to challenge Saudi, UAE, and now Israeli and US interests.
Missile technology has further empowered the group. The Houthi arsenal comprises short- to long-range ballistic missiles, including Soviet Tochka (120 km), Zelzal-3 (250 km) and SCUD-C (600 km) systems, as well as Iranian-engineered systems such as Quds-1, Quds-2, and Quds-3 land-attack cruise missiles. In particular, the group claims that it has missiles with ranges up to 2,000 kilometres, and also has hypersonic variants that are very hard to intercept. Further, the Houthis also claim to possess surface-to-surface missiles like the Toufan, which enables deep strikes in the Gulf region, along with anti-ship missiles like the C-801, which threaten global maritime logistics.
Houthis attacks on international shipping — most notably in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden — have become a major bargaining tool, which they often claim as acts of solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza amidst Israel’s ongoing war with Hamas. Since late 2023, more than 100 attacks on commercial and military vessels have been executed by the Houthis. While many failed to cause any significant damage, the psychological and strategic disruption they created is immense. The Houthis also became the first non-state actor to use anti-ship ballistic missiles, ushering in a new era of naval asymmetry.
Beyond kinetic capabilities, the Houthis have ventured into cyber warfare, engaging in surveillance, malware deployment, and wiretapping through social engineering. These tactics allow the group to disrupt communications, gather intelligence, and assert control over narratives, especially in contested zones. Emerging technologies, including satellite navigation and hydrogen fuel cells, have further enhanced the range, stealth, and precision of its drones — technological advancements reportedly enabled by Iranian assistance.
The consequences of these technological adaptations, however, extend beyond military concerns. The Houthis’ warfare in maritime and border regions is producing profound environmental consequences, threatening ecosystems, livelihoods, and already fragile humanitarian conditions in Yemen and beyond.
Environmental Implications of These Attacks
The Houthis’ intensified attacks in the Red Sea not only reflect geopolitical instability but have also triggered a silent environmental crisis that demands immediate attention. Increasing attacks on maritime vessels are devastating news for a fragile marine ecosystem within the Red Sea. The Red Sea is famous for its incredible biodiversity, with more than 1,200 species of fish and more than 350 varieties of coral found there. The Red Sea’s coral reefs are already facing the adverse impact of climate change, but now they are also struggling with oil spills and shipwrecks caused by the growing violence in the region.
A particularly vivid example was the Houthi strike on 18 February 2024, when an anti-ship ballistic missile hit the Belize-flagged bulk carrier MV Rubymar, resulting in its sinking with 200 tons of heavy fuel oil and 80 tons of marine diesel onboard. These incidents are catastrophic for the marine ecosystem. The resulting oil spills destroy coral reefs and threaten aquatic life, thus eventually affecting critical food sources for impoverished coastal communities in Yemen and Somalia. Even more concerning is that these spills threaten to contaminate desalination plants — critical lifelines for drinking water in the arid region. The effects of the degradation of marine biodiversity, coupled with threats to food and water security, can lead to a global humanitarian crisis characterised by resource scarcity, displacement and cycles of renewed violence.
The environmental damage caused by the Houthis’ attack goes well beyond the Red Sea’s immediate ecosystem. Houthi attacks have forced a major shift in global shipping routes. Ships intended to go around the Suez Canal are being diverted around the Cape of Good Hope — a more carbon-intensive, longer route. Although crucial for maritime security, this rerouting has had a significant impact on global carbon emissions. A single container ship on its way from Shanghai to Hamburg via the Cape emits about 38 per cent more CO₂, or 4.32 million kilograms more, than if it had gone via the Suez Canal. Moreover, ships are increasing their speed to cover longer distances, burning even more fuel and increasing carbon emissions further.
In fact, carbon emissions for Asia-to-Mediterranean routes soared by 63% in the Q1 of 2024 relative to the Q4 of 2023, according to Oslo-based freight analytics firm Xeneta. Some companies are also turning to alternative modes of transport — including trucks and air freight — to meet delivery schedules, each one considerably more polluting than maritime shipping. Studies show that a truck journey is up to 10 times more polluting than sea transport, while air freight can produce 47 times the emissions per ton-mile. These diversions are complicating the efforts of companies that are trying to meet their net-zero ambitions, as they will need to either invest more into expensive carbon offsetting systems or reduce emissions elsewhere.
Similarly, on the domestic front in Yemen, the environmental cost of war is acute and multifaceted. The obliteration of water infrastructure — wells, pumps and pipelines — has left millions deprived of drinking water, forcing the over-extraction of groundwater reserves and hastening aquifer depletion. At the same time, abandoned farmland — a result of displacement and destruction — is causing soil erosion, desertification, and the disintegration of traditional agriculture. Waste management systems and water treatment plants have also been damaged, leading to the pollution of water sources and land which are further exacerbating the issue of water scarcity in the country.
