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Young People Challenging Violent Extremism Online: Insights from Asia

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Executive Summary

This report examines online youth-led initiatives involved in challenging violent extremism (CVE).

It focuses on the 2013–2023 online presence of 13 youth organisations, namely: KRIS (Philippines), Youth for Peace Movement Davao de Oro (Philippines), United Voice for Peace Network Inc. (Philippines), Global Peace Youth (Philippines), Students Against Violence Everywhere, Paiman Alumni Trust, Sri Lanka Unites, Youth for Peace (Cambodia), Sambisig, Team Pakigsandurot, MasterPeace, Youth for Peace Philippines Cordillera Youth Brigade and College of Youth Activism and Development.

Based on data scraped from more than 130 social media posts, the report highlights the dynamics of youth-led CVE efforts online, and discusses at strategic planning, content creation and organisational challenges.

The study identifies the dual approach of young people in CVE work across both online and offline spaces. The predominant use of digital platforms to document offline activities suggests that for many, the online platform is secondary, pointing to the challenges of internet access in certain regions of Asia.

Limited internet access in marginalised communities emerges as a significant barrier, underlining the need for more inclusive online participation. Organisational hurdles include communication issues, resource constraints, team dynamics and visibility challenges, particularly where messaging is too localised.

This report recommends that CVE youth organisations be given more training in online content creation and social media literacy. It suggests prioritising and supporting offline activities to improve sustainability, and proposes collaborative online spaces to boost engagement. The report also recommends that tech companies broaden their existing community systems to amplify and lend credibility to CVE-related content on social media platforms.

The report shows that online youth-led CVE initiatives in Asia are not explicitly labelled as CVE. They have a variety of names but all are geared towards challenging ideas and acts that are violent and extreme in nature.

In some initiatives, young people directly condemn violent forms and acts of extremism. Other initiatives advocate social change in a preventive sense, with young people addressing factors that contribute to violence and extremist ideas.

Another type of initiative involves Asian youths promoting positive values and behaviours as a means of CVE, advocating positive messaging, active participation and good citizenship. This approach encourages positive behaviour as a counter to extremist ideologies.

The report concludes with a recommendation that tech companies should support existing youth CVE initiatives, rather than creating new ones. This support might include establishing a support network for these initiatives and organising conferences to gather and connect young CVE advocates across the region. Strengthening communication channels with youth groups and fostering collaborative online spaces would improve coordination and content dissemination.

Modifying search engine functions would make it easier to identify relevant groups. Using community systems to endorse CVE-related content would boost credibility, while supporting regulatory duties with AI (artificial intelligence) capabilities would make content moderation easier. Strengthening proactive measures to safeguard online spaces and reduce harmful influences requires addressing emerging threats such as domestic terrorism and extremist ideologies.

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1 Introduction

Young people account for 16% of the global population, with 1.2 billion aged between 15 and 24.[1] In Asia, about 47% of people are under the age of 30.[2] Young people, according to research, constitute a substantial portion of the global population that engages with social media, and a significant number of them are active users on a daily basis.[3]

Numerous studies have shown that young people are susceptible to violent extremism, making them prime targets of online recruitment by extremist groups.[4] This is especially concerning with the rise of social media and other online platforms, which give extremists a tool for online recruitment and radicalisation.[5] This is a cause for concern in Asia, where some of the world's extremist groups are based.[6]

The digitisation of violent extremism has also enabled digitised ways of challenging it. The term *challenging violent extremism*, or CVE, made its internet debut in 2009.[7] A quick Google search reveals that the term first appeared online on March 2009 in a report by the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism, which highlighted counter-terrorism activities.[8] The term CVE originated in the context of countering violent extremism, as part of a broader discourse on preventing violent extremism (PVE). The lack of a common definition of terms, including *violent extremism*, is itself a challenge in the PVE literature.[9]

1 While there is no universally agreed definition of youth, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) definition is used for this report, defining youth as individuals aged between 15 and 24 years old. See https://www.unesco.org/en/youth.

2 Z. Syzdykova et al., "Governance of Cross-Border Migration in Asia," *Space and Culture, India* 7, no. 4 (2020): 264–273, https://doi.org/10.20896/saci.v7i4.568.

3 G. Appel, L. Grewal, R. Hadi, and A. T. Stephen, "The Future of Social Media in Marketing," *J. Acad. Mark. Sci.* 48, no. 1 (2020): 79–95, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11747-01900695-1.

4 For example: S. Podder and S. Gates, "Social Media, Recruitment, Allegiance and the Islamic State," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 9, no. 4 (2015): 107; Iffat Idris, "Youth Vulnerability to Violent Extremist Groups in the Indo-Pacific," GSDRC, https://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/1438-Youth-Vulnerability-to-Violent-Extremist-Groups-in-the-Indo-Pacific.pdf; Pauline Hope Cheong and Jeffry R. Halverson, "Youths in Violent Extremist Discourse: Mediated Identifications and Interventions," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33, no. 12 (2010): 1104–1123; P. Thomas, "Youth, Terrorism and Education: Britain's Prevent Programme," *International Journal of Lifelong Education* 35, no. 2 (2016): 171–187.

5 Robyn Torok, "Social Media and the Use of Discursive Markers of Online Extremism and Recruitment," in *Research Anthology on Religious Impacts on Society* (IGI Global, 2021), 734–764; Imran Awan, "Cyber-Extremism: Isis and the Power of Social Media," *Society* 54, no. 2 (2017): 138–149.

6 See A. Kruglanski, X. Chen, M. Dechesne, S. Fishman, and E. Orehek, "Fully Committed: Suicide Bombers' Motivation and the Quest for Personal Significance," *Political Psychology* 30, no. 3 (2009): 331–357.

7 Throughout this report, the term 'challenging violent extremism' or CVE, is used. Recognising the ongoing discussions about the precise use of this term, it is important to clarify that, for the sake of consistency within this report, CVE encompasses all initiatives undertaken by youth-led organisations aimed at putting an end to violence and extremist ideas while promoting peacebuilding. See W. Clifft, "The Case for Defining CVE and PVE," *International Counter Terrorism Review* 2, no. 1 (2021); M. Santerini, "Juvenile Extremism: Integration and Educational Models," in *Understanding Radicalization in Everyday Life*, ed. Loretta Fabbri and Claudio Melacarne (Milan: McGraw-Hill, 2023), 93.

8 See "Inter-American Committee against Terrorism – Newsletter No. 65," https://www.oas.org/en/sms/cicte/Newsletter/Informe_65_eng.pdf.

9 D. Laitsch and D. S, McCall, "A Public Health Approach to Inclusive Schools," in *The Challenge of Radicalization and Extremism*, ed. Eveline Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Hermann J. Abs, and Kerstin Göbel, 224–245, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004525658_010.

In the context of violent extremism, social media has become a two-way street: both sowing peace and spreading violence.[10] This is true of Asia, especially the southeastern region. However, as contended in literature elsewhere, the peacebuilding potential of social media is constantly undermined by the unfavourable circumstances that limit its usage in developing countries, especially in Asia.[11] The reason for this lies in a multitude of factors, including limited access to technology, infrastructure deficiencies, socioeconomic barriers, government restrictions, digital literacy deficits and security concerns.[12]

Against this backdrop, a number of youth-led, online CVE initiatives are taking place on social media platforms, taking advantage of the aptitude of today's young people for socialising and mobilising on the internet.[13] Of all the social media platforms in Asia, Facebook is the most popular, especially among young people.[14] Some studies even say that the reason why Facebook has such a large user base is that it offers multiple functions to suit a range of people.[15] It is an ideal platform for organisations to make themselves accessible to a varied audience, facilitating connections and real-time communication with stakeholders.[16] Facebook is believed to be used by almost all internet users.[17]

This report explores the nature of youth-led, online CVE efforts in Asia, drawing examples from 13 youth organisations. A quick online search for 'youth-led CVE efforts in Asia' yields limited results. However, as this report shows, this does not mean young Asians are not actively engaged in CVE. Instead, they tackle extremism in a number of ways, ranging from anti-terror advocacy to the promotion of cultural harmony, reflecting diverse approaches across the region. Terms like *violent extremism* and its prefixes (such as *challenging*, *preventing* and *countering*) may not be prevalent in the Asian context, but efforts to address such issues do exist.

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10 Pamina Firchow, Charles Martin-Shields, Atalia Omer, and Roger MacGinty, "PeaceTech: the Liminal Spaces of Digital Technology in Peacebuilding," *International Studies Perspectives* 18, no. 1 (2017): 4–42; Sol Iglesias, "The Role of Civil Society in Peacebuilding: Southeast Asia in Focus," in Paper for Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) Meeting at Brussels 7 (2013); Melike Yagmur Savrum and Leon Miller, "The Role of the Media in Conflict, Peace Building and International Relations," *International Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies* 2, no. 3 (2015): 1–12; Ioannis Tellidis and Stefanie Kappler, "Information and Communication Technologies in Peacebuilding: Implications, Opportunities and Challenges," *Cooperation and Conflict* 51, no. 1 (2016): 75–93; Yuji Uesugi, Anna Deekeling, Sophie Shiori Umeyama, and Lawrence McDonald-Colbert, *Operationalisation of Hybrid Peacebuilding in Asia: From Theory to Practice* (Springer Nature, 2021); Raihan A. Yusoph, "Social Media as a Tool for Peace? Mapping Online Engagement among Mranaw Youths," (2024).