Evidently, the Houthi conflict is not only a geopolitical or humanitarian crisis – it is also an environmental one that ripples through ecosystems, economies, and global climate commitments. Environmental disruption is not just collateral damage; it is becoming part of a vicious cycle that ties environmental collapse to conflict, insurgents’ territorial control, and, ultimately, long-term regional stability.
Houthis Capitalising on the Environment Crisis
The Houthis are exploiting Yemen’s fragility to uphold power and portray themselves as instrumental in mitigating the country’s growing ecological and humanitarian crisis. Yemen has long faced an environmental crisis, encompassing acute water shortage, deforestation, and agricultural decline; these are made worse by protracted fighting in the region. In the territory that it controls, the Houthis have consolidated control over critical institutions and economic channels, putting in place systems of resource extraction to finance military activities, providing basic services and tightening its monopoly on the use of force. Concurrently, the Houthis have exerted control over water resources and agricultural land, integrating them into its overall strategy of governance. By controlling access to essential services — including humanitarian assistance, water, and scarce agricultural support — the Houthis have induced deep dependence in local communities. This has helped the Houthis reinforce authority in the territory under its control. The group also does this by comparing its governance to the failures of the internationally recognised Yemeni government, casting themselves as guardians of the environment and providers of basic needs.
The Houthis have also adopted a narrative that promotes them as protectors of Yemen’s natural resources from external threats, in particular from foreign military interventions by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The group highlights the damage caused to the environment by these adversaries — whether oil spills from attacks on tankers or a military operation that destroyed the ecosystem — and frames its own actions as a necessary step to protect Yemen’s environment from exploitation. The environmental rhetoric of its maritime campaigns in the Red Sea, in particular, supports this account, stressing that foreign shipping activities pose environmental risks and framing attacks against vessels transporting hazardous materials as being about resisting ecological damage by outsiders.
Additionally, the Houthis exploit humanitarian crises resulting from environmental degradation to increase its influence and enhance its legitmacy. By controlling the flow of aid to areas facing resource scarcity or climate-related disasters, it establishes itself as the authority that can help. Thus, by controlling aid, the Houthis increase local dependency and gain legitimacy in the eyes of people as an indispensable actor amidst the widespread suffering and instability. The group has increasingly drawn upon the language of environmental justice and sustainability to position itself as the defender of Yemen’s natural resources. While not always expressed in explicit policy terms, its discourse has at times aligned with global narratives of climate justice, particularly in how it frames foreign military interventions as not only a violation of sovereignty but also a source of environmental degradation. Through these strategies — capturing resources, constructing narratives and taking advantage of humanitarian crises — the Houthis are able to wield the environmental degradation of Yemen as a tool to strengthen its hold in the country while undermining rivals’ claims to legitimacy along the way. This explains how armed groups adapt to socio-environmental challenges, and how exploitation of these crises are used by such groups to gain legitimacy and stay rooted in fragile contexts like Yemen.
Breaking the Cycle: Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
Climate resilience must be embedded within Yemen’s peacebuilding process in order to disrupt this cycle. International organisations should incorporate climate concerns into political frameworks such as the UN Roadmap to End the War in Yemen. Recovery efforts should do more than just military demobilisation by addressing structural drivers of fragility, such as the uneven accessibility of water, land and fisheries. Climate-sensitive recovery and reconstruction efforts should pay special attention to three key areas that address localised resource conflicts, ensure equitable access to water, land, and fisheries, and build resilience through long-term adaptation strategies. Climate-smart agriculture, shared water systems and sustainable livelihoods for former combatants can stabilise rural areas that are often at risk of conflict. Further, it is equally important to expand Yemen’s access to climate finance to support the country’s adaptation and mitigation efforts effectively.
While direct engagement by technology companies in a fragile context like Yemen may be limited in the short term, technology can play a crucial role in supporting future climate resilience and recovery. Tools such as satellite monitoring for water management, mobile-based early warning systems, and digital platforms for community-led resource tracking offer promising support for climate-sensitive reconstruction, especially in the medium to long term.
Yemeni authorities must end the weaponisation of natural resources and fulfil its international obligations by cleaning pollutants and protecting ecosystems. Civil society organisations should be empowered to organise community-based and local-level climate awareness initiatives, stimulate dialogue on climate challenges, and enhance research on climate-conflict dynamics. An inclusive, localised and climate-sensitive reconstruction process is a key not only to post-war recovery, but also to breaking cycles of violence and ecological breakdown in the future.
Anadi is a recipient of the Asia Economic Dialogue 2025 Research Fellowship. She has served as a Research Associate at the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS) in New Delhi, India. Her research interests include non-traditional security threats, public policy, and climate policy. She has completed her M.Phil. from the Diplomacy and Disarmament division, Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament (CIPOD), School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. She completed her Master’s in Politics with specialization in International Studies from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. She has also been the recipient of a Junior Research Fellowship for completing her M.Phil. dissertation. LinkedIn Handle / X Handle