11 Sol Iglesias, "The Role of Civil Society in Peacebuilding"; Clement Silverman, "Can positive messaging on social media promote peacebuilding in Myanmar?" 2018; Yusoph, "Social Media as a Tool for Peace?".

12 See L. Kosowicz et al., "Lessons for Vietnam on the Use of Digital Technologies to Support Patient-Centered Care in Low- and Middle-Income Countries in the Asia-Pacific Region: Scoping Review (preprint)," https://doi.org/10.2196/preprints.43224; C. Perumal, N. Lyndon, and Z. Sakawi, "SWOT Analysis of Telecenter Development as a Rural Community Empowerment Strategy," *International Journal of Advanced and Applied Sciences* 10, no. 12 (2023): 109–120, https://doi.org/10.21833/ijaas.2023.12.013.

13 See Susan Szmania and Phelix Fincher, "Countering Violent Extremism Online and Offline," *Criminology & Pub. Pol'y* 16 (2017): 119; Primitivo III Cabanes Ragandang, "Social Media and Youth Peacebuilding Agency: A Case from Muslim Mindanao," *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 15, no. 3 (2020): 348–361.

14 S. McLachlan, "45 Facebook Statistics Marketers Need to Know in 2024," Hootsuite, https://blog.hootsuite.com/facebook-statistics/; "Facebook Daily Usage Frequency among Young Adults in the Middle East and North Africa Region from 2020 to 2022," Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1380179/mena-facebook-usage-frequency-among-youth/.

15 Saima Kamran Pathan, Kamran Taj Pathan, and Muhammad Ali Memon, "Facebook Usage and Its Impact on Youth: A Case Study of Students of Sindh University," *The Government Annual Research Journal of Political Science* 6, no. 6 (2018): 199–217.

16 Catherine Tan et al., "Asia-Pacific Libraries on Facebook: Content Analysis on Posts and Interactions," *Singapore Journal of Library & Information Management* 41 (January 1, 2012): 65–88, https://dr.ntu.edu.sg/bitstream/10220/9435/1/sjlim2012tanetalfacebookanalysis.pdf.

17 Kaela Malig, "Facebook Is Most Popular Social Media Platform Among Internet Users in Philippines – Pulse Asia," *GMA News Online*, October 12, 2021, https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/scitech/science/806672/facebook-is-most-popular-social-media-platform-among-internet-users-in-philippines-pulse-asia/story/.

Despite the presence of these youth-led CVE initiatives, young people are still commonly portrayed as transgressors[18] and the cause of violence, rather than being recognised as potential peace agents capable of effecting change.[19]

This bias hinders the understanding of the valuable contributions young people can make to challenge violent extremism. This report aims to document and highlight the efforts of youth-led CVE initiatives, including their best practices, the challenges they face and their future prospects, with Asia-based youth organisations as a case study. Asia is the chosen focus for accessibility reasons (the researcher is from the Philippines). A number of studies note Asia's long-standing challenges of conflict and violence.[20]

The report is divided into six parts, each describing different aspects of youth-led CVE initiatives in Asia. It starts by discussing the prevailing threats of violent extremism in Asia, and the role of young people in promoting peace and challenging extremist narratives using social media.

The following section provides an overview of youth-led initiatives against violent extremism, and a discussion of the digital landscape of youth-led CVE efforts. The report then highlights the experiences of young activists involved in online CVE initiatives, including their successes and challenges. Finally, recommendations are provided for tech companies to support youth-led CVE efforts and combat violent extremism online.

18 Henrik Urdal, "Youth Bulges and Violence," in *Political Demography: How Population Changes Are Reshaping International Security and National Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2011), 117–132; Lesley Pruitt, "Rethinking Youth Bulge Theory in Policy and Scholarship: Incorporating Critical Gender Analysis," *International Affairs* 96, no. 3 (2020): 711–728.

19 L. J. D. Genon, "Toward 2030: Synergies with SDG 16 and the Youth, Peace, and Security Agenda," in *Sustainable Development Goal 16 and the Global Governance of Violence* (Routledge, 2023), 131–143.

20 Shanthie Mariet D'Souza, "Countering Insurgencies, Terrorism and Violent Extremism in South Asia," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 28, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 1–11; Sadia Nasir, "Rise of Extremism in South Asia," IPRI, https://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/paper7f.pdf; Dina Sharipova and Serik Beissembayev, "Causes of Violent Extremism in Central Asia: The Case of Kazakhstan," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 46, no. 9 (February 28, 2021): 1702–24, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2021.1872163.

2 Methodology

This report is based on a qualitative research design. 13 youth-led organisations were selected for an analysis of online engagement on their respective social media pages.

The criteria for the sample organisations were:

- They must be run by young people
- They must be operating in Asia
- Their social media page must include posts published in 2023
- Their recent posts must be relevant to CVE.

While the organisations are also operational on other social media sites such as X (formerly Twitter), Instagram and Tiktok, Facebook is the focal point of enquiry for this report. This choice is based on the widespread use of Facebook in Asia and its popularity among the selected organisations, as the report indicates.[21]

The organisations operate in Asia, specifically the Philippines, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia and Sri Lanka.

Data from this report encompass the years 2013 to 2023. These years are crucial for understanding the operational landscape and impact of these youth organisations in Asia. Firstly, the rapid growth of social media and digital technology during this period transformed the way organisations engage with their target audiences and conduct their activities.[22] By analysing data from 2013 to 2023, we can gain insights into the evolution of these organisations, their strategies, successes and challenges, and their overall impact on CVE in the region. Data scraped from more than 130 social media posts, primarily by young people, serve as the primary source. These posts offer a comprehensive understanding of the evolving landscape of youth-led organisations in the specified countries over those years.

To select the organisations, a Facebook search was carried out. The search terms included combinations of *youth organisation* and *youth* with keywords such as *peace* and *peacebuilding*. Terms such as *violent extremism* and *radicalisation* were paired, and terms such as *challenging* and *preventing* were added in the context of violent extremism.

To categorise the selected organisations, two criteria were formulated.

The first criterion centres on the degree of activeness on social media pages. Organisations are classified as inactive if they exhibit no online presence or activity for over a year, with no mentions or tags from others. Semi-active organisations maintain an online presence in a

21 S. McLachlan, "45 Facebook Statistics"; "Facebook Daily Usage Frequency."
22 J. Marlowe, A. Bartley, and F. L. Collins, "Digital Belongings: The Intersections of Social Cohesion, Connectivity and Digital Media," *Ethnicities* 17, no. 1 (2016): 85–102, https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796816654174.

given year, irrespective of offline activities, but postings are irregular postings and there is over one month of inactivity. Active organisations maintain an online presence in a given year, irrespective of engagement and offline activities, and post at least once a month.

The second criterion focuses on reacts and shares[23] with online content: classified as good, decent or poor. Good organisations garner a substantial number of reacts and shares. Decent organisations garner a significant number of reacts but few shares. Poor organisations have low numbers of both reacts and shares.

These criteria are designed to help assess the organisations' online activity and the impact of their content. Primary data were the content posted on the Facebook accounts of the sampled youth organisations. Interviews conducted with these organisations add valuable primary information.

Secondary data were collected from the organisations' reports, academic journal articles and online news articles (such as those published on the peer-to-peer Global Digital Challenge website and on the websites of selected organisations in the study).

Challenges encountered in this research include language issues – certain organisations' posts are in local languages, posing accessibility problems for the researcher. Another limitation is access to the sample youth organisations; only eight interviews were conducted. Reliance on the social media pages of the sampled organisations has also proven challenging, particularly in situations where securing online interviews is difficult. These factors collectively contribute to the constraints and potential biases which need to be considered when interpreting the research findings.

23 "Reacts" show how users feel about a post, such as through Like or Love, while "Shares" involve reposting content to reach a wider audience. Reacts indicate emotional responses, whereas shares extend visibility.

3 Threat of Violent Extremism in Asia: A General Overview

Asia is home to many prominent extremist groups with diverse ideologies, competing for influence and resources.[24] A mix of sociopolitical grievances, religious tensions and ethnic conflicts is said to form the basis of extremist ideas in the region. Understanding these threats is crucial, especially as variations in the prevalence of extremism across Asian regions suggest the need for tailored approaches.[25]

The recruitment and radicalisation methods of extreme groups include online platforms.[26] In Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia and the Philippines, violent extremist groups use social media platforms for propaganda, fundraising and the dissemination of teaching material.[27] Here, the internet serves as a breeding ground for extremist ideologies, enabling the rapid spread of extremist content and connections among individuals across borders. The shift towards social media for recruitment shows how extremism is evolving and the challenges posed by online spaces.[28] The anonymity and accessibility of online spaces pose an additional layer of challenges in countering extremist activities.[29] This emphasises the need for effective monitoring and countermeasures to address online recruitment and radicalisation.

The roots of violent extremism in Asia can be internal or external. Internal groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Indonesia have been identified as sources of violent extremism, while external jihadist movements such as Al Qaeda and IS have significantly fuelled extremism in the region.[30] IS Khorasan Province poses a threat not only in Afghanistan but also in neighbouring countries such as Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, the Maldives and Sri Lanka,[31] with radicalisation efforts targeting young people.[32]

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24 A. Kruglanski et al., “Fully Committed”; M. Saddiqa, S. Parveen, S. Ali, and W. Ahmed, “Determinants of Terrorism and Its Impact on Economic Growth: A Panel Study of South Asian Region,” *Review of Economics and Development Studies* 6, no. 2 (2020): 513–523, https://doi.org/10.47067/reads.v6i2.219.

25 R. Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” *Journal of Strategic Security* 4, no. 4 (2011): 7–36, https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.1; J. Braithwaite and B. D’Costa, *Cascades of Violence: War, Crime and Peacebuilding across South Asia* (ANU Press, 2018), 706.

26 N. Shortland, J. Portnoy, P. McGarry, A. Perliger, T. Gordon, and N. Anastasio, “A Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Violent Extremist Propaganda: The Motivational Pathways Underlying Movement toward and away from Violent Extremist Action,” *Frontiers in Psychology* 13 (2022), https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.858392.

27 N. F. Wilujeng and H. Risman, “Examining Asean Our Eyes Dealing with Regional Context in Counter Terrorism, Radicalism, and Violent Extremism,” *PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences* 6, no. 1 (2020): 267–281, https://doi.org/10.20319/pijss.2020.61.267281.

28 M. Conway, “Determining the Role of the Internet in Violent Extremism and Terrorism: Six Suggestions for Progressing Research,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 40, no. 1 (2016): 77–98, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2016.1157408; Wilujeng and Risman, “Examining Asean.”

29 A. Nivette, M. Eisner, and D. Ribeaud, “Developmental Predictors of Violent Extremist Attitudes,” *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 54, no. 6, (2017): 755–790, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022427817699035.

30 J. Jamhari and T. Testriono, “The Roots of indonesia’s Resilience against Violent Extremism,” *Studia Islamika* 28, no. 3 (2021): 517–545, https://doi.org/10.36712/sdi.v28i3.23956.

31 A. Sayed and T. R. Hamming, “Growing Threat of the Islamic State in Afghanistan and South Asia,” United States Institute of Peace, June 7, 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/06/growing-threat-islamic-state-afghanistan-and-south-asia.

32 N. Manhas, “The Rise of ISKP in South Asia: A Threat to Regional Stability,” Pacific Forum, May 11, 2023, https://pacforum.org/publications/pacnet-34-the-rise-of-iskp-in-south-asia-a-threat-to-regional-stability/.

Similarly, South Asia faces groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Taliban, while Southeast Asia contends with organisations such as Abu Sayyaf and JI.[33] Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF)[34] have also become a global concern, prompting initiatives such as the sub-regional meetings on counterterrorism between countries like Indonesia and Australia.[35]

The looming presence of FTFs has also influenced the securitisation of migration and border control policies in the European Union, among other regions.[36] In Central Asia, extremist groups have engaged in activities that can be traced back to wider pressure groups, social movements or established terrorist organisations.[37] These regional dynamics are influenced by historical grievances, ethnic tensions and geopolitical rivalries.[38]

The impact of violent extremism in Asia is most significant in social and economic terms, primarily affecting income per capita growth in regional economies. It also has negative effects on foreign direct investment and overall economic performance.[39] This is particularly concerning given that the economic impact of terrorism tends to be more pronounced in developing economies, which most Asian countries are.[40]

Aside from the economic effects, violent terrorism affects other sectors, such as tourism. Research indicates that terrorist events can have a detrimental effect on tourism development in Asia, impacting the international tourism industry in the region.[41] The social impact of terrorism extends to trust; terrorism is shown to erode trust within societies, hindering economic performance.[42]

A number of efforts have been made to challenge violent extremism in Asia. These involve a range of strategies focused on prevention, intervention and rehabilitation. One strategy involves enhancing community connectedness to combat social isolation, improving economic opportunities, and challenging norms that may lead to support for extremist causes.[43]

Preventive measures also aim to strengthen professional practices and decision-making to prevent radicalisation into violent extremism. Education is highlighted as a crucial tool in challenging extremism,

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33 Nivette, Eisner, and Ribeaud, " Developmental predictors of violent extremist attitudes."
34 FTF is a term which originated in the mid-2010s to describe individuals who travel to conflict zones to participate in terrorist activities. See S. Widagdo, S., K. Indrayanti, and A. Saraswati. 2021. "Repatriation as a Human Rights Approach to State Options in Dealing with Returning ISIS Foreign Terrorist Fighters." *SAGE Open* 11: 215824402110326.
35 N. W. Veronika, "Anticipating the Return of Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Indonesia-Australia's Initiative on Sub-Regional Meetings on Counterterrorism," *Jurnal Hubungan Internasional* 11, no. 1 (2022), https://doi.org/10.18196/jhi.v11i1.13084.
36 C. Baker-Beall, "The Concept of the Foreign Terrorist Fighter: An Immanent Critique," *European Journal of International Security* 8, no. 1 (2022): 25–46, https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2022.30.
37 P. Gill, J. Horgan, and A. Deckert, "Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent Behaviors of Lone-Actor Terrorists," *Journal of Forensic Sciences* 59, no. 2 (2013): 425–435, https://doi.org/10.1111/1556-4029.12312.
38 P. Simi, K. Sporer, and B. Bubolz, "Narratives of Childhood Adversity and Adolescent Misconduct as Precursors to Violent Extremism," *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 53, no. 4 (2016): 536–563, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022427815627312.
39 K. Gaibulloev and T. Sandler, "The Impact of Terrorism and Conflicts on Growth in Asia," *Economics & Politics* 21, no. 3 (2009): 359–383, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2009.00347.x.
40 H. Bardwell and M. Iqbal, "The Economic Impact of Terrorism from 2000 to 2018," *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy* 27, no. 2 (2020): 227–261, https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2020-0031.
41 Y. Sun and M. Luo, "Impacts of Terrorist Events on Tourism Development: Evidence from Asia," *Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Research* 46, no. 4 (2021): 696–723, https://doi.org/10.1177/1096348020986903.
42 S. B. Blomberg, G. D. Hess, and D. Y. Tan, "Terrorism and the Economics of Trust," *Journal of Peace Research* 48, no. 3 (2011): 383–398, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343311401641.
43 L. Mazerolle, E. Eggins, A. Cherney, L. Hine, A. Higginson, and E. Belton, "Police Programmes that Seek to Increase Community Connectedness for Feducing Violent Extremism Behaviour, Attitudes and Beliefs," *Campbell Systematic Reviews* 16, no. 3 (2020): https://doi.org/10.1002/cl2.1111.

particularly due to its role in deterring young individuals from joining extremist groups.[44]

Bilateral agreements, such as that of Indonesia and Australia, are forged in the hope of enhancing security collaboration to address FTFs in Asia-Pacific.[45]

The empowerment of women is also explored as a potential tool for CVE, while grassroots community actors play a key role in preventing youth radicalisation through social control and informal networks. This is especially pertinent to Asia, where 60% of the world's young population lives.[46]

44 M. Sas, K. Ponnet, G. Reniers, and W. Hardyns, "The Role of Education in the Prevention of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Developing Countries," *Sustainability* 12, no. 6 (2020): 2320, https://doi.org/10.3390/su12062320.
45 Veronika, "Anticipating the Return of Foreign Terrorist Fighters."
46 "Global Employment Trends for Youth 2022: Asia and the Pacific," *International Labour Organisation*, 2022.

4 Young people and the Use of Social Media for Peacebuilding

Research shows that youth engagement in peacebuilding is essential for fostering sustainable peace, the personal wellbeing of young people and positive social outcomes.[47] Young people involved in peace initiatives are perceived as proactive contributors to solutions rather than mere bystanders to conflicts.[48] Studies emphasise the need for youth participation across all levels of peace leadership for sustainable peacebuilding.[49] Despite the structural barriers that impede youth involvement and limit their social and economic mobility, the active engagement of young people is deemed indispensable for the success of peacebuilding endeavours.[50] Through a gendered lens, youth-led peacebuilding programmes can challenge prevailing norms and promote gender equity in broader peacebuilding efforts.[51]

Peacebuilding efforts of young people on social media represent a dynamic area with significant promise for peace and conflict transformation. Statistics show that nearly all young people use social media. Recent movements led by young people leverage these platforms for advocacy. The passage of UN resolutions 2250 and 2419 acknowledges the role young people play in peace efforts.[52]

State-sponsored programmes and philanthropic agencies support youth-led peacebuilding efforts in various regions, setting up peace leadership programmes for young peacebuilders.[53] A study in Muslim Mindanao shows how the use of social media by young people for peacebuilding departed from traditional structures.[54] In Bosnia and Herzegovina, integrating social media in peacebuilding involves participatory arts and youth activism.[55]

These findings underline the transformative potential of youth engagement via social media, promoting inclusivity and positive change in conflict-affected regions.

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47 A. Özerdem and S. Podder, "The Positive Contributions of Youth to Peacebuilding," in *Youth in Conflict and Peacebuilding: Mobilization, Reintegration and Reconciliation* (Springer, 2015), 184–207; S. McKeown and L. K. Taylor, "Intergroup Contact and Peacebuilding: Promoting Youth Civic Engagement in Northern Ireland," *Journal of Social and Political Psychology* 5, no. 2 (2017): 415–434, https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v5i2.769.

48 C. O'Sullivan, L. Taylor, C. Pineda-Marin, M. Sandoval-Escobar, R. Toro, M. L. Barreto, D. Alfonso, and J. L Niño, "Artesanos de Paz: Promoting Everyday Peacebuilding among Children and Youth through a Participatory Theater-Based Intervention in Colombia," *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 29, no. 3 (2023): 213–224, https://doi.org/10.1037/pac0000656.

49 M. O. Alomair, "Peace Leadership for Youth Leaders: A Literature Review," *International Journal of Public Leadership* 12, no. 3 (2016): 227–238, https://doi.org/10.1108/ijpl-04-2016-0017.

50 J. Cornelio and S. Calamba, "Going Home: Youth and Aspirations in Postconflict Marawi, Philippines," *Journal of Youth Studies* 26, no. 5 (2023): 668–685, https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2022.2038781.

51 L. Pruitt, "Gendering the Study of Children and Youth in Peacebuilding," *Peacebuilding* 3, no. 2 (2015): 157–170, https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2015.1052630; Barbara K. Trojanowska, *Finding Gender Equality in the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda: From Global Promises to National Accountability* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2022), 1–3.

52 H. Berents and C. Mollica, "Reciprocal Institutional Visibility: Youth, Peace and Security and 'Inclusive' Agendas at the United Nations," *Cooperation and Conflict* 57, no. 1 (2022): 65–83, doi.org/10.1177/00108367211007873.

53 Alomair, "Peace Leadership for Youth Leaders."

54 Ragandang, "Social Media and Youth Peacebuilding Agency."

55 H. Redwood, T. Fairey, and J. Hasić, "Hybrid Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Participatory Arts and Youth Activism as Vehicles of Social Change," *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 17, no. 1 (2022): 42–57, https://doi.org/10.1177/15423166211066775.

Social media cultivates peacebuilding efforts by mobilising peace actions, building solidarity and maintaining engagement.[56] During events like the Arab Spring, social media facilitates dialogue and mobilises peace initiatives.[57] Social media also helps engage hard-to-reach young people in research and promotes positive mental health by facilitating global connections. It plays a key role in community engagement and risk-prevention initiatives, demonstrating its value in reaching and involving young populations for a range of purposes.

Young Asians have turned to social media as part of their peace-related initiatives. In Indonesia and Pakistan, young people use social media for community participation.[58] In Pakistan, the use of social media for storytelling and narrative creation has been highlighted as a means of peacebuilding.[59] The influence of social media on positive youth development and engagement with peacebuilding efforts has also been explored.[60] In Kuwait, young people are described as a tech-savvy generation influenced by social media. This could potentially shape their civic participation and community engagement in nation-building.[61] In efforts to use social media for peacebuilding in Indonesia, the intensity of social media usage has been linked to post-conflict peacebuilding outcomes. A study from the Philippines indicates that social media, when combined with other structural elements, can impact youth agency in peacebuilding endeavours.[62]

These examples show the transformative potential of new media technologies, including social media, in amplifying traditional media for peacebuilding purposes.

Tech companies can enhance stakeholder engagement and value co-creation through social media platforms, to foster collaboration and dialogue among various actors involved in peacebuilding efforts.[63] Tech companies can actively engage with these peace efforts by countering misinformation on social media platforms, which is crucial for promoting peace and stability.[64] By implementing strategies to tackle misinformation effectively, tech companies can help create a more informed and peaceful online environment.

Tech companies can also leverage social media to promote inclusivity and diversity, which are fundamental principles of peacebuilding. By creating platforms that amplify marginalised voices, promote intercultural dialogue and celebrate diversity, tech companies can foster a culture of understanding and respect across diverse communities.[65]

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56 S. Fahmy and S. Hussain, “War or Peace Tweets? The Case of Pakistan,” *Media International Australia* 188, no. 1 (2021): 67–85, https://doi.org/10.1177/1329878x211042432.
57 H. Baytiyeh, “Social Media’s Role in Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Recovery,” *Peace Review* 31, no. 1 (2019): 74–82, https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2019.1613599.
58 R. Ida, M. Saud, and M. Mashud, “An Empirical Analysis of Social Media Usage, Political Learning and Participation among Youth: A Comparative Study of Indonesia and Pakistan,” *Quality & Quantity* 54, no. 4 (2020): 1285–1297, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-020-00985-9.
59 S. Haidar and F. Farrukh, “Peace and Well-Being with Storytelling in TESOL: Exploring Peacebuilding through Voices of English Language Learners in Pakistan,” *TESOL Journal* 14, no. 4 (2023), https://doi.org/10.1002/tesj.736.
60 A. S. Hashmi, M. Hamid, and S. M. A. Hashmi, “Youth, Counter Violent Extremism and (Social) Media: A Case of Pakistan,” *NUST Journal of International Peace & Stability* 5, no. 1 (2022): 61–72, https://doi.org/10.37540/njips.v5i1.122.
61 R. Lakshminarayanan, “Youth Development in Kuwait: Dimensions of Civic Participation and Community Engagement towards Nation Building,” *Digest of Middle East Studies* 29, no. 2 (2020): 230–250, https://doi.org/10.1111/dome.12221.
62 Ragandang, “Social Media and Youth Peacebuilding Agency.”
63 G. D. Şakar and E. S. Balci, “Stakeholder Engagement and Value Co-Creation via Social Media: A Case Study of Container Shipping Companies,” *Celal Bayar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 17, no. 2 (2019): 293–324, https://doi.org/10.18026/cbayarsos.585270.
64 J. Roozenbeek, E. Culloty, and J. Suiter, “Countering Misinformation,” *European Psychologist* 28, no. 3 (2023): 189–205, https://doi.org/10.1027/1016-9040/a000492.
65 A. Chatchalermpol, W. Pongsuwan, and L. Vajropala, “Social Media Perception Affecting the Business of PTT Public Company Limited,” *Information Management and Business Review* 8, no. 3 (2016): 58–64, https://doi.org/10.22610/imbr.v8i3.1332.

5 Different Names, not CVE Exactly: An Overview of Youth-Led CVE Initiatives in Asia

Looking at the broader picture of youth-led, online CVE initiatives involving young Asian people, at least three levels of engagement can be identified.[66] These forms of engagement are not explicitly labelled as CVE. They may have different names, but all are geared towards challenging ideas and acts that are violent and extreme in nature.

First Level: Direct Condemnation of Violent Extremism

The first level involves young people using the social media to directly condemn violent forms and acts of extremism. In this category, young people express their denunciation of violent extremism, including acts of violence, bombings, terrorist attacks, radicalisation and extremism.

Figure 1. The hashtag #KamiTidakTakut went viral in Indonesia with netizens expressing their opposition to a bombing

66 Hussain and Saltman (2014) offer a dichotomy of online CVE programmes: positive and negative. Positive measures encompass strategies aimed at "challenging extremist narratives and propaganda by generating counter-content". Conversely, negative measures entail strategies designed to "block, filter, take down, or censor extremist content." See G. Hussain and E. M. Saltman, "Jihad Trending: A Comprehensive Analysis of Online Extremism and How to counter it," Quilliam, 2014, https://preventviolentextremism.info/jihad-trending-comprehensive-analysis-online-extremism-and-how-counter-it.

In Indonesia, the hashtag #KamiTidakTakut (Bahasa for 'we are not afraid') emerged as a motivational response following a bombing.[67] In Iraq, young people have launched numerous campaigns on Facebook and Twitter, opposing military operations and advocating the liberation of major cities from militant groups. Similarly, in Morocco, young people use Facebook to share diverse content, including images and texts, to counter and challenge IS narratives.[68] These findings offer valuable pointers for crafting effective public anti-terrorism campaigns. Young people engage directly with these issues online by posting images of attacks, sharing emergency hotlines and organising campaigns to condemn violent extremism in all its forms.

Figure 2. Afghan Youth Organization posted on its Facebook page the photo of a woman and her story of being a victim of extremist groups

67 J. Oktavianus and B. Davidson, "Countering Terrorism on Social Media: An Analysis of Online Anti-Terrorism Movement in Indonesia," *Communication and the Public* 8, no. 4 (2023): 308–323, https://doi.org/10.1177/20570473231189898.

68 S. Alava, D. Frau-Meigs, and G. Hassan, "Youth and Violent Extremism on Social Media: Mapping the Research," UNESCO Publishing, 2017, https://doi.org/10.54675/STTN2091.

Second Level: Preventive Measures Addressing Root Causes

The second level involves young people engaged in preventive measures to combat the emergence of violent extremism. Here, young people focus on addressing the factors that contribute to violence and extremist ideas, advocating social change in a preventive sense. This involves addressing issues such as abuse, discrimination, cultural differences and intolerance, lack of acceptance, socioeconomic disparities and political grievances. In the Philippines, students at Xavier University – Ateneo de Cagayan launched the 'I am Mindanao' campaign to challenge the threat of violent extremism from groups like the Maute Group, inspired by IS, by advocating inter-cultural dialogue across communities in Mindanao.[69]

In Indonesia, youth-led social media initiatives are gaining traction in countering intolerant values and encouraging political engagement among young individuals. Similarly, Hariningsih explores how Facebook is used in Bogor-West Java to challenge extremist ideologies and promote inclusivity and tolerance.[70] Through their advocacy efforts, these young people work to challenge violent extremism in preventive ways, seeking to address underlying factors that may turn an extremist idea into a violent one.

Third Level: Promotion of Positive Values and Behaviours

The third level concerns the promotion of positive values and behaviours by young people as a means of CVE. Here, young people advocate positive messaging, active participation and good citizenship to foster a culture of peace and inclusivity. They use social media platforms to spread messages of kindness, empathy, cooperation and mutual respect, with the aim of building stronger communities and preventing violence. This approach focuses on reminding individuals of their inherent goodness and encourages positive behaviour as a counter to extremist ideologies. Through their efforts, these young people aim to promote a culture of peace and resilience, emphasising the importance of constructive engagement and collective responsibility in combatting violent extremism.

In the Arab world – which has more than 81.3 million social media users, most of whom are young people – platforms like Facebook and Twitter serve as tools for collective expression around current issues, conflicts and wars.[71] In Bangladesh, youth-led efforts are aimed at sharing positive messages and influencing cooperation among CVE practitioners through mobile apps, rather than taking down or censoring online extremist content. However, a key problem is that these apps are not promoted well, so they do not reach many people.[72]

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69 S. Pedroza, "'I am Mindanao' Campaign Goes Global," Xavier University-Ateneo de Cagayan, 2017, https://www.xu.edu.ph/xavier-news/63-2017-2018/2607-i-am-mindanao-campaign-goes-global.

70 A. S. Hariningsih, "The Utilization of Facebook as a Social Media Platform to Counter the Propagation of Intolerant Values among Youth of Desa Ciasmara Bogor-West Java," in Procedings of the 1st ICA Regional Conference, ICA 2019, Bali, Indonesia, October 16–17, 2019, https://doi.org/10.4108/eai.16-10-2019.2304296.

71 F. Salem, R. Mourtada, and S. Alshaer, "Citizen Engagement and Public Services in the Arab World: The Potential of Social Media," Dubai School of Government – Governance and Innovation Program. Arab Social Media Report, 6th edition, 2014.

72 L. Barua and A. A. Kafy, "Countering Violent Extremism Using Social Media and Preventing Implementable Strategies for Bangladesh," *Heliyon* 7, no. 5 (2021), e07121. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2021.e07121.



Figure 3. A young Bangladeshi youth leader engaged with the organisation Youth for Peace in a webinar on positive messaging

Offline and Online Youth-Led CVE Initiatives

A defining feature of these youth-led CVE initiatives is the dynamic blend of offline and online strategies. In Sri Lanka, many youth initiatives are predominantly organised offline (in-person). These initiatives are then showcased on social media channels, and disseminated primarily in the form of videos, photos and quotes.[73] These materials are sourced from various community interactions, including events, recorded webinars and local gatherings. The strategic emphasis on offline approaches aims to target regions with limited internet access or where in-person activities align more effectively with their objectives.

One issue affecting these youth-led CVE initiatives is the lack of formal networks. They operate sporadically and individually. We see this in Sri Lanka, where young people operate independently within their respective circles of influence. Instead of working together as a cohesive group, they engage in peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives in their own individual ways.[74]

Some initiatives stem from academic requirements or voluntary associations. Funding for these endeavours varies, with some emerging organically from grassroots efforts. Others receive support from seed funding. Limited resources and manpower present significant challenges to their sustainability and effectiveness. Partnerships and donations come from diverse sources, including local and international foundations, government agencies and social media giants like Facebook.[75] However, the specific details of these relationships often remain opaque, complicating efforts to fully gauge their impact.

73 "Young People Countering Hate Speech on Social Media in Sri Lanka," Search for Common Ground – Sri Lanka, 2019, https://documents.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/SFCG-SRI_Lanka_Rapid_Conflict_Assessment_on_Hate_Speech_2019.pdf.
74 "Young People Countering Hate Speech."
75 UNESCO mobilises youth to prevent and respond to online extremism by fostering alternative discourses, combating hate speech and building stakeholder capacity, while upholding fundamental freedoms. See "Preventing Violent Extremism through Education: A Guide for Policy-Makers," UNESCO, 2017, https://doi.org/10.54675/BAUW5133.

Figure 4. A youth organisation in Afghanistan Laaluanar showcasing the online reach of its CVE initiatives (photo by Laaluanar)

Youth-led CVE initiatives in Asia leverage social media platforms – notably Facebook, X and Instagram – to disseminate their content. The primary target audience remains young people, with content carefully crafted to engage with their interests and address their concerns effectively. These initiatives may vary seasonally, especially where they are funded through specific projects or grants. This results in fluctuations in activity throughout the year.[76]

Online content serves two purposes. Some initiatives target local communities, with content tailored to resonate locally, reflecting language use and addressing specific grassroots issues. Other initiatives extend their primary focus beyond the local community, particularly with English-language content that addresses global issues, offering the potential to extend international reach.

76 Interview with a Filipino youth leader via Zoom, January 7, 2024.

6 Unpacking the Digital Landscape of Youth-Led CVE Work

This section presents key insights into the operational strategies of 13 CVE youth organisations and their use of online space. It includes discussions on their preferred social media platform, the nature of their posts, and level of engagement they gain online.

Young people's experiences of navigating online spaces and their perspectives on what constitutes violent and extreme content have been overlooked, despite growing concerns about online youth radicalisation and the shift towards far-right extremism superseding IS propaganda.[77] The photos below provide examples of the content found in the online posts related to CVE by Team Pakigsandurot,[78] one of the 13 organisations that operate primarily on social media.

Preferred Social Media Platform

Seven of the 13 youth-led organisations use the online space as the primary platform for CVE. Eight of them use the online space but only to document their offline (in-person) activities.

These organisations' operations are therefore dual in nature: some mainly operate through the online space, while others use social media as a platform for the documentation of their CVE activities.

The eight organisations – KRIS (Philippines), Youth for Peace Movement Davao de Oro (Philippines), United Voice for Peace Network Inc. (Philippines), Global Peace Youth (Philippines), Students Against Violence Everywhere, Paiman Alumni Trust, Sri Lanka Unites, Youth for Peace (Cambodia) – which use social media as a secondary platform are those which mainly conduct CVE activities offline or on the ground and propagate their achievements or events by posting them online. The five remaining organisations – Sambisig, Team Pakigsandurot, MasterPeace, Youth for Peace Philippines Cordillera Youth Brigade and College of Youth Activism and Development – mainly operate on digital platforms, as they are less active on the ground.

All the youth-led organisations are similar in the types of online post they share on their respective accounts. Their posts include pictures, videos, quotations, infographics, shared posts and webinars. This is not to say, however, that they cover similar subjects in their posts. As mentioned earlier, those youth groups that use their accounts as secondary platforms post content about their CVE activities on the

77 Frissen T 2021. "Internet, the great radicalizer? Exploring relationships between seeking for online extremist materials and cognitive radicalization in young adults." *Computers in Human Behavior* 114: 106549. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2020.106549

78 Photos used with permission from Team Pakigsandurot.

ground (in person). Whereas those engaged with digital CVE activities mainly post webinars and infographics of activities such as online competitions, awarding ceremonies and podcast series.

Over half of the youth-led organisations operate on more than one social media platform. While Facebook is common to all of them, most of the organisations are also present on other social media platforms, such as X and Instagram. Cross-posting is a practice common to all of them, and involves copying and pasting a particular post simultaneously across more than one digital platform.

Despite the fact that the organisations use more than one social media platform, the level of engagement of their posts – and even their follower metrics – varies considerably between social media platforms. For instance, most organisations engage well on Facebook but are less engaged on Instagram and X. Their preference for Facebook (as the most used platform) reflects the accessibility and familiarity of the platform for young people. Facebook, considered one of the largest social networking sites,[79] was the first social network to surpass one billion registered accounts and currently has more than three billion monthly active users.[80] Some studies have noted that people in Southeast Asia, particularly Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, are 'living digital lifestyles'.[81] Surveys also show that much of online activity happens on Facebook itself, and as of January 2019, the Philippines ranked second in terms of its number of Facebook users, with almost 80 million subscribers.[82] Beyond this engagement, the existence of a lightweight version of Facebook (Free FB)[83] is pervasive among Filipino users as it allows them to navigate social media without any charges or fees.

Youth Organisations' Posts and Online Engagement

The study accumulated 130 social media posts, through online data scraping. These posts are from the social media accounts of all the 13 cited youth-led organisations engaged in PCVE. Ten randomly selected social media posts, from between January 2013 and December 2023, were taken from each organisation. The purpose was to assess the level of engagement of each post, in terms of reacts (e.g., likes) and shares. We assessed the impact and reach of young people's online, CVE-related strategies, regardless of whether the online platform was used as a secondary space to support their advocacy.

This means that even if the organisation's main strategy focuses on offline activities, we still analyse the effectiveness of their online efforts.

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79 Aida Abdulahi, Behrang Samadi, and Behrooz Gharleghi, "A Study on the Negative Effects of Social Networking Sites such as Facebook among Asia Pacific University Scholars in Malaysia," *International Journal of Business and Social Science* 5, no. 10 (September 2014), https://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol_5_No_10_September_2014/18.pdf.

80 Stacy Jo Dixon, "Most Popular Social Networks Worldwide as of October 2023, Ranked by Number of Monthly Active Users," Statista, February 2, 2024, https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/.

81 "Southeast Asians Emerge on Digital," Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/business/news/insights/southeast-asians-emerge-on-digital.

82 "Number of Facebook Users in Southeast Asia as of January 2019, by Country" Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/193056/facebook-user-numbers-in-asian-countries/.

83 Free FB is a feature provided by some telecommunications companies in the Philippines, which allows users to access a limited version of Facebook without incurring data charges. With Free FB, users can browse their Facebook feed, view and like posts, and send messages without using up their mobile data allocation. This service is particularly popular among Filipino users who may have limited access to mobile data or prefer to conserve their data usage while staying connected on social media.

Figure 5. Word cloud of the common terms used by the cited organisations in their PCVE-related social media posts (figure developed by the author)

While the selected organisations all advocate against violent extremism, not all of them use the term CVE in their social media posts. However, they share a number of words that substitute for the term *preventing and countering violent extremism* (PCVE). Figure 5 shows the terms that youth organisations commonly use in their posts. The words *peace* and *youth* emerge as the most frequently used, reflecting the nature of the organisations and the core advocacy they espouse. Other common terms young people use in their posts include *peacebuilding, harmony, advocates, cultural* and *peace-builders*.

Figure 6 shows the alternative terms young people use in referring to PCVE. These terms include *peacebuilding, peace, tolerance, diversity* and *reconciliation*. They reflect how young people adopt PCVE advocacy to support Asia's cultural diversity and help challenge extremism and violence.

Young people also vary the hashtags they use for each group. Each organisation uses tags that include the organisation name or its abbreviation. They also include hashtags related to the activity and the names of the organisation they are collaborating with. None of them shared common tags in their PCVE-related posts.

Figure 6. Word cloud of alternative terminologies for PCVE used by the cited organisations in their social media posts (figure developed by the author)

As discussed in the Methods section, this report categorises the posts' social engagement as good, decent and poor, based on their reacts and shares. Figure 7a shows that of the 130 social media posts, approximately 16% have good social media engagement. This means that only 21 posts garner more than 1,000 forms of reacts (such as likes) or shares. Meanwhile, 24%, or 31 posts are decent enough to gain 101–1,000 reacts or shares. On the other hand, 60% of the posts have fewer than 100 reacts or shares, which implies that these posts have poor levels of social media engagement.



Figures 7a & b. Post engagement based on reacts and shares (figure developed by the author)

Figure 7b showed interesting results. While the number of reacts is a significant factor when consider the reach of posts, Figure 7b proved otherwise. As the graph illustrated, none of the PCVE-related posts have good engagement in terms of shares. This is the case even with the 16% of them that initially had more than 1,000 reacts. 4% of the posts were decent enough to gain 101–1,000 shares. The data show that most of the posts that fall within this range gained good social media engagement in terms of shares. On the other hand, 96% of posts had poor engagement levels, meaning they each received fewer than 100 shares.



Figure 8. A photo from Team Pakigsandurot's project on Islamnotphobia, showing intercultural engagement among university students

The capacity of each organisation to create engaging posts in terms of layout and design editing is also considered. Interestingly, the majority of the cited organisations have decent to good levels of attractive posts. Features contributing to the overall appeal of the page include infographics, videos and posts.

At present, young people are considered to have a deeper knowledge and understanding of the intricacies of technologies, especially those of the digital world, which older people tend to struggle to navigate.

Some posts, although appealing, do not have a substantial number of reacts or shares. This could mean that audience engagement is reliant on the appeal of the posts, and that the content itself needs to be relevant to people's individual circumstances and interests.

Figure 9. Youth organisation in the Philippines running a positive messaging photo exhibition on university premises – an example of an offline activity that is common among the organisations

7 Youth-Led Organisations and CVE

Most of the organisations in the study are fairly new, having being established in the past ten years. The oldest organisation included in the study was formed in 2004. Eleven of the 13 organisations were formed between 2011 and 2020, while the remaining two were formed in 2004 and 2005, respectively. The establishment of the organisations themselves didn't always coincide with the creation of their social media presence (such as a Facebook page, Twitter account or Instagram profile). Some organisations set up their social media at a later stage.

All the organisations have established their social media presence in the last decade, at a time when social media was rising rapidly as a versatile platform for interaction and engagement. This is particularly true of Facebook, which has enjoyed continual growth since 2008.[84] This point is especially significant given the popularity of Facebook in the Philippines – where most of the organisations being analysed are located – compared with other social media platforms such as Twitter or Instagram.[85]

Despite being primarily characterised as youth organisations, not all were formed or are led by young people themselves. Only nine of the 13 were created and are currently led by young people, four of which are known to have been established by students in their respective schools or universities.

Conversely, while these remaining four may employ the services and heavily involve the active participation of young people – particularly in the conceptualisation and implementation of projects or activities – they are organised under the auspices of either a government office or an older, private individual engaged in peacebuilding efforts or youth-related advocacy. For instance, in the Philippines, MasterPeace was established by the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace, Reconciliation and Unity, to support government peacebuilding efforts in the country. Some organisations are also localised offshoots of larger non-governmental organisations (NGO), either local or international, that aim to expand the reach of larger NGOs.

Although these organisations were created for different purposes, with at least two formed as part of an educational requirement, their origins remain fundamentally similar, and they are notably altruistic in nature, that is to say, not for profit. Most of these youth organisations began small, starting with students or youth leaders in their respective areas,

84 E. Ortiz-Ospina, "The Rise of Social Media" OurWorldInData.org, 2019, https://ourworldindata.org/rise-of-social-media.

85 However, it is worth noting that other social media platforms like TikTok are gaining increasing attention from young people, which may require organizations to adjust their strategies (See Vogels, E., Gelles-Watnick, R., and Massarat, N., 2022. Teens, Social Media and Technology 2022. *Pew Research Center*, https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2022/08/10/teens-social-media-and-technology-2022/

while the rest were formed by government, private individuals or larger NGOs, the advocacy work of which specifically targeted young people themselves or at the very least included them.

Such advocacy is often far-reaching and not necessarily limited to PCVE, but concerned with violence in general. For instance, one organisation also promotes issues such as human rights, gender equality, inclusivity, tolerance and peace, while simultaneously claiming to advocate the prevention of violent extremism. Another was created as a means for government to engage with young people in peacebuilding as part of the broader pursuit of government policies aimed particularly at CVE.

Three closely related organisations were formed by undergraduate students as part of a course requirement, only to expand their offline and online operations considerably upon receiving substantial funding (around 1,000 USD) from Facebook to boost their online presence, as revealed during our interviews with two youth organisations in the Philippines.

These organisations subsequently became semi-active and completely inactive around 2018 to 2023, as one was dependent on a project timeline, while the other two closed when their student leaders graduated. This shows that it is important to bear in mind that some youth-based organisations are established and run programmes with fixed durations and end dates. They will inevitably close if there is no established continuity plan beyond the graduation of their core members.

Meanwhile, the remaining ten of the 13 organisations are evenly divided between active and semi-active. As discussed in the Methods section, we differentiate between active and semi-active in terms of a year's online presence and frequency of posts.

Semi-active organisations are characterised by having a clear online presence within one year, but its most recent posts were several months ago, so updates are irregular. They are notably variable, in that not all pages exhibit the same frequency of social media activity. In one particular instance, the most recent post is six months old but was mentioned by another page only one month previously. This means that absence of posts is not conclusive of an organisation's inactivity. For active organisations, however, some have posts as recent as December 2023, but activity is never a guarantee of engagement with the target demographic, as discussed earlier.

These youth organisations often start small and organic, but with continuous activity, they eventually attract the attention of donors and partners. This strengthens their capabilities and the scope and quality of their activities considerably. However, such support is often limited to offline activities, and except for two cases, seldom involve efforts exclusively centred on social media. This may reflect a practical concern for both actors (i.e., youth organisations and donors or partners) – while social media is indeed a powerful platform nowadays, in regions such as South and Southeast Asia, offline activities are considered more practical and are generally deemed to be more likely to produce positive results in countering violent extremism. This is evident in the organisations' current activities and in the way they operate their social media accounts as a platform to share or promote their offline activities.

8 Highlights of Asian Youth-Led CVE Initiatives

This section briefly discusses highlights of young Asians' engagement in CVE work, beyond those organisations selected for this report. The term *highlights* is deliberately used in preference to *successes*, as success can be hard to determine. Highlights include the achievements young people claim as their own while engaging in CVE work.

A key highlight of youth-led CVE initiatives concerns EdVenture's Peer to Peer: Facebook Global Digital Challenge (P2P). With support from Facebook and the US Department of State, Asian university students were invited to participate in the P2P campaign on CVE, as a result of their positive messaging.[86]

In Pakistan, organisations such as the Youth Association for Development and the Pakistan Youth Alliance are actively engaged in countering violent extremism through digital initiatives, empowering young people through online education and community engagement.[87] Similarly, in Malaysia, the Malaysian Youth Council hosts online forums, workshops and campaigns to address radicalisation and foster social cohesion among young people. Meanwhile, in Sri Lanka, the Grassrooted Trust conducts digital workshops and advocacy campaigns to empower youth, build resilience against extremist ideologies, and promote peace and reconciliation in society.[88]

In Bangladesh, the organisation Young Power in Social Action has successfully developed an app aimed at combatting violent extremism through community engagement in the Cox's Bazar district. The app offers flipcharts and leaflets which highlight the roles and responsibilities of students and youth cohorts in CVE.[89] In Afghanistan, the youth organisation Laaluanar gained almost 2.5 million of online impressions[90] and more than 150,000 likes on its Facebook posts.

The Filipino 'I Am Mindanao' campaign at Xavier University – Ateneo de Cagayan ran offline peace seminars. It also created online content such as educational materials and short documentaries on violent extremism, which have reached around five million people online.[91] According to the P2P website, more successful youth-led campaigns can be found in EdVenture, which has implemented more than 600 P2P programmes in more than 75 countries, generating 250 million online and offline impressions since its inception.

86 "Peer to Peer: Facebook Global Digital Challenge," EdVenture Partners, https://www.edventurepartners.com/peer-to-peer-facebook-global-digital-challenge.
87 "Youth Association for Development," https://yad.org.pk/.
88 "The Grassrooted Trust," http://www.grassrooted.net/.
89 Barua and Kafy, "Countering Violent Extremism."
90 "Impressions" refer to the number of times your content is displayed on someone's screen, whether or not they interact with it.
91 Pedroza, "'I Am Mindanao'."

It is important to note that while metrics such as online impressions and reach provide valuable insights into the impact of youth-led CVE initiatives across Asia, they should not be the sole measure of success. These initiatives represent more than statistics: they embody the dedication, passion and resilience of young people towards CVE in their communities.

Careful consideration must be given to the effects (if not impact) that these initiatives have on the lives of young people, particularly the young activists themselves. Small-scale youth initiatives are integral parts of the larger, global CVE movement. Each initiative contributes to a broader narrative of empowerment, resilience and positive change, demonstrating the collective efforts of young people to create a more peaceful and inclusive world. As support for youth-led CVE initiatives continues, evaluation should in part look at the transformative impact these initiatives have on individuals and communities, beyond mere numbers.

9 Challenges Young People Faced in Running Online CVE Initiatives

This section outlines the challenges encountered by young people when running CVE initiatives on online platforms. These challenges range from navigating the intricate balance between positive and negative measures, to overcoming financial hurdles and grappling with algorithmic complexities. They underline the multifaceted nature of the experiences young people undergo when engaging in CVE work in the digital age.

i. Communication and Integration Challenges

By communication and integration challenges, we refer to difficulties young people face in coordinating and aligning the online and offline activities of CVE initiatives, and difficulties in recognising the interconnected nature of these activities. The lack of internet access and digital literacy of people from marginalised communities is what mainly underpins this dichotomy.

An internationally recognised CVE organisation from Bangladesh, in interview, strongly emphasised the limitations of the internet as the greatest challenge. The organisation struggles to see online and offline efforts as complementary elements. This perceived dichotomy between online and offline activities may lead to a fragmented approach in the framing of future activities, possibly resulting in the complete separation of the various dynamics of CVE methods – traditional and digital – as opposed to one interconnected initiative with complementary elements.

In interview, one organisation said that despite the fact that traditional peacebuilding activities tend to foster more meaningful engagement and participation due to the socioeconomic barriers faced by their target groups, they still believe in using both elements as complementary methods because reaching the demographics is only a part of the overall aim of engagement and connectivity.

Overcoming this challenge requires strategic efforts to bridge the digital divide, making internet access more equitable and equipping targeted communities with the necessary skills to participate meaningfully in online CVE activities. Bridging this perceived dichotomy requires a paradigm shift, acknowledging the synergies between online and offline activities, and fostering a holistic approach that capitalises on the strengths of both domains for more effective CVE outcomes.

ii. Resourcing and Engagement Challenges

The financial hurdles in CVE online engagement present another challenge for young people. Managing social media pages, a key component of these initiatives, entails costs that may not be readily apparent. Despite the common perception that online engagement is less costly, the reality is often different. Small organisations, such as student-led initiatives, may find it challenging to allocate resources to content creation and engagement strategies.

In one of the interviews with Team Pakigsandurot, a youth-led organisation in the Philippines, they shared that they had to rely on a one-off grant from a tech company to organise competitions and attract subscribers to its page.[92] While social media offers a platform for engagement, the digital landscape demands a strategic and dynamic approach, through which organisations must produce consistent, interactive, and visually appealing content to stand out and compete with other online content, in order to capture and retain the attention of their audience. That being the case, the content activities carried out by Team Pakigsandurot required funds to sustain impactful presence.

Despite making full use of digital platforms, the notion that managing social media pages comes without financial cost is undermined by the competitive nature of the internet. The challenge lies not just in creating content but in ensuring its relevance and attractiveness to garner wider engagement. Recognising and addressing the competitive nature of the online environment is essential for the sustainability and success of youth-led CVE efforts in the online space.

Addressing the financial challenges involved in sustaining an impactful online presence requires strategic planning and resource allocation, as well as the exploration of sustainable funding models for youth-based organisations to ensure the longevity and effectiveness of their online CVE initiatives.

iii. Team Dynamics and Content Production Challenges

Another set of challenges young people face in online CVE work lies in managing social media pages effectively. It is crucial to have a team that has the time and ability to edit a range of online content types. These include infographics, infomercials, memes and date-specific posts, all of which play a crucial role in shaping a compelling narrative online.

Here, a diverse team will help produce richer and more inclusive content, which will be more relatable to a wider audience. Editing emerges as a vital way to give clarity, accuracy and visual appeal to materials shared online. The importance of diversity and editing skills are therefore essential for strengthening the impact and increasing the reach of online CVE efforts.

It is clear that youth-led CVE usually emerges as an educational requirement, which explains why some initiatives eventually disappear. This was the case with one of our interviewed organisations.

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92 Interview with a Filipino youth leader via Zoom, January 6, 2024.

Core members finished their studies and are now pursuing their own career paths.

Localised initiatives within the landscape of online CVE efforts led by young people can also make or break the perception of an organisation. Some initiatives can be over-localised, limiting their potential impact and reach. The content may be too specific for or even incomprehensible to a broader audience. Addressing these challenges requires a strategic shift towards more inclusive content that resonates with a broader audience in tandem with sustained efforts to keep initiatives active despite the changing circumstances of core members.

iv. Existence of Violent and Extremist Content[93]

Social media attention and algorithmic challenges are significant obstacles faced by young people engaged in online CVE initiatives. Capturing public attention in the vast and dynamic landscape of social media is a difficult task. The challenge is exacerbated by competing extremist content and the complexities introduced by algorithms that affect content visibility.[94] The difficulty lies not only in producing visually appealing content about CVE but also in ensuring that such content effectively challenges violent and extremist content.

The sheer volume of content available on social media, together with algorithms that match content to individual preferences, makes it challenging for counter-narratives to gain traction. Individuals who initially follow a page based on a particular narrative may be consistently exposed to similar content, creating a potential echo-chamber effect. Overcoming these challenges demands that young people have a nuanced understanding of social media dynamics, strategic content creation, and potentially advocate for transparency in how algorithms work, to ensure a fair and balanced online discourse. This involves pushing for clearer information about how algorithms decide what content is shown to users, how they rank or filter content, and how they might influence online interactions and visibility.

v. Strategic and Accountability Challenges

The dichotomy of positive and negative measures presents a critical challenge for online CVE initiatives led by young people. Positive measures, focused on producing and spreading counter-arguments against violent extremism, emphasise constructive efforts to challenge extremist narratives. In contrast, negative measures involve the blocking and removal of internet content, a strategy with its own complexities and potential drawbacks, as it may be prone to misuse and censorship.

93 "Violent and extremist content" includes material that promotes violence or radical ideologies. Violent content depicts or encourages violence, while extremist content supports extreme beliefs or ideologies, often aiming to recruit or radicalize individuals (see A. Ware, L. Kelly & GG.reg Barton (2023) Development NGO responses to countering violent extremism and hate, Conflict, Security & Development, 23:5, 367–383, DOI: 10.1080/14678802.2023.2283335)

94 G. Denoeux and L. Carter, "Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism," USAID, 2009, https://www.cvereferenceguide.org/en/resource/guide-drivers-violent-extremism; M. Fernandez, M. Asif, and H. Alani, "Understanding the Roots of Radicalisation on Twitter," Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Web Science – WebSci '18," 2018, DOI:10.1145/3201064.3201082.

The challenge lies in finding a balanced approach that effectively combats violent extremism while guarding against unintended consequences. Hussein and Saltman's[95] categorisation of these measures highlights the need for a comprehensive strategy which goes beyond content removal to actively promote alternative narratives and counter-extremist perspectives. Striking this balance requires careful consideration of the potential impact and ethical implications associated with both positive and negative measures in the context of online CVE.

The role and accountability of tech companies are key. Currently, responsibility for negative measures, such as content monitoring and removal, often rests with individuals. However, there is a growing recognition that entrusting such responsibility with tech companies, which have the necessary resources and expertise, could yield more effective results. This suggests that tech companies need to recruit specialists dedicated to monitoring and identifying potentially harmful content. This will centralise accountability and potentially mitigate issues around misuse and censorship that may arise when individuals are tasked with content control.

Recognising the influential role tech companies play in shaping online spaces, there are calls for those organisations to help counter violent extremism. This could involve content moderation and integrating positive measures within their corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives, fostering a more proactive and collaborative approach to building a safer online environment.

The competitive nature of online space means that young people need to learn more sustainable strategies. Here, engagement between young people and tech giants (via CSR) becomes crucial. Rather than focusing exclusively on content removal, the incorporation of positive measures by tech companies (detailed in the Recommendations section below) would strengthen CVE as a strategy. This could involve expanding the reach of CVE organisations' content, providing funding or establishing partnerships. Such engagement would enhance advocacy and help dismantle violent extremist groups online.

95 G. Hussain and E. M. Saltman, "Jihad Trending: A Comprehensive Analysis."

10 Recommendations

Tech companies have a significant role to play in addressing the challenges faced by youth-led online CVE initiatives in Asia. These initiatives often lack sustainability and cohesion, emerging sporadically without established networks and relying heavily on funding. Moreover, as young people transition into adulthood, the focus of these initiatives may shift, leading to organisational instability and eventual decline.

Tech companies can support existing youth organisations rather than create new initiatives. Support might involve establishing a support network for youth-led CVE organisations or organising conferences to gather and connect existing youth-led initiatives. By fostering collaboration and providing resources for capacity-building, tech companies could enhance the sustainability and effectiveness of CVE youth-led efforts.

Most youth organisations in Asia use online platforms as a way of promoting their offline CVE efforts.[96] The reality that many communities in Asia struggle with communications technology should be emphasised.

Following the data presented relevant to online CVE youth-led efforts, as well as our aim to explore how tech companies can benefit from supporting these initiatives, this section presents the recommendations of the study.

Our approach in framing these recommendations is two-pronged – to strengthen both tech companies and CVE youth groups. Efforts and improvements should be mutual in order to achieve the overarching goal of addressing violent extremism.

- *Training and support for young people:* Our first recommendation focuses on content creation training and social media literacy. An analysis of youth groups with low engagement on social media reveals a common factor – poor quality of posts. By poor in this context, we refer to unattractive publication materials and unappealing captions. Consumers tend not to treat this content seriously, resulting in lower engagement. As a solution, tech companies may fund the training of youth groups, particularly with workshops on how to improve the quality of online posts.[97] The overall goal is to improve online engagement of peace-related content.

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96 Ah Ram Lee and J. Suzanne Horsley, "The Role of Social Media on Positive Youth Development: An Analysis of 4-H Facebook Page and 4-H'ers' Positive Development," *Children and Youth Services Review* 77 (2017): 127–138; Ibrahim Natil, "Introducing Challenges to Youth Civic Engagement and Local Peacebuilding," in *Youth Civic Engagement and Local Peacebuilding in the Middle East and North Africa* (Routledge, 2021), 1–12; C. E. Uzuegbunam and N. O. Omenugha, " Mainstream Media, Social Media and Peace-Building in Nigeria: Old Challenges, New Opportunities?" *The Nigerian Journal of Communication* 15, no. 2 (2018): 519–534.

97 I. Idris, "Media/Communications on Peacebuilding/Social Cohesion/Changing Prevailing Narratives on Conflict," GSDRC, 2–19, https://gsdrc.org/publications/media-communications-on-peacebuilding-social-cohesion-changing-prevailing-narratives-on-conflict/; Tellidis and Kappler, "Information and Communication Technologies," 75–93; Uzuegbunam and Omenugha, "Mainstream Media," 519–534.

- *Strengthening offline activities:* With Asia as the focus of this study, the report also recommends strengthening offline activities. Our findings show that most youth groups in Asia use social media as a platform for announcements and documentation rather than a primary means of conducting anti-violent extremism work. One reason for this is slow internet connections. We recommend that tech companies consider supporting young people's offline activities to the same degree as their online efforts. This will make youth groups more sustainable and potentially improve the quality of their offline activities. Not only that, their events will also garner more traction, relative to the popularity of the sponsoring tech company.[98] Since youth groups mostly use offline events as their primary source of online content, improving such events should improve their online presence as well.

- *Enhancing communication and collaboration with young people:* Tech companies might consider expanding their communication channels to engage with younger individuals who could be potential funding recipients. Such an initiative would aim to enhance the efficiency of communication between the companies and younger demographics. One of our interviewees suggested that tech companies could even hire youth groups that are solely dedicated in carrying out such endeavours in order to mitigate common causes of project termination such as lack of time, conflicts of schedule and lack of funds. This would make it easier for both tech companies and youth groups to identify more opportunities and activists for CVE projects.

  This recommendation stems from the idea that tech companies typically engage with youth groups in peacebuilding projects by contracting a potential partner to execute their plans and proposals. This often involves collaboration between the tech company and the contracted organisation to implement initiatives. The problem with this arrangement is that some youth groups, which offer considerable value and potential, end up get overlooked. They remain unrecognised and invisible to funding institutions, sponsors and contractors.[99]

- *Fostering collaborative online spaces:* We recommend the creation of more collaborative online spaces and networking. Low online engagement is a consistent problem for CVE groups, leading to inactive social media pages. Despite the quality and success of their content, both online and offline, there are instances where online engagements remain low. To address this issue, tech companies may create online spaces where CVE (and CVE-related) youth groups can come together and promote each other's content. These spaces may be either online (with tech companies creating and promoting digital pages and groups) or offline (with the commissioning of multiple groups as one big project). This would expose posts to more people, increase engagement and improve visibility.

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98 Adeshina, "Peace Building and Social Media," 11; Lee and Horsley, "Role of Social Media," 127–138; Natil, "Introducing Challenges," 1–12; Tellidis & Kappler, "Information and communication technologies," 75–93; Uzuegbunam & Omenugha, "Mainstream Media," 519–534.

99 Idris, "Media/Communications on Peacebuilding," 2–19.

- *Modifying search engines for enhanced networking:* Tech companies should consider enhancing their group navigation systems by assigning fixed tags to groups. This innovation would involve introducing predefined and standardised tags that accurately reflect the nature and purpose of each group. By doing so, users searching for specific criteria would have a more streamlined and effective experience, mitigating irrelevant results and helping to identify those groups aligned with their precise interests more easily. Users would immediately know what that group is about – regardless of the group name, photo, or description – if they were tagged as *youth*, *peace*, *peacebuilding*, or even *against violent extremism*. This would increase interconnectivity among people.

  This is based on our experience of data gathering; it was difficult to identify groups that met such specific criteria. For instance, the default search bar on Facebook often displayed irrelevant groups in searches on keywords associated with *peacebuilding*, or *challenging violent extremism* and *youth*. Some groups seemed to meet the criteria, but this was not immediately apparent until their pages were opened. This lack of upfront clarity posed a significant challenge as it required additional steps in the search process, making it more time-consuming and potentially leading to omissions.

- *(Re-)integrating community checks and balances:* Tech companies currently have community systems (such as Facebook's fake news feature and X's community notes) which serve as protective measures to identify and conceal harmful content. However, we propose a broader and more positive application of these community systems. Beyond their role in concealing harmful content, they could also be harnessed to amplify and lend credibility to CVE-related content.

  By expanding the functionality of community systems to support and endorse CVE content, these platforms could contribute positively to online discourse. This approach would not only help mitigate the spread of harmful information, but would also foster a digital environment in which CVE (and peace-related) content is encouraged, recognised and elevated. This would leverage technology proactively to promote constructive discussions and counteract the negative influences that may arise in the online space.

- *Incorporating AI into the sphere:* Tech companies could take advantage of AI to carry out regulatory duties. AI could be used to promote youth groups that advocate peace and, at the same time, remove those that spread violent extremism and other harmful content. This could also be combined with human efforts, especially given that AI systems are error-prone in their early stages of development.[100] To strike a balance, we also suggest that there should also be a team of dedicated individuals manually reviewing both promotions and reports produced by AI.

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100 Ujué Agudo, Karlos G. Liberal, Miren Arrese, and Helena Matute, "The Impact of AI Errors in a Human-in-the-Loop Process," *Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications* 9, no. 1 (2024): 1; Ángel Alexander Cabrera, Abraham J. Druck, Jason I. Hong, and Adam Perer, "Discovering and Validating AI Errors with Crowdsourced Failure Reports," Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 5, no. CSCW2 (2021), 1–22; Sasanka Sekhar Chanda and Debarag Narayan Banerjee, "Omission and Commission Errors Underlying AI Failures," *AI & Society* (2022), 1–24; Amama Mahmood, Jeanie W. Fung, Isabel Won, and Chien-Ming Huang, "Owning Mistakes Sincerely: Strategies for Mitigating AI errors," in Proceedings of the 2022 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, 1–11.

- *Addressing emerging threats:* The 2024 Global Terrorism Threat Assessment emphasises that contemporary threats of violent extremism originate predominantly from domestic terrorists who are motivated by ideologies such as White nationalism, violent misogyny, anti-government extremism and a spectrum of conspiracy theories.[101] This insight emphasises the imperative for tech companies to proactively address these emerging threats and devise strategies to counter them before they gain traction in the digital sphere. By recognising and confronting these dangers at an early stage, technology firms can play a pivotal role in mitigating the spread of extremist ideologies online and safeguarding online spaces from their pernicious influence.

101 "Global Terrorism Threat Assessment 2024," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/global-terrorism-threat-assessment-2024.

